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Abstract 
BUREAUPATHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: CASE STUDIES OF FRAUD 
HOTLINES by 
Chelsea Binns 
Adviser: Professor F. Warren Benton 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examined the effect of organizati onal bureaucracy on 
fraud hotline performance.  Fraud hotlines are used  to receive anonymous 
fraud tips from employees in all sectors to prevent  and detect fraud.  This 
work contributes to the research on fraud hotlines,  which today is very 
light. This work also examined individual hotline p erformance against 
organization theory, which is absent in the literat ure. The literature also 
doesn’t include studies using social media data to determine organizational 
climate.  This work contributes to that literature by providing a collective 
case study examination of the fraud hotlines in six  organizations.  Their 
hotline performance was examined in light of the Th eory of Bureaucracy.  
According to the literature, the condition of organ izational bureaupathology 
can result in crime concealment, reduced fraud repo rting, and/or reduced 
hotline performance.  
To determine the presence and level of dysfunctiona l organizational 
bureaucracy and bureaupathology with respect to emp loyees, the primary 
audience of fraud hotlines, this study qualitativel y measured employee 
perception of specific bureaucracy and bureaupathol ogy indicators in their 
workplace by examining their company review submiss ions in social media.  
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Hotlines were evaluated using their individual leve l hotline 
metrics/statistics and also by examining their spec ifications, metrics, 
functionality, and adherence to best practices.  In terviews with hotline 
administrators, an evaluation of the level of repor ted organizational fraud, 
and consideration of the historical context was als o considered in evaluating 
the overall performance of the hotlines.   
This study ultimately determined there is no consis tent relationship 
between organizational bureaupathology and hotline performance.  At times, 
where an organization had more bureaupathology, the  hotline tended to perform 
better, in terms of its metrics, functionality and adherence to best 
practices. At other times, hotlines with lower leve ls of bureaupathology 
tended to perform worse than their counterparts.  T hese organizations were in 
the private sector, so the sector where a given hot line is operated may be a 
factor.  
This study further found better functioning hotline s didn’t have less 
internal fraud.  Organizations where employees perc eived a high presence of 
the bureaucracy indicators “Insistence on the Right s of Office” and 
“Impersonal Treatment” tended to have a better adhe rence to hotline best 
practices, yet had a higher instance of internal fr aud in comparison to 
organizations.  In other words, the conditions that  contribute to a 
successful hotline may also give rise to fraud, and  or inhibit fraud 
reporting, in the same organizations.    
This study further determined fraud hotlines might not prevent fraud. 
Regardless of hotline performance, including the nu mber of calls received, 
all of the subject organizations experienced employ ee crime.  
These results are contrary to expectations but cons istent with 
bureaupathology theory, which says that employees i n excessive bureaucracies 
adhere strongly to organizational rules and procedu res and may be incapable 
of responding to unpredictable events. 
 
 
 
vi
As a result of the aforementioned findings, organiz ational hotline 
assessment methodology should consider external fac tors, such as the 
historical context, presence of internal fraud and employee sentiment as 
factors in assessing organizational fraud, in asses sing hotline performance.  
 
Keywords: Theory Of Bureaucracy, Bureaucracy, Burea upathology, Organization 
Theory, Bureaupathic, Bureaucratic, Case Study, Fra ud Hotline, Ethics 
Hotline, Employee Hotline, Public Sector Fraud, Pri vate Sector Fraud, Crime, 
White Collar Crime, Organizational Crime, Corporate  Crime, Financial 
Industry, Employee Crime, Employee Fraud, Corporate  Fraud, Internal Fraud, 
Internal Crime, Glassdoor.com, Social Media, Employ ee Reviews, federal, 
state, city, social media, Glassdoor.com, media, Do dd-Frank Wall Street 
Report and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, The Sar banes Oxley Act of 2002, 
benchmarking, Bank, Company Reviews 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
This central research question of this study is “Do es organizational 
bureaucracy affect fraud hotline performance?”  Thi s study examines the 
relationship between organizational bureaucracy and  fraud hotline performance 
by examining the answers to a series of sub-questio ns to isolate performance 
indicators.  This study employs a case study method  and uses organizations as 
a unit of analysis.  Six organizations’ hotlines ar e analyzed in this study, 
to include two private sector, three government sec tor, and one nonprofit 
sector hotline.  This study focuses on employee cal lers of hotlines, as they 
are the primary audience of fraud hotlines.  This s tudy also focuses on 
internal crime, as that is the type of crime commit ted by employees. 
This study considers the following sub-questions.  Does dysfunctional 
organizational bureaucracy exist in the six subject  organizations?  Do 
employees perceive bureaupathology in the six subje ct organizations?  Does 
bureaupathology result in reduced hotline functiona lity?  Does 
bureaupathology result in low number of hotline cal ls?  Does bureaupathology 
result in reduced best practices compliance? Does b ureaupathology result in 
fraud, waste and abuse? 
To measure the above, the following conditions will  be established: (i) 
state of dysfunctional organizational bureaucracy i n each of the subject 
organizations; (ii) Perception of employees as to b ureaucracy in their 
organizations; (iii) The functionality of the hotli ne; to include the number 
of hotline calls received by the subject organizati on; (iv) The level of 
adherence of best practices compliance by the subje ct organization; and the 
(vi) State of internal fraud, waste and abuse in th e subject organization. 
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To establish the state of dysfunctional organizatio nal bureaucracy, 
this study uses relevant literature, to include org anizational documents and 
media reports.  To determine the perception of empl oyees as to the state of 
bureaucracy in their organizations, this study exam ines social media data in 
the form of employee reviews, for statements sugges ting organizational 
bureaucracy indicators.  To ascertain the number of  calls received to the 
hotline, this study examines individual level fraud  hotline data for each 
organization and compares that to established bench marking levels.  To 
understand the level of adherence of best practice compliance in the subject 
organization, this study examined organizational do cuments, media records and 
other public documents, and evaluated that informat ion against the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. To determi ne the level of internal 
fraud, waste and abuse, in each of the subject orga nizations, this study 
examined media records and other public documents.  
Chapter one explores the significance of the proble m, the theoretical 
basis, the relevant literature, the problem stateme nt and sets forth the 
research question.  Chapter two explores the defini tion, use, value and 
performance of fraud hotlines.  It also sets forth the major historical 
developments in the area of fraud hotlines, which r esulted in the creation of 
legislation requiring their use in publicly listed companies.  This chapter 
also summarizes the Theory of Bureaucracy and the c urrent literature relevant 
to the research question, regarding the relationshi p between bureaucracy and 
fraud hotlines. Chapter three discusses the researc h methodology employed in 
this work, and will define the variables, set forth  the research design, 
discuss the threats to validity, and data analyzed.   Chapter four describes 
the case studies conducted for each of the six orga nizations.  Chapter 5 
evaluates the summary, conclusions and the key rese arch findings. This 
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chapter also reviews the policy implications and su ggestions for future 
research. 
Significance of the Problem 
Employee crime has persisted despite the existence of fraud hotlines.  
Fraud hotlines are advanced by legislation as a fra ud prevention and 
detection tool.  Hotlines were required by legislat ion as a measure to 
protect the public in the wake of massive employee crime.  The assumption of 
the legislation enacted from 2002-2010 was that emp loyees would use hotlines 
to report fraud. Employees are said to know about c rime occurring in their 
organizations.  Hotlines are receiving tips, yet th ese tips are not thwarting 
major crime.   
Hotlines cannot be sufficiently analyzed using the data available, and 
methods commonly employed, today.  Today, there are  no reporting standards 
for hotline data.  Organizations, including publicl y listed companies who are 
required to have fraud hotlines, do not have to pro vide their hotline metrics 
to anyone. They do not have to be reported in compa ny reports, such as the 
10-K, or otherwise shared inside or outside the org anization.  As a result it 
is very challenging today to determine fraud hotlin e utility and performance.  
Hotlines are also not required to monitor their per formance.  
Organizations that have fraud hotlines are encourag ed to benchmark their 
metrics.  However, the available benchmarking data is incomplete and may not 
be a sufficient method for analysis.  For instance,  benchmarking data 
available for the financial industry is not provide d in disaggregated 
fashion.  Rather, it is combined with another indus try.  As a result, this 
industry is unable to isolate their data for a true  performance measure. 
 Benchmarking is also not a very robust method of p erformance analysis.  
The use of benchmarking data as a performance measu re ignores all other 
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factors, such as functionality, best practice adher ence, employee sentiment, 
organizational climate, external, or historical fac tors, etc. 
Recent media reports have said agency bureaucracy m ay be adversely 
affecting fraud hotlines.  Specifically, the U.S. S ecurities and Exchange 
Commission’s Whistleblower Hotline, established by Congress in 2010.  Thus 
this work seeks to determine whether organizational  bureaucracy affects the 
fraud hotline process.  The bureaucracy literature suggests that agency 
bureaucracy may adversely affect a hotline in sever al ways.  It may prevent 
employees from reporting, it may cause employees to  conceal fraud, and it may 
also hinder the hotline’s ability to properly handl e calls.   
Contribution to the Literature 
There are several aspects to this research, which m ake it relevant and 
provide a significant contribution to the literatur e.  For one, today, the 
Today, the research literature is very light on fra ud hotlines, in general.  
Fraud hotlines have also never been analyzed indivi dually, and 
comprehensively, for performance.  Hotlines have al so never been analyzed 
against any organizational theory.  Also, the liter ature is also absence 
studies using social media data to determine organi zational climate. 
Theoretical Basis 
Organizational bureaucracy may affect a fraud hotli ne in several ways.  
For one, it may prevent the hotline from receiving necessary tips, by 
hindering employee reporting and/or causing employe es to conceal fraud.  It 
can also result in reduced fraud reporting.  It may  also prevent the 
organization from properly handing calls received.   
Critics say program bureaucracy can limit the effic acy of hotline 
programs. (Kelly, 2012; Kocieniewski, 2012)  While legislation supports the 
use of hotlines to receive fraud tips, hotlines may  not function well in 
certain organizational environments. For example, r ecently the Dodd-Frank 
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2 010 augmented The Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to add the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) Whistleblower Program, which provides rewards  for tipsters, who may now 
report directly to the SEC. However, the program ha s not produced many 
rewards.  
A review of the literature demonstrates there is an  association between 
high levels of bureaucracy and employees both under reporting, and concealing, 
fraud. 
There are several reasons why an employee may not r eport fraud in an 
excessively bureaucratic environment. For one, the literature suggests an 
employee’s tendency to underreport fraud can be a r esult of misaligned goals. 
(Thompson, 1961, pp. 92-100)  According to some res earchers, such as Edward 
Giblin, (1981) the state of excessive bureaucracy, or bureaupathology, causes 
employees to place their own goals over the success  of the organization, 
which makes them reluctant to come forward to repor t fraud. (22-25) 
Overall, fraud hotlines appear to be ineffective at  revealing major 
frauds.  A case study of individual fraud hotlines in light of Organizational 
Bureaucracy may shed light on this issue.  Research  regarding the Theory of 
Bureaucracy suggests that bureaucratic processes th at exist within 
organizations can be contrary to the mission of a s uccessful hotline 
reporting process, and can explain the reason why e mployees may not report 
fraud via hotlines, why a hotline can be insufficie ntly communicated to 
employees, and why the complaints may not be triage d in a manner consistent 
with the information they intend to collect (major fraud reporting).  It is 
possible, based on the literature, that fraud hotli nes have succumbed to 
institutionalization of the surrounding organizatio n (O'Hara, 2005, p. 149) 
Relevant Literature 
Fraud hotlines, used in government organizations si nce the 1970’s, have 
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been advanced as a method of fraud prevention and d etection since the passage 
of SOX in 2002. As a confidential reporting mechani sm where employees can 
report fraud occurring in their workplace, hotlines  are valued due their 
ability to receive anonymous tips, and their abilit y to receive such tips 
from internal sources.  
Despite the existence of hotlines, employee crime h as persisted and has 
become increasingly more severe. First, major inter nal frauds destroyed 
companies and caused legislators to require public companies to institute 
fraud hotlines.  Then, yet more major internal frau ds have occurred, which 
are believed to have contributed to the recent fina ncial crisis (2008-2012), 
which damaged the world economy.  In response, legi slation further requiring 
companies to use fraud hotlines was established.  H owever, internal crime has 
persisted.  (Kashton, 2011).  Some critics believe bureaucracy might limit 
the efficacy of the hotline process. (Kelly, 2012; Kocieniewski, 2012; Tobe, 
2013; Singer, 2013)  
According to the literature, hotlines are the best way to prevent fraud 
but they may not function well due to organizationa l bureaucracy, which can 
impede hotline performance.   
While legislation supports the use of hotlines to r eceive fraud tips, 
it is believed hotlines may not function well in ce rtain organizational 
environments. A review of the literature demonstrat es there is an association 
between high levels of bureaucracy and employees bo th underreporting, and 
concealing, fraud. 
Problem Statement 
Employee crime has been one of the biggest threats facing organizations 
for nearly forty years.  In 1977, the American Mana gement Association (AMA) 
reported employee theft represented “the single big gest source of loss due to 
crimes against business.” Today, industry surveys i ndicate this problem 
 
 
 
7
persists. In 2011, a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) s urvey determined internal 
crime was the most serious crime problem facing org anizations. (Global 
Economic Crime Survey) In a 2014 survey, PWC found that one in three 
organizations is affected by economic crime.  (PWC,  2014; Kroll 2013/2014) 
According to Kroll’s recent Global Fraud Report, 72 % of those surveyed said 
their company suffered a fraud involving an employe e. (2013/2014) 
Recent employee thefts have been severe enough to t hreaten the world 
economy.  According to the Federal Bureau of Invest igation, the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2012, when hundreds of ban ks failed, financial 
assets worldwide declined by $50 trillion and 51 mi llion jobs were lost, was 
caused by employee crime. (FBI, 2011) 
Evidence demonstrated employees with knowledge of c rime were not 
reporting it to company hotlines.  Hotlines were fi rst established to prevent 
corporate fraud under The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 200 2.  Following the crisis 
in 2010, The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Cons umer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) was created, which incentivized empl oyees with monetary 
rewards and expanded the scope of their crime repor ting audience to include 
the SEC.   
It is difficult to determine the value of calls rec eived to hotlines, 
from the data that is available today. Specifically , it is unclear how many 
hotline calls are resulting in criminal prosecution s.  Available statistics 
show tips received by hotlines are not leading to c riminal prosecutions.  
According to the 2013 Corporate Governance and Comp liance Hotline 
Benchmarking Report from The Network, one of the le ading third party hotline 
providers, none of the tips they handled between 20 05-2011 led to a single 
criminal prosecution.  In 2012, it was reported tha t less than 1% lead to a 
criminal prosecution.  (2013, p. 20)   
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Hotlines are believed to prevent corporate crime. S tudies, such as a 
2002 study conducted by big four accounting firm Er nst & Young, showed that 
as many as 1 in 5 workers are aware of fraud occurr ing in their place of 
employment.  Furthermore, research has continually demonstrated that employee 
tips are the primary way that fraud is discovered w ithin an organization. 
(ACFE Report 2002-2012)  
A likely mechanism to receive such tips would be th rough the fraud 
hotline, the reporting mechanism employed by many m ajor public companies 
since SOX. Yet, in their 2010 Report to the Nation on Fraud and Abuse, the 
ACFE reported that only half of their subject organ izations that employed a 
fraud hotline,  and received notification of fraud by employee tip,  actually 
received the tip via the hotline.  
Timely notification is critical.  According to a 20 11 KPMG Report, in 
the United States alone, the average internal fraud  was perpetuated for over 
4 years before the time it was discovered, costing victimized firms 1.2 
million on average.  _ 
Overall, the reason fraud hotlines are critically i mportant to a given 
organization is because they serve as the predomina nt mechanism for receiving 
whistleblower complaints, which are the primary way  that fraud is discovered 
in a given organization.  Legislative reform has re inforced the importance of 
whistleblower complaints by requiring companies to have anonymous reporting 
mechanisms (Sarbanes Oxley (2002)) and allowing com plainants to bypass 
internal processes and go straight to the SEC (Dodd  Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (2010)).   
Nevertheless, whether the complainant is reporting internally or 
externally, employee crime persists despite various  iterations of the 
internal complaint process and despite employee kno wledge of fraud. This 
leaves one to question the purpose and utility of t he fraud hotline.  
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Research Question 
 
This work explores the relationship between organiz ational bureaucracy 
and fraud hotlines, using six organizations’ hotlin es as case studies.  The 
central question of this work is as follows: Does o rganizational bureaucracy 
affect fraud hotline performance?  
The Dependent Variable in this study is Fraud Hotli ne Performance.  The 
Independent Variable in this study is Organizationa l Bureaucracy.  The Unit 
of Analysis in this study is Organizations. 
 
This central question will be divided into a series  of sub-questions.  
In answering those sub-questions, this work will id entify and isolate 
specific indicators, which will be used to measure an organization’s fraud 
hotline performance.  This study considers the foll owing sub-questions.   
I.  Does dysfunctional organizational bureaucracy exist  in the six 
subject organizations?   
II.  Do employees perceive bureaupathology in the six su bject 
organizations?   
III.  Does bureaupathology result in reduced hotline func tionality?   
IV.  Does bureaupathology result in low number of hotlin e calls?  
V.  Does bureaupathology result in reduced best practic es compliance? 
VI.  Does bureaupathology result in fraud, waste and abu se? 
 
The first two questions establish whether the organ ization has 
dysfunctional bureaucracy conditions present and wh ether they are perceptible 
by employees.  To measure the above, the following conditions will be 
established: (i) state of organizational bureaucrac y in each of the subject 
organizations; (ii) perception of employees as to b ureaucracy in their 
organizations; (iii) number of hotline calls receiv ed by the subject 
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organization; (iv) functionality of the hotline; (v ) level of adherence of 
best practices compliance by the subject organizati on, and (vi) state of 
internal fraud, waste and abuse in the subject orga nization. 
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Chapter 2   Literature Review 
 
This chapter explores the definition, use, value an d performance of 
fraud hotlines.  It also sets forth the major histo rical developments in the 
area of fraud hotlines, which lead to the creation of legislation requiring 
their use in publicly listed companies.  This chapt er also summarizes the 
Theory of Bureaucracy and the current literature re levant to the research 
question, regarding the effects of bureaucracy on f raud hotlines. 
Definitions 
Fraud Hotlines 
Fraud hotlines are confidential reporting mechanism s for employees and 
third parties to report fraud, waste and abuse occu rring in all 
organizations.  The general purpose of a fraud hotl ine is to receive tips 
from complainants about fraud, waste, and abuse.  A ccording to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), who has issue d guidance on implementing 
fraud hotlines, the audience of a hotline includes “employees, customers, 
contractors, service providers, suppliers and other  third parties” whose 
awareness of the hotline is considered an “importan t component in ensuring a 
hotline’s effectiveness.”(2005) 
 
Bureaucracy 
In this work, general references to “bureaucracy” a re referring to the 
bureaucratic structure of organizations.  The state  of bureaucracy is further 
defined by the presence of the following conditions : (i) Hierarchy of 
Authority; (ii) System of Rules; (iii) Technical Ex pertise; (iv) Career 
Service; and (v) Insistence on the Rights of Office .  (Thompson, 1961)  In 
this work, employee presence of organizational bure aucracy in a set of 
 
 
 
12
subject organizations, was established.  In this wo rk, the employee 
perception of bureaucracy in their organization is considered a negative 
association. It has been established in the literat ure “bureaucracy has a 
negative connotation in the mind of the layman.” (S inghi, 1974, p. 3) In this 
study, the perception of organizational bureaucracy  on the part of employees 
is assumed to be negative.  Thus the reference to b ureaucracy in this work in 
reference to employee perception is referring to dy sfunctional bureaucracy. 
 
Bureaupathology 
Bureaupathology is the state of excessive bureaucra cy, which is 
determined by the presence of bureaupathic conditio ns, which represent the 
negative effects of bureaucratic leadership. (Thomp son, 1951, p. 153) The 
state of bureaupathology, is determined by the pres ence of bureaupathic 
conditions, which is defined by the following known  attributes: (i) 
Impersonal Treatment; (ii) Prolonged Role Enactment ; (iii) Resistance to 
Change; (iv) Resistance to Interrogation and Invest igation; and (v) Strict 
Reliance on Organizational Rules and Procedures.  ( Thompson, 1961, pp. 153-
177)  
The state of dysfunctional organizational bureaucra cy and 
bureaupathology were measured separately in this wo rk, based on their 
separate attributes, which were used to analyze soc ial media data content.  
Both sets of attributes were later considered toget her to arrive at an 
overall qualitative assessment of the state of dysf unctional bureaucracy, in 
the minds of the employees who reviewed their organ izations in social media. 
Use 
Employees are the primary callers of fraud hotlines .  In their 2012 
Report to the Nations, the ACFE reported over half of their fraud hotline 
tips came from employees. (ACFE, p. 33) 
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Fraud hotlines have been used in the government sec tor since the late 
1970’s, following the Civil Service Reform Act of 1 978 (CSRA).  The CSRA was 
the first piece of legislation to increase the lega l protections of federal 
employees who reported misconduct in the workplace.  (Shimabukuro, Whitaker, & 
Roberts, 2013)  The widespread use of hotlines bega n in 1989, following 
President George Bush’s signing of the Whistleblowe r Protection Act (WPA).  
The WPA is a federal law that protects government w histleblowers from 
retaliation by their employer for reporting wrongdo ing in the workplace.   
Hotlines were required in publicly listed companies  following the 
implementation of SOX.  SOX was named after creator s Senator Michael Oxley 
(R-Ohio) and Representative Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryla nd).  SOX is a federal law 
created to strengthen the internal controls of publ ically listed companies 
following the revelation of internal fraud at sever al major companies in 2002 
(e.g., Enron, Arthur Andersen, Adelphia Communicati ons, Incline, WorldCom).  
SOX provisions require that companies have an “anon ymous reporting mechanism” 
for employees to report fraud, and hotlines became the generally accepted way 
of receiving those tips and satisfying the regulato ry requirement. 
The use of fraud hotlines in the private sector was  later reinforced by 
Dodd-Frank in 2010. Dodd-Frank was instituted in re sponse to major corporate 
fraud, which contributed to the world financial cri sis of 2008-2012.  In 
September 2008, there was an unprecedented number o f bank closures and in 
December 2008, financier Bernard Madoff was arreste d after stealing $65 
billion from client accounts in a massive ponzi sch eme.  (McCool & Graybow, 
2009) Dodd-Frank is a U.S. federal statute that was  signed into law on July 
21, 2010.  Dodd-Frank is said to represent the most  comprehensive change to 
financial regulation since the Great Depression. (G reene, 2011)  
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Dodd-Frank required regulators to create 243 new ru les, designed to 
enhance accountability and transparency within the financial system. (Davis 
Polk, 2010)  Consequently, Dodd-Frank expanded whis tleblower provisions in 
SOX and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SE A) to provide a 
whistleblower, who reports violations of certain la ws to federal authorities, 
a payout of between 10-30% of recoveries over $1 mi llion. (Securities and 
Exchange Commission)  Under Dodd-Frank, employees m ay bypass internal 
hotlines and report known fraud directly to the SEC .  This provision is 
contrary to SOX, which encouraged employees to repo rt fraud to their company. 
In the nonprofit sector, fraud hotlines are not req uired.  Fraud 
hotlines were suggested for use as a matter of best  practices following SOX, 
yet due to a lack of reporting requirements, it is unclear today the number 
of nonprofit entities that employ the use of fraud hotlines. 
Value 
Despite the existence of fraud hotlines, organizati onal fraud is 
increasing, and employees are the most likely perpe trators. (Kroll, 
2013/2014) According to Kroll’s recent Global Fraud  Report, 72% of those 
surveyed said their company suffered a fraud involv ing an employee. 
(2013/2014) This fraud is costing companies a lot o f money.  Per the same 
report, the economic cost of crime to businesses in creased from an average of 
.9% of revenue to 1.4% due to increases of “every f raud covered in the 
survey” including “internal financial fraud” which increased by 4%. 
(2013/2014) 
Employees are also said to be aware of fraud occurr ing in their 
organization.  According a 2011 National Business E thics Survey, over half 
(52%) of Fortune 500 employees polled said they obs erved misconduct in their 
workplace. (Ethics Resource Center, 2012) 
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The research literature supports the use of hotline s as a method of 
receiving organizational fraud tips.  Specifically,  research has continually 
demonstrated that: (i) employee tips are the primar y way that fraud is 
discovered within an organization (Association of C ertified Fraud Examiners, 
2002-2012); (ii) employees are aware of fraud occur ring within their 
organization (Ernst & Young, May 2013), and (iii) e mployees with knowledge of 
fraud are willing to report it, and most would pref er to do so anonymously.   
(Malone & Childs, 2005) 
Fraud hotlines are also proven to be effective.  Ov erall, hotlines have 
been known to reduce fraud losses by as much as 50% . (Buckhoff, 2003)  
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Exa miners, up to two thirds 
of hotline reports have justified additional invest igation and over half of 
those investigations have lead to corrective action s. (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2002-2012)  
Fraud hotlines are also expected to prevent fraud.  According to an 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 2011 Forensic and 
Valuation Services Trend Survey, over half of respo ndents believed “internal 
whistleblower hotlines [will] lead to improvements in preventing fraud in the 
next two to five years.”  (Andrews & LeBlanc, 2013)  
Performance 
Today, it is challenging to determine whether an in dividual hotline is 
performing optimally, due to a lack of available da ta, and an absence of 
reporting standards.  There are no universal regula tions or reporting 
requirements for fraud hotlines.  Although publicly  listed companies are 
required by law to have anonymous reporting mechani sms (SOX, Dodd-Frank), the 
fraud hotline itself is not subject to any particul ar set of rules, 
regulations or provisions.  Although best practices  recommend the 
dissemination of hotline data and findings, organiz ations are not required to 
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distribute or publicize their hotline data. Overall , organizations have 
tremendous latitude in the development and maintena nce of their hotlines.   
Due to an absence of regulations, there is no singl e source of best 
practices. However, according to industry sources, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations (FSG), created by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
in 1991 and revised following SOX in 2004, has been  identified by industry 
executives as a key source of best practices for ho tlines in all sectors.  
(The Network; NAVEX Global, 2007)  The guidelines “ cover all organizations 
whether publically or privately held and of whateve r nature, such as 
corporations, partnerships, labor unions, pension f unds, trusts, nonprofit 
entities and governmental units.”  (NAVEX Global, 2 007)  The Justice 
Department uses these guidelines to evaluate whethe r “a company should be 
given leniency or even avoid prosecution for corpor ate crimes, the most 
common of which are fraud, environmental waste disc harge, tax offenses, 
antitrust offenses and food and drug violations.”  (NAVEX Global, 2007) 
Organizational culture has a strong influence on ho tline use and 
design.  The guidelines by design are very broad, g iving organizations wide 
latitude.  According to The U.S. Sentencing Commiss ion, the guidelines are 
purposefully broad, and “do not offer precise detai ls for 
implementation…deliberately…to encourage flexibilit y and independence by 
organizations in designing programs that are best s uited to their particular 
circumstances.”  (Desio)  
Due to individualized policy, and a lack of availab le data, hotline 
performance can be difficult to determine. Hotline benchmarking data exists, 
but it has limitations.  For instance, NAVEX Global  provides their 
benchmarking in median rates.  Per NAVEX Global’s 2 014 Benchmarking Report 
“…because there is always more than one right answe r to the question ‘how 
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many reports should we be getting?’ for any given m etric, we also provide 
what we consider to be a healthy range of results.  If a company’s data falls 
into that range, even if that data is 10% more abov e or below the median 
industry rate, our opinion is that it is unlikely t he data is representative 
of an issue.” (p. 5) 
Other benchmarking data is provided in an aggregate d fashion, which can 
impede research efforts.  For instance, The Network  conducts an annual 
benchmarking report (2006-2013) where they report t he number of tips received 
per 1,000 employees in the finance, insurance and r eal estate industries in 
the aggregate, at 9.41 tips per 1,000 employees.  ( 2013) As a result, the 
average number of calls actually received in any on e of these industries 
cannot be determined.  Another leading third party provider, NAVEX Global, 
supplies a benchmarking report but they report only  the median number of 
calls.  Another set of benchmarking data is produce d by the Security 
Executive Council.  Their benchmarking is also aggr egated. 
Although it is challenging to determine for certain , industry sources 
believe employer-sponsored hotlines are underutiliz ed. (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2002-2012; Ernst & Young , May 2013)  There are 
several reasons for that assumption.  For one, when  asked, employees are 
often unaware they exist.  According to a recent E& Y study, over half the 
respondents, top executives from 1,200 major compan ies in 33 countries, said 
they didn’t know whether their company had a fraud hotline. (Ernst & Young, 
May 2013) This finding is problematic, because empl oyees are the primary 
callers of fraud hotlines.  In their 2012 Report to  the Nations, the ACFE 
reported over half of their fraud hotline tips came  from 
employees. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiner s, p. 33) 
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Historical Developments 
Pre-2002 
 
There are a number of conditions that led to the es tablishment of fraud 
hotline legislation.  Prior to SOX, there was lack of transparency in the 
financial documents filed by publically listed comp anies in America; a 
condition which some exploited to commit fraud.  Th e most notable of these 
frauds was Enron, which collapsed on November 28, 2 001.  (Thomas, 2002)  
Enron was the biggest American company to go bankru pt, to date. ($62 billion 
in assets as of September 30, 2001) (Oppel & Ross S orkin, 2001)  Overall, in 
the pre-SOX period, an absence of internal controls  was attributed to fraud 
in many well-known and respected entities, includin g “Big Four” accounting 
firm Arthur Anderson.  AA was Enron’s auditor, who lost their accounting 
license and no longer exists today. 
In summary, fraudulent corporate practices in the p re-SOX period 
included (i) improper internal loans to company exe cutives, (ii) company 
misrepresentation of their value of their company t o investors, and (ii) 
auditing practices failing to detect fraud.  This r esulted in: investor loss 
of capital; employee loss of jobs; possessions; and  retirement funds; company 
reputational loss; and an overall weakening of the American stock market. 
 A sample of known frauds that occurred in the pre- SOX period include 
Adelphia Communications, Arthur Andersen, Enron, He althSouth, ImClone, Tyco, 
WorldCom Inc. and Xerox. 
  
Adelphia Communications  
 
Adelphia Communications was the nation’s sixth larg est cable television 
company.  The SEC called the Adelphia’s fraud “one of the most extensive 
financial frauds ever to take place at a public com pany.” (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2002) Adelphia’s top executive s funneled money out of 
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the company for years and used it to support a lavi sh lifestyle that included 
extravagant purchases such as private airplanes and  a golf course.  (Swensen, 
2007)  Overall, the executives hid $2.3 billion in liabilities from their 
investors.  (Barrett, 2002)  It was later determine d that the company’s 
founder, John Rigas, had given himself $3.1 billion  in “off balance sheet 
loans.”  (Frank & Solomon, 2002)  Rigas was indicte d in September 2002 and 
charged with bank, wire, and securities fraud.  Rig as’ two sons and two 
additional executives were also charged. Adelphia f iled for bankruptcy 
protection in June and Rigas stepped down as CEO of  the company in May 2002. 
(Makar, Alam, & Pearson, 2004; BBC News, 2002)  Del oitte was their auditor. 
 
Arthur Andersen  
Arthur Andersen was a respected member of the Big F our until their 
involvement in the Enron scandal. Their relationshi p with Enron began in the 
early 1990’s, when Enron outsourced its internal ac counting function to 
Arthur Andersen.  Ultimately, the firm was convicte d of obstructing justice 
(in connection with the Enron investigation) and th eir public accounting 
license was revoked in 2002.  (Makar, Alam, & Pears on, 2004) 
 
Enron  
 
Enron was the first of several major corporate frau d scandals to become 
public in 2002.  It was also one of the more egregi ous.  Enron grossly misled 
the public by not properly reporting its true finan cial status.  
Specifically, Enron overstated their profits by $60 0 million.  (Oppel & 
Sorkin, 2001)  In fact, Enron ultimately went bankr upt having never reported 
having a bad quarter with respect to earnings.  (Th omas, 2002) The 
repercussion of Enron’s fraud was massive.  Overall , investors lost over $60 
billion in fewer than 2 years.  (NBC News, 2006)  E mployees lost their jobs 
and their retirement plans were now worthless, as t hey were largely invested 
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in Enron stock, which dropped to 26 cents per share .  (Thomas 2002)  Former 
Enron workers were thus unable to sell the shares o f Enron stock that 
comprised their 401K/retirement plans. Workers also  reported losing their 
cars and houses and had trouble getting new jobs af ter being associated with 
Enron.  Employees would later say that Enron manage ment, who didn’t lose 
money in this scandal, had encouraged them to inves t with the company, 
calling it a “sound” investment. (U.S. Congress, 20 02, p. 4333)  In fact, 
workers were forbidden from selling their Enron sto cks when the price fell.  
(Oppel, 2001)  Employee action groups filed numerou s lawsuits against Enron 
executives, trying to win back some of their lost s avings.  Workers were 
victorious in gaining a 10k increase in the severan ce cap (previously $4,650) 
but will likely never fully recover their losses du e to Enron’s fraud.   
(Biegelman, 2004; Makar, Alam & Pearson, 2004; Sche pp, 2002; Young, 2002) 
 
HealthSouth  
 
In 2003, top executives at HealthSouth were found t o have engaged in an 
accounting scheme that overstated their earnings by  an estimated $4 billion.  
Overall, fifteen HealthSouth accounting and finance  executives pleaded guilty 
by the end of 2003.  Former HealthSouth CEO Richard  Scrushy was indicted in 
2004 on 85 criminal charges.  After the fraud went public, shares of 
HealthSouth fell from $4 per share to just 10 cents .  Big Four accounting 
firm Ernst & Young (E&Y) was the auditor for Health South.  E&Y later claimed 
to have no knowledge of the fraud. (Frudenheim, 200 4; Makar, Alam & Pearson, 
2004) Scrushy was ultimately acquitted of his crimi nal charges in relation to 
HealthSouth, but he later resolved civil charges wi th them, which included an 
officer and director ban (Stemple & Gates 2013).  S crushy was found civilly 
liable to HealthSouth for $2.88 billion. (Stemple a nd Gates 2013) 
ImClone  
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In 2002, ImClone Systems, a biotechnology firm, was  subject of a 
congressional investigation as a result of their fa ilure to tell investors 
that one of their drugs failed to receive FDA appro val.  Ex-ImClone CEO Dr. 
Samuel Waskal ultimately admitted to fraud and pled  guilty two counts of 
securities fraud, one count of bank fraud, one coun t of perjury, one count of 
obstruction of justice and one count of conspiracy.   On June 10, 2003, Waksal 
was sentenced to 87 months in prison, was fined $3 million, and ordered to 
pay restitution. (DOJ, 2003) 
Waskal committed insider trading by telling family members and close 
friends to sell ImClone shares the day before feder al regulators refused to 
review ImClone’s new cancer drug.  (SEC, 2003)  Mar tha Stewart was one of the 
people who was given the tip to sell her ImClone st ock.  Stewart was known to 
be a personal friend of the Waskal family. (Makar, Alam & Pearson; SEC, 2003; 
BBC News, 2002) 
 
Tyco  
 
Former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Marc Swart z were indicted in 
2002 for stealing over $600 million from Tyco.  To commit their fraud, the 
executives fraudulently manipulated employee loan p rograms.  They never 
informed investors of their personal loans and neve r repaid the money.  
Kozlowski’s and Swartz’s fraud outraged the public when the media reported 
they used the stolen money to purchase opulent luxu ry items to outfit their 
multi-million dollar apartments on Park Avenue in M anhattan (also purchased 
with stolen funds).  Such items included a $15,000 umbrella stand, a $17,000 
toiletry case, a $6,300 sewing basket, $5,900 for t wo sets of sheets, $2,900 
in coat hangers, $2,200 waste basket, a $1,650 appo intment notebook, and a 
$445 pincushion. (Ross, 2002)  Further purchases by  the executives included 
vacation homes in Nantucket, yachts, Renoir and Mon et paintings, and jewelry 
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from Tiffany’s.  (CNN, 2002)  They also gave themse lves bonuses totaling 
nearly $100 million that were never disclosed to th e board of directors. 
(Makar, Alam, & Pearson, 2004) PricewaterhouseCoope rs audited Tyco. 
 
WorldCom Inc.  
 
WorldCom Inc. perpetrated one of the largest accoun ting frauds in 
history.  WorldCom’s bankruptcy was also the larges t in U.S. history (by the 
size of its assets).  However, the crime was relati vely basic, involving a 
reduction in reported line costs and an exaggeratio n of reported revenues. 
(SEC Report, 2003)  In June 2002, the company discl osed that their accounting 
improprieties resulted in a loss up to $7 billion a nd that the former CFO had 
been charged with fraud.  Essentially, their fraud eradicated a stock that 
was valued at over $180 billion, leaving investors with a stock that was 
virtually worthless.  (Blau, 2003)  WorldCom simult aneously filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy with $41 billion in debt and informed  12,800 of its roughly 
75,000 workers that they'd be losing their jobs.  ( Young, 2002) And those 
employees were unable to collect their severance pa y due to a recent shift in 
company policy.  Accordingly, WorldCom was not obli gated to make a lump sum 
payment and severance payments to employees were ca pped at $4,650 under the 
bankruptcy code.  (Young, 2002)  Overall, employees  were left without their 
jobs, appropriate severance, health insurance, and 401K plans. (WorldCom 401K 
plans were almost entirely comprised of company sto ck and were now 
worthless.)  In contrast, immediately following the  scandal, WorldCom 
executives were given full pension in excess of $1 million and had received 
recent bonuses and company loans valued at $10 mill ion and up. (Katz, 
Marshall & Banks, 2011) 
 
Xerox  
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In 2003, six former Xerox executives, including the  CEO, CFO and 
company controller, agreed to pay over $22 million in penalties for 
misleading investors about their earnings in order to boost stock prices. 
(Bandler & Hechinger, 2003) They concealed their fr aud by recognizing 
revenues in the wrong time periods, a practice that  is in violation of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  ( SEC, 2002)  Xerox’s fraud 
reduced shareholders' equity by $137 million and ne t worth by $76 million. 
(Deutsch, 2001; SEC, 2003; Makar, Alam & Pearson, 2 004) KPMG was Xerox’s 
auditor. 
 In addition to the frauds at Adelphia Communicatio ns, Arthur Andersen, 
Enron, HealthSouth, ImClone, Tyco, Worldcom Inc. an d Xerox, similar frauds 
were reported at AOL Time Warner, Aura Systems, CMS  Energy, Computer Systems 
International, Global Crossing, Quest Communication s and Safety-Kleen. 
(Hagenbaugh, 2003) 
 The common theme of the above frauds was the misre presentation by the 
company of their value, to the public. Despite GAAP  accounting requirements, 
suspected internal controls and auditing by Big Fou r accounting firms, said 
companies were engaging in fraudulent practices.   SOX was created to 
establish internal controls of these and other publ ic companies to prevent 
similar entities from misleading their employees an d investors. 
2002 
 
SOX first required hotlines in publicly listed comp anies.  Passed in 
2002, SOX was lauded as “the most sweeping law affe cting corporations since 
the 1930’s.” (USA Today, 2003) SOX was named after Senator Michael Oxley 
(Republican- Ohio) and Representative Paul Sarbanes  (Democrat-Maryland) who 
each drafted a separate bill in mid-2002 that the H ouse and Senate combined 
and named after the co-creators.  In 2002, the 107 th  Congress of the U.S. 
Congress passed SOX.  SOX was passed by a vote of 4 23-3 in the House and 99-0 
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in the Senate.  SOX was signed into law by Presiden t George Bush a short time 
later on July 30, 2002. (Association of Certified P ublic Accountants, 2007) 
SOX is enforced by the Securities and Exchange Comm ission (SEC). 
While SOX has several mandates, the primary purpose  of SOX is to verify 
that companies have effective internal controls of publicly listed companies.  
(USA Today, 2003)  President Bush said SOX was desi gned to “deter and punish 
corporate and accounting fraud and corruption, ensu re justice for wrongdoers, 
and protect the interests of workers and shareholde rs.”  (Soren McAdam 
Christenson LLP, 2011)  Accordingly, SOX created ne w penalties for such 
wrongdoing and a new oversight body, the Public Com pany Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), an independent board created to moni tor accounting firms that 
audit public companies.  The PCAOB also has the aut hority to investigate and 
discipline accountants. (Yormark, 2004) 
 SOX also enhanced corporate responsibility by requ iring CEOs and CFOs 
to certify the accuracy of their financial reports.   SOX enforces corporate 
accountability by barring corporate executives from  using the “lack of 
knowledge” defense with respect to wrongdoing occur ring in their company.  
(Yormark, 2004)  SOX also enhanced criminal penalti es to enforce 
accountability.  To that end, criminal penalties, i ncluding fines and 
imprisonment, were created and/or enhanced for crim es involving the 
destruction, falsification, and alteration of recor ds by the company and/or 
their auditor.  Penalties involving these crimes un der SOX could result in a 
prison sentence of up to 20 years and a $5 million fine. (Yormark, 2004)   
 SOX further instituted several reforms relating to  auditor 
independence.  SOX required auditors to rotate posi tions so that no one 
person is ever in charge of an entire client engage ment. SOX also prevented 
auditors from performing certain functions for a cl ient while also performing 
their auditing, bookkeeping, financial information system management, 
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appraisal or actuarial services, or other managemen t services. (Yormark, 
2004) 
 SOX rules also extended fraud-reporting obligation s to lawyers.  Under 
section 307, outside counsel are required to report  suspected securities 
violations to the Chief Legal Counsel, of the compa ny in question, and if 
necessary, escalate their concerns to the company’s  audit committee or board 
of directors. (Yormark, 2004) 
 SOX further required companies to create and promu lgate a code of 
ethics for senior financial officers, restrict exec utive compensation, 
establish independent audit committees, appoint an in-house “financial 
expert” and institute a confidential reporting mech anism for fraud (i.e., a 
fraud hotline). (Hagenbaugh, 2003) 
To ensure accurate books and records, SOX required publicly listed 
companies to establish a financial accounting frame work that generates 
verifiable financial reports with traceable, inedit able, source data.  SOX 
instituted corporate penalties for non-compliance o r inaccurate/incomplete 
certifications, including fines of up to $5 million  and a prison term of 20 
years.  (New York State Society of CPAs, 2002) 
2008 
 
Despite SOX and the existence of fraud hotlines, in  2008, massive 
corporate frauds were uncovered, which were so egre gious they caused a global 
financial crisis (“crisis”), which lasted from 2008 -2012. The crisis caused 
an unprecedented number of bank failures.  Banks th at didn’t close during the 
crisis suffered other financial loss.  During this time, many banks 
nationalized, recapitalized, merged, were taken ove r or received state 
guarantees. (Harkay, 2009)   
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Overall, this crisis caused the value of financial assets worldwide to 
decline by as much as $50 trillion and brought the loss of 51 million jobs 
across the globe. (Loser, 2009; BBC News, 2009) Fro m 2007-2010, bank closures 
increased by 4,633%.  In September 2008, the collap se of Lehman Brothers, the 
fourth largest investment bank in the United States , marked the beginning of 
a massive economic downturn, in what experts called  the worst recession in 80 
years. (The Economist, 2013) 
Overall, during the crisis, three hundred and sixty  six (366) U.S. 
banks failed. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora tion (FDIC), which often 
serves as a receiver for failed banks, reported mos t banks closed in Georgia 
(63) followed by Florida (53) and Illinois (45).  B y contrast, prior to the 
crisis, during a six-year period (2000-2006), twent y-four (24) banks failed.  
In 2010 alone, at the peak of the crisis, one hundr ed and forty two (142) 
banks failed.  In 2007, 3 banks failed. As of Janua ry 31, 2011, the FDIC paid 
out $8.89 billion to banks under loss-share agreeme nts. (Sidel, 2011)  To 
cover these losses and additional payouts of up to $21.5 billion were 
expected by 2014. (Sidel, 2011)  
Perhaps the most significant of the bank failures w as the closure of 
the traditional investment banks, as a result of th e Glass Steagall Act in 
1933.  In less than 10 days, from September 14-21, 2008, Lehman Brothers 
failed, Merrill Lynch was acquired and Goldman Sach s and PS1 all became bank 
holding companies.  (Augar, 2008) 
Although banks are FDIC insured, investors can stil l lose money when 
banks close. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the FDIC insurabl e limit for depositors was 
$100,000.  While Dodd-Frank permanently increased t he FDIC limit to $250,000, 
anything above that amount is subject to loss. (Cha n, 2010)  
The FDIC insures bank deposits under the Banking Ac t of 1933 (Glass-
Steagall Act). The FDIC is funded through insurance  assessments collected 
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from its member depository institutions and held in  a Deposit Insurance Fund 
(DIF), which is used to pay depositors if member in stitutions fail.  (Getter, 
2014) 
However, FDIC insurance, and other depository insur ances, such as the 
National Credit Union Share Insurance (NCUA), do no t cover funds held in 
investments such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, li fe insurance policies, 
annuities or municipal securities, even when purcha sed from an FDIC or NCUA 
insured bank or savings institution. (Chan, 2010)   
When banks fail, bank employees may suffer sudden a nd permanent 
financial loss due to the diminished value of insti tutional stocks.  As a 
case in point, following Bear Sterns collapse in Ma rch 2008, an average Bear 
Stearns employee retirement fund worth $200,000 was  now worth $2,000. 
(Goldman, 2008)  It was reported that employees wer e so devastated by this 
news that grief counselors were called in to admini ster immediate therapy. 
(Goldman, 2008).  Most of the affected employees we re among the support 
staff.  (Goldman, 2008) 
Similarly, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, it was e stimated that  
24,000 employees lost an estimated $10 billion in p aper wealth.  (Smith, 
Craig, & Lobb, 2008)  Half of Lehman’s employees al so lost their jobs, with 
most of the losses concentrated among non-managemen t positions.  Although key 
executives were blamed for much of the bank’s failu res, most of them found 
similar positions at competitors. (Newsweek, 2009) 
Overall, the bank closure policy is geared toward e xpediency and is 
often unfriendly to bank employees.  The FDIC does not forewarn employees of 
impending closures.  According to FDIC chairwoman S helia Bair (2006-2011), 
who was a critic of the policies and practices lead ing to the crisis 
(Kolhatkar, 2014), the FDIC closes down most banks on Fridays so they have 
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the two extra days over the weekend to complete the  transition and make sure 
customers have immediate access to their money on M onday. (Egan, 2009) 
However, skeptics think this is actually done to pr event customers from 
panicking and withdrawing funds. (“Why Does the FDI C,” 2010)  
One example of a bank failure which documents the d evastating closure 
process is that of TeamBank in Paola, Kansas, which  was closed Friday, March 
20, 2009 by the Office of the Comptroller of the Cu rrency. According to 
reports, at the end of the workday, 110 TeamBank em ployees were ushered into 
the lobby by government agents and told their emplo yer was closing down.  
According to one employee who had been with the ban k for seven years, the 
closure was something he would “never want to go th rough again.  There were a 
lot of tears - many people had spent their entire w orking lives in that lobby 
and now it was gone." (Stock, 2010) 
One TeamBank employee recounted the experience as f ollows:  
“FDIC agents in conjunction with the Office of Comp troller of the 
Currency (OCC) swe[pt] in like a Mongol horde, shut ting down the 
institution with ruthless efficiency. FDIC agents p ore[d] [sic] over 
everything in the office, rooting through filing ca binets and rifling 
through desk drawers. "All of the employees were ga thered in one room 
and kept separate from bank officers," says McCaule y, who produced 
$331,000 in 2008 before all hell broke loose. "Then  we were brought to 
the lobby where an OCC officer announced that TeamB ank was no longer 
operational and that within a few minutes, some peo ple from the FDIC 
were going to come in, that they would treat TeamBa nk employees with 
respect and that they would stay for the whole week end." A sheriff 
stood guard by the main door, and the moment the OC C officer started 
talking, the sheriff taped a closure notice to the door. "I've never 
seen anything run with such precision," McCauley sa ys. "It was an 
amazing thing." TeamBank was instantly sold to Grea t Southern and by 
seven that night, all signs and advertisements in t he bank's hometown 
of Paola, Kan., had been covered over with Great So uthern's logo. On 
Monday morning, the bank opened under Great Souther n's control.”  
(Stock, 2010) 
 
As demonstrated, bank failures were shocking and fi nancially damaging 
for employees, who suffered some of the greatest lo ss.  While many believe 
that most employees are innocent victims, many expe rts believe failed 
leadership in the financial industry contributed to  the crisis. (Greene, 
2011; George, 2008) Regulators, such as The Office of the Comptroller of the 
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Currency (OCC), have also reported studies of bank failures show “insider 
abuse…is often a contributing factor to [bank] fail ure.” (2006)  
Experts believe that employees are aware of frauds occurring in the 
workplace, and these frauds should be reported to t he hotlines established as 
part of SOX.  Research has consistently demonstrate d that many employees know 
about fraud occurring in their workplace.  A 2002 s tudy conducted by Ernst & 
Young showed that as many as 1 in 5 workers are awa re of fraud occurring in 
their place of employment.  Furthermore, research h as continually 
demonstrated that employee tips are the primary way  that fraud is discovered 
within an organization. (ACFE, 2002-2012)  In fact,  in their 2012 report, the 
ACFE reported 43% of the frauds in public companies  were discovered via a 
tip, which was up from 40% in 2010. 
However, it is difficult to believe that hotlines a re functioning well 
to detect and prevent internal crime, given the mag nitude of frauds that have 
occurred despite the existence of the hotline.  In the wake of bank closures, 
media reports documented employee familiarity with internal crime, which 
would have been ripe for reporting.   
As a case in point, the “largest bank failure in U. S. history,” 
Washington Mutual bank. (WaMu) (Arnall & Herman, 20 08; Sidel, Enrich, & 
Fitzpatrick, 2008) WaMu was once one of the largest  originators and servicers 
of residential mortgages in the U.S. through subpri me subsidiary Long Beach 
Mortgage, holding $307 billion in assets when it fa iled. (Arnall & Herman, 
2008) Shortly thereafter, an employee told the medi a the employees “saw it 
coming.”  (Arnall & Herman, 2008)  
"The executives are the ones who made the decision to take WaMu 
in this direction.  Too many of the middle folks li ke myself said 
this is wrong, we're making loans we shouldn't be m aking, we're 
qualifying borrowers who we know are going to strug gle to pay the 
loan back."  (Arnall & Herman, 2008) 
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Indeed, WaMu internal documents obtained in connect ion with the lawsuit 
demonstrate they approved loans, regardless of borr ow risk, in the name of 
profit. (Arnall & Herman, 2008) 
The types of schemes perpetuated during the crisis typically involved a 
large number of employees, and thus would leave man y witnesses/tipsters.  
According to the Department of Treasury (DOT), the biggest financial 
institution frauds during the crisis involved insid ers, and their schemes 
involved: (i) unsound lending practices, such as in adequate collateral and 
poor loan documentation; (ii) excessive concentrati ons of credit to certain 
industries or groups of borrowers; (iii) unsound or  excessive loans to 
insiders or their related interests or business ass ociates, (iv) violations 
of civil statutes or regulations, such as legal len ding limits or loans to 
one borrower; and (v) criminal violations of law an d statute, such as fraud, 
misapplication of bank funds, or embezzlement. (Reg ulatory Bulletin: Fraud 
and Insider Abuse) 
 
The DOT advises that employees of these firms can b e a great source of 
information, finding:   
“Insiders often commit crimes using subordinates wh o do not 
question their instructions. In some instances, how ever, the 
subordinates may be astute enough to know that what  the insiders 
instructed them to do is questionable or wrong and may freely 
discuss the situation if the regulators simply inqu ire.” 
(Regulatory Bulletin: Fraud and Insider Abuse, 2010 ) 
 
It is believed the internal culture of the companie s that failed during 
the financial crisis didn’t support hotline reporti ng.  Experts believe that 
if more internal crime was reported, then criminal prosecutions might be 
possible.  Once such expert, Robert Gnaizda, who ap peared in the “Inside 
Job,” an Academy Award winning documentary about th e financial crisis, said 
the executives of Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehm an Brothers and Merrill 
Lynch could be criminally prosecuted if employees c ame forward.  According to 
 
 
 
31
Gnaizda, such cases “would be very hard to win…but… they could do it if they 
got enough underlings to tell the truth.”  (The Ins ide Job, 2010) 
 
2010 
 
The use of fraud hotlines in the private sector was  reinforced under 
Dodd-Frank.  Dodd-Frank was designed to regulate Wa ll Street following the 
financial crisis of 2007-2010. Lawmakers determined  additional regulations 
were required in the wake of the global financial c risis of 2007-2010, to 
prevent future instances of employee fraud at finan cial institutions.  
Dodd-Frank was created by Barney Frank (D-Mass) and  Senate Banking 
Committee Chairman Chris Dodd.  This U.S. federal s tatute was proposed on 
December 2, 2009 and signed into law on July 21, 20 10.  Dodd-Frank is said to 
represent the most comprehensive change to financia l regulation since the 
Great Depression. (Greene, 2011)  Dodd-Frank requir ed regulators to create 
243 new federal rule-makings, designed to enhance a ccountability and 
transparency within the financial system. (David Po lk, 2010; “The Uncertainty 
Principle,” 2010)  
On November 3, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Co mmission (“SEC”) 
issued proposed rules to implement the whistleblowe r provisions established 
by Dodd-Frank.  Dodd-Frank expanded whistleblower p rovisions in SOX and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) to provid e tipsters, who report 
violations of certain laws to federal authorities, a reward based on the 
amount of money recovered by the SEC.   
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank also expanded the whistle blower protection 
provisions in § 806 of SOX to include increased sta tute of limitations in 
which to file complaints and greater compensation f or damages.  Employees are 
also provided extra protections against employer re taliation.  The amendments 
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include the following protections, which apply to e mployee complainants who 
participate in an SEC investigation: 
o Protection against retaliation by their employer;  
o Potential of double back-pay damages awarded to whi stleblowers 
who file a lawsuit claiming retaliation by their em ployer; the 
statute of limitation for filing such retaliation c laims was 
increased to six years (The previous statute of lim itations was 3 
years; the statute of limitation for standard retal iation claims 
was also increased from 90 to 180 days.);  
o Opportunity to file a retaliation complaint directl y in federal 
court, bypassing the Department of Labor administra tive process 
(Exall); 
o Right to a jury trial for retaliation claims, regar dless of 
whether a mandatory arbitration agreement, often us ed in the 
financial services industry, was in place.  
o Protection of a new independent investigative body,  the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection, created to investiga te and 
commence civil actions against financial industry e mployers who 
retaliate against their whistleblower employees. 
 
Dodd-Frank further expanded SOX protections to incl ude other related 
entities named on a given entity’s financial statem ents, including 
subsidiaries and affiliates, from both public and p rivate industry.  SOX is 
further protected from internal employee agreements  which may attempt to 
supersede or invalidate SOX.  Such agreements are n ow strictly prohibited. 
(Bouchard & Linthorst, 2010; Seyfarth Shaw, 2010; E xall)  
The amendments to SOX under Dodd-Frank add multiple  reporting 
incentives for potential whistleblowers.  They allo w a whistleblower to 
collect substantially more money than they could pr eviously under SOX.  
Employees can also pursue actions against more enti ties, in an extended time 
period, and do so without notifying their employer.   The new amendments also 
allow employees to bypass reporting to their employ er.  Before Dodd-Frank, 
employees had to exhaust administrative remedies be fore filing a claim.  Now 
employees can go straight to the SEC, The Departmen t of Justice (DOJ), and/or 
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC ) and file claims directly 
in federal court.   
The new process is believed to result in larger set tlements.  According 
to employment lawyers, “successful employees may ob tain substantial remedies, 
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including reinstatement without loss of seniority, double back-pay, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expert witnes s fees.”  (Seyfarth Shaw, 
2010) 
Employees can also obtain a percentage of the sanct ions levied against 
their employer, in exchange for actionable tips.  S ections 922 and 929A of 
Dodd-Frank added a new section to the Securities an d Exchange Act of 1934 
(SEA) requiring the SEC to provide a monetary award  to whistleblowers up to 
30% of the total amount of the sanctions. The statu tory language also gives 
tipsters confidence in their ability to receive an award.  The SEC is given 
the discretion to award the whistleblower anywhere between 10-30% of the 
sanctions.  The amount of the award cannot be less than 10%. (Exall)  It 
should be noted there are some limitations noted in  the proposal 
documentation.  The information must be “original” and provided voluntarily 
to the SEC, rather than in response to inquiry. The  sanction in question must 
also exceed $1,000,000. 
 The payout under these terms can be sizable.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has reported settlements since July 2010 in the 
amounts of $75 million, $100 million and $550 milli on, respectively. 
(Kerschberg, 2011)   
Under Dodd-Frank, the whistleblower is also provide d an extended 
reporting timeframe.  Section 922 allows the employ ee to file a claim “up to 
six years after the violation occurred, or three ye ars after he or she knew 
or reasonably should have known of facts material t o the violation, so long 
as the complaint is filed within ten years of the v iolation.”  (Seyfarth 
Shaw, 2010) 
Lawmakers believe the new whistleblower provisions will prevent future 
corporate fraud by increasing employee reporting to  authorities.  Congress 
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finds the provisions to be a great way to discover fraud without cost to the 
taxpayer (the funds used for whistleblower bounties  will be paid out from the 
penalties the company pays to the SEC). (Carton, 20 10) Likewise, the SEC 
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro (2009-2012) said the rewa rd may “avoid missing the 
next Bernard Madoff.”  (Carton, 2010)  Lawyers beli eve Dodd-Frank “will help 
restore investor confidence in the financial indust ry” yet find 
“Investigating claims of this nature is a real burd en on resources." 
(Reisinger, 2011) 
Employers criticized Dodd-Frank’s provisions allowi ng employees to 
bypass internal reporting processes previously esta blished under SOX.  In 
December 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported ove r 260 companies sent 
letters to the SEC, complaining about the whistlebl ower provisions.  
Specifically, lawyers for Delta, FedEx, Gap and Pfi zer said the new rules 
were contrary to existing compliance programs in th at they “disincent 
employees from looking for ways to improve or corre ct corporate behaviors, 
and incent them to find ways to profit from corpora te wrongdoing.” (Koppel, 
2010) 
Lawmakers also raised concerns.  At a debate on May  12, 2011 before the 
House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Ma rkets and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (“debate”), Representative Sc ott Garrett, R-NJ, 
Chairman of the subcommittee was critical of Dodd-F rank, asking:  
(i) “Will the incentive structure created by the Do dd-Frank 
provisions exacerbate violations by encouraging the m to fester 
and become more serious problems?, (ii) Does the le gislation and 
the proposed rulemaking allow those complicit in vi olations to 
not only escape punishment, but potentially receive  massive 
rewards in spite of their malfeasance?” (iii) “If i nternal 
compliance programs are bypassed, isn’t good corpor ate 
citizenship discouraged, and won’t there be a great er likelihood 
that companies will have less accurate financial st atements and 
that companies will need to restate those financial s upon which 
investors had already relied?” (Waddell, 2011)  
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 In response to those concerns, one representative,  Michael Grimm, R-
NY, proposed legislation designed to preserve the i nternal reporting 
structure of SOX (to prevent bogus claims and claim s from those involved in 
crime).  
In the wake of Dodd-Frank, employment lawyers advis ed clients to audit 
their subsidiary compliance (to extend their corpor ate compliance structures 
to subsidiaries and other related entities), review  their waiver and 
arbitration agreements (concerning possible existin g restrictions on waivers 
and predispute arbitration) and to find new ways to  encourage internal 
reporting (which could mean expanding their existin g processes, such as 
internal hotlines). (Bouchard & Linthorst, 2010)  
 Consulting firms were also unhappy with Dodd-Frank ’s provisions 
negating internal reporting.  The Deputy CEO of Del oitte LLP, Robert 
Kueppers, said whistleblowers should be “required t o report their concerns 
fully and in good faith through company-sponsored i nternal compliance systems 
before reporting to the SEC as a condition of eligi bility to receive a 
monetary award.” (Waddell, 2011) Although internal reporting incentives were 
later added, they do not require employees to repor t internally.  Rather, 
they say employees can increase their chances of ea rning the award by further 
solidifying their claims. 
In the beginning, it seemed as though the increased  incentives may have 
resulted in increased reports.  In 2010, the SEC re ported receiving up to two 
“high quality” whistleblower tips per day.  Prior t o Dodd-Frank, they 
received only 24 per year. (Koehler) 
 Despite the arguments of critics, Mary L. Schapiro,  Chairman of the 
SEC, told the American public the new whistleblower  rules would prevent and 
detect major financial fraud, such as that committe d by Ponzi schemer Bernard 
Madoff, who somehow eluded all other means of detec tion.   
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It is important to examine the current state of hot line performance for 
any unintended political consequences.  Representat ive Scott Garrett (R-NJ) 
said there could be problems due to lawmakers’ “rus h[] to meet a political 
deadline.”  Specifically, Garrett believed Dodd-Fra nk was “passed to check 
off long-standing agendas of certain constituencies , rather than to address 
issues that actually contributed to the cause of th e financial crisis.” 
(Garrett, 2011)   
In summary, the legislation enacted between 2002 an d 2010 was based on 
the assumption that fraud hotlines have the ability  to prevent and detect 
fraud. SOX established the need for confidential re porting mechanisms to 
prevent and detect fraud in publicly listed compani es.  However, the 
existence of the fraud hotline didn’t prevent or de tect many instances of 
corporate crime, such as the financial crisis of 20 08.  After 2008, lawmakers 
added a financial incentive for callers and removed  their need to report 
internally.   
Overall, these actions reflect the following assump tions: (i) pre-SOX, 
call volume and quality to company fraud hotlines w as inadequate in 
preventing and detecting fraud; (ii) potential call ers are incentivized by 
monetary rewards; (iii) money reward will increase the quantity and quality 
of reporting; and (iv) hotline callers may not alwa ys report internally.   
It is important to determine whether hotlines are a n appropriate 
organizational fraud prevention and detection mecha nism.  It is also 
essential to establish whether the SEC whistleblowe r hotline is receiving 
quality tips that are illuminating organizational f raud. 
2010-Present 
 
Following SOX, nonprofit entities have been advised  to maintain fraud 
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hotlines as a matter of best practices. (Andrews & LeBlanc, 2013; 
(GrossMendelsohn, 2013) Per SOX, all entities, incl uding nonprofit 
organizations, are prohibited from, and can be held  criminally liable for, 
retaliating against whistleblowers and impeding an investigation. (American 
Bar Association, 2013)  However, nonprofits are not  required to use fraud 
hotlines.  Today, due to the lack of reporting requ irements, it is largely 
unknown how many nonprofits currently operate fraud  hotlines. In a 2007 
study, it was determined that 40% of the subject no nprofits operated a fraud 
hotline. (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 200 7) 
Of those nonprofits that operate hotlines managed b y The Network, one 
of the largest third party hotline providers, they report an “extremely high 
percentage” of corruption and fraud (13% of all cas es in the “Public 
Administration” sector [a category containing some,  but not all, of their 
nonprofit clients]), which has been “consistent ove r the last four years.” 
(2013, p. 13) Overall, this assessment is based on 64 organizational clients 
of The Network, with a total of 468,966 employees. 
Per recent evidence, employee fraud in the nonprofi t sector is steadily 
increasing and is responsible for a large amount of  loss in this area.  
According to the 2013 Report to the Nations, a semi annual report by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), th e frequency of fraud 
occurring in this sector has risen since 2010, clim bing from 9.6% to 10.4% in 
the cases they examined, with a median loss of $100 ,000. (p. 25) Two recent 
examinations of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form  990 filings, filed by 
organizations which are exempt from income tax, sug gest these frauds have 
resulted in a loss of as much as $170 million since  2009, with the greatest 
amount of loss occurring in a finite number of orga nizations.  These frauds 
are reported in the Form 990 as “significant divers ions.” 
In 2012, the IRS reviewed tax filings and publicall y available 
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information of 285 nonprofit organizations reportin g a significant diversion 
of assets, since 2009 (when they began collecting g overnance data from 1300 
nonprofit organizations). As a result of this effor t, the IRS determined 
approximately $170 million was lost in “significant  diversions” as reported 
in Part VI, Section A, Item 5. (Panetta, 2012) Most  reported cases of 
“significant diversions” involved theft or embezzle ment. (Panetta, 2012) 
In 2013, the Washington Post examined over 1,000 IR S Form 990s and 
determined over a half billion dollars were misappr opriated from ten 
nonprofits alone, between 2008 and 2012, due to “th eft, investment fraud, 
embezzlement and other unauthorized uses of funds.”  (Stephens, 2013) In one 
of the more egregious examples cited in the study, The American Legacy 
Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to smoking danger  awareness, lost an 
estimated $3.4 million due to an employee embezzler . (Post, 2013) (Stephens, 
2013) 
Lawyers say nonprofit entities are especially susce ptible to employee 
fraud, largely due to this sector’s “trust[] of emp loyees” and “less 
stringent financial controls” than other businesses . (Devaney, 2013) 
According to the American Bar Association, nonprofi t employees are usually 
more “trusted” due to the emphasis on “altruistic p rogram activities” and 
“constrained staffing levels at most nonprofits...m ak[ing] segregation of 
duties more difficult.” (Sol) 
To prevent fraud in this sector, lawyers recommend nonprofits 
“encourage whistleblowing” as a preventative measur e. (Devaney, 2013) This 
recommendation is in line with the recommendations of ACFE studies since 
2002, where tips were determined to be the primary form of fraud detection in 
all sectors. (Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse)  However, 
nonprofits are not required to have fraud hotlines.   Therefore it is unknown 
how the employees in this sector are reporting frau d without a confidential 
reporting mechanism. 
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Theory Relevant to Research Question 
 
This study examines the affect of organizational bu reaucracy on fraud 
hotline performance.  The theory relevant to this r esearch question is the 
Theory of Bureaucracy. 
Theory Of Bureaucracy 
 
The foundation of the Theory of Bureaucracy was fir st established in 
the 1890’s, beginning with theorists such as Max We ber, who set forth the 
characteristics of an ideal organization. Weber (19 40) conducted a “classical 
analysis of bureaucracy” emphasizing hierarchical s tructure and a fixed 
division of labor in the pursuit of “precision, rel iability and efficiency.” 
Bureaucracy was seen as the means to achieve that g oal. (Tompkins, 2005)   
Bureaucracy was not “defined” in the traditional se nse, but rather, was 
characterized by a set of attributes.  Weber said t his criterion was integral 
to achieving the “ideal state” in an organization. (Tompkins, 2005) The 
“specific list of criteria for the fully developed bureaucratic form” 
included “technical training of officials, merit ap pointments, fixed salaries 
and pensions, assured careers, the separation of or ganizational rights and 
duties from the private life of the employee, and a  fixed and definite 
division of work into distinct offices or jobs.” (T hompson, 1961, p. 11)  
Thus the state of bureaucracy was defined by the pr esence of the following 
conditions: (i) Hierarchy of Authority; (ii) System  of Rules; (iii) Technical 
Expertise; (iv) Career Service; and (v) Insistence on the Rights of Office.  
(Thompson, 1961) 
Bureaupathology 
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The state of bureaucracy was viewed both positively  and negatively by 
scholars.  While most agree that bureaucracies are “rational” and 
“necessary,” problems were noted.  For many, proble ms arose due to an 
individual’s response to the organizational climate  created by bureaucracy.  
Researchers such as Victor A. Thompson found that w hen the characteristics 
that defined a bureaucracy were “exaggerated” the s ituation could turn 
“bureaupathic” which is a deviation from the organi zational ideal. (1961, p. 
159) 
Over time, theorists became critical of the notion of an “ideal 
organization” when they determined organizations ha d inherent flaws.  Those 
flaws were due in part to the worker’s reaction to the state of bureaucracy, 
which caused them to become very deliberate in thei r actions. Specifically, 
Theorists such as Merton said bureaucracies resulte d in workers becoming 
“methodical, prudent and disciplined.” (Merton, 195 7, pp. 195-206)  
In the 1960’s researchers determined inflexible wor kers made 
bureaucratic organizations incapable of making nece ssary changes.  In fact, 
in 1964, in “The Bureaucratic Phenomenon” Michel Cr ozier said a bureaucratic 
organization was akin to “an organization that cann ot correct its behaviour 
by learning from its errors.”  (p. 187) 
Specifically, Thompson said “personal behavior patt erns” such as 
“excessive aloofness, ritualistic attachment to rou tines and procedures, and 
resistance to change” and a “petty insistence upon rights of authority and 
status” could “exaggerate the characteristic qualit ies of bureaucratic 
organization.” (1961, pp. 152-153) Thompson found t hese behaviors to be 
bureaupathic, in that they do not serve to advance the organization’s mission 
and instead “reflect the personal needs of individu als.” (1961, p. 153) 
(“What Really”, 1991, p. 491)  In 1967, Anthony Dow ns developed a list 
 
 
 
41
of “bureaucratic personalities” which further docum ented bureaupathic 
behaviors.   
Researchers also began to acknowledge that bureaucr acy could cause 
workers to act against the organization.  One such scholar was Downs, who 
said workers in a bureaucracy have an inherent tend ency to conceal 
information from superiors that is unfavorable. (19 64, pp. 10-12). 
Meanwhile, scholars still advanced the need for bur eaucracies in spite 
of flaws.  For instance, in 1964, Anthony Downs sai d hierarchy was necessary 
in bureaucracies, although hierarchy could cause in formation flow between 
workers to be distorted. (Downs, pp. 9-10) 
In the 1970’s, researchers detected organizational problems in 
bureaucracies.  Robert Kharasch examined organizati onal behavior in the 
federal government, and found organizational “malfu nctioning” that was “out 
of control.” (p. 116)  In 1974, Christopher Hood lo oked at British public 
administration and determined administrative failur es, including “over-
organization, red-tape” and “ritualized procedures. ” (Caiden, 1991, pp. 114-
15) 
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, scholars further attribut ed bureaucracy to 
organizational crime.  In a study conducted in the early 1970’s, Bowden 
determined bureaucracy could prevent innovation, re sulting in “anomie, 
distrust and lawlessness” which give rise to miscon duct. (Caiden, 
“Administrative Reform,” p. 114-15)  In 1981, Willi am Pierce said 
bureaucracies could result in “bureaucratic failure ” causing theft, 
corruption and waste (Caiden, “Administrative Refor m,” p. 116)   
In the 1990’s, researchers concluded bureaupatholog y could result in 
public harm. In 1999, Diane Vaughn found “formal or ganizations can deviate 
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from the rationalist expectations of the Weberian m odel” where worker 
behaviors, both “conforming” and “deviant,” can “ad versely affect the public” 
leading to organizational “failure, crime, and devi ance.” (pp. 272-273)  In 
1991, Gerald E. Caiden elaborated the list of worke r bureaupathic behaviors, 
first created by Downs, resulting in 175 bureaucrat ic pathologies, or 
bureaupathologies. (Bozeman & Rainey, 1998)   
Although researchers focused on individual behavior s, bureaupathologies 
were now viewed as faults of the organization, as a  whole.  According to 
Caiden, bureaupathologies were inherent in bureaucr acies, were pervasive, and 
“lived” beyond individual actors.   Per Caiden, bur eaupathologies are:  
“The systematic shortcomings of organizations that cause 
individuals within them to be guilty of malpractice s. They cannot 
be corrected by separating the guilty from the orga nization for 
the malpractices will continue irrespective of the organization’s 
composition.  They are not random, isolated inciden ts, either.  
While they may not be regular, they are not so rare  either.  When 
they occur, little action is taken to prevent their  recurrence…” 
(“What Really”, 1991, p. 490) 
Additional research during this time suggested the full breadth of 
organizational problems, including crime, might nev er be fully known. Caiden 
said there are latent problems in all organizations , which may never come to 
light as a result of bureaucracy. (Caiden 1985; “Wh at Really,” 1991)  In 
1991, Caiden advanced the concept of “Public Maladm inistration” where he 
observes that organizations may have problems, whic h sometimes only come to 
light via the investigative process or from a whist leblower. (“What Really” 
p. 491) 
Caiden’s analysis would explain the reluctance of a  bureaucratic 
employee to report fraud in all sectors.  Caiden sa id, in a bureaucracy, 
organizational problems, such as crime, could remai n hidden forever, because 
employees are reluctant to come forward.  Per Caide n, employees may “agree 
what is being done is unsatisfactory” but they “[ar e not] prepared to take 
 
 
 
43
the first step.” (“What Really”, 1991, p. 491)  Cai den found “public 
maladministration” was present in both the public a nd private sectors. (“What 
Really”, 1991, p. 492)   
Overall, the Theory of Bureaucracy explains how org anizational 
processes may not always function for the good of t he organization as a 
whole, namely, to advance and foster a fraud hotlin e.  
Current Literature Relevant to the Research Questio n 
 
The central question of this work is as follows: Do es organizational 
bureaucracy affect fraud hotline performance?  The state of organizational 
bureaupathology can affect a fraud hotline in sever al ways.  For one, it can 
prevent employees from reporting known fraud.  It c an cause them to conceal 
known fraud, and it can also impede the organizatio n’s ability to handle 
hotline calls.  Overall, research demonstrates that  the presence of excessive 
bureaucracy can adversely affect a fraud hotline.  Because employees are the 
primary audience for employer-sponsored hotlines, t he perception of the 
employees as to the presence of bureaucracy in thei r organization is central 
to this work.  
A review of the Bureaupathology literature demonstr ates an association 
between high levels of bureaucracy and employees bo th underreporting, and 
concealing, fraud.  Additionally, the state of comp lexity and hierarchical 
rigidity, characteristic of bureaucracies, can crea te an organizational 
environment that could impede the successful operat ion of a fraud hotline. 
Bureaupathology and Hotlines 
First, it is important to review the potential effe cts bureaupathology 
can have on a fraud hotline, which include crime co ncealment, reduced fraud 
reporting and reduced hotline performance. 
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Crime Concealment 
 
Employees can react to excessive bureaucracy by con cealing crime. In 
his work “Excessive Bureaucratization: The J-Curve Theory of Bureaucracy and 
Max Weber through the Looking Glass,” Caiden says t he “excessive division of 
labor” present in an excessive bureaucracy results in a “detachment” on the 
part of the employee, which causes them to conceal known crime. (1985) 
Specifically, according to Caiden,  
 
“For most caught in excessive division of labor, th ere is a 
detachment that cares not whether the job is spoilt  or targets 
are reached, or property is stolen, or the work is constantly 
disrupted.  While they themselves may not deliberat ely act 
wrongly, they do not prevent others from doing so.  They keep 
their minds on their own business, which is staying  out of 
trouble.  They do not inform on wrong doing which c ould be a 
breach of work etiquette in their position, and, wh en required by 
peer pressure and identification, they protect wron gdoers by 
covering up.  They drift through life, or at least their work 
life, in a dream, doing whatever is necessary to ju stify their 
continued employment and membership, but not much m ore.  They do 
not believe – with reason – that anything they do w ill change 
their job situation.  It will all be much the same wherever they 
go and whatever they do.” (1985, p. 25) 
 
Excessive bureaucracy can also cause employees to b ecome insecure.  As 
a result, employees may not report potential crime for fear of being wrong.  
In 1998, Bozeman and Rainey find bureaucracy create s a work environment that 
has “an inherent flaw…providing a work environment highly conducive to the 
insecurities that flow between specialization and a uthority.”  (1998, p. 168)  
Researchers say employee insecurity can result in:  
“information asymmetry” where those at the top are responsible 
for tasks and outputs they neither perform nor full y understand, 
and in such cases they tend to rely on procedural c ontrol 
mechanisms (e.g., the number of forms filled out, n umber of 
clients processed) as substitutes for substantive c ontrol.  The 
attempt to control the work of subordinates in this  fashion 
creates a tendency for workers to “go by the book,”  avoid 
innovation, reduce the risk of error, and do little  more than 
what they are told.” (Scott, 2002, p. 478). 
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Reduced Fraud Reporting 
 
There are several reasons why an employee may not r eport fraud in an 
excessively bureaucratic environment.  For one, org anizational 
bureaupathology can cause an employee to have misal igned goals.  (Thompson, 
1961)  When this happens, an employee places their own goals over the success 
of the organization, which makes them reluctant to come forward to report 
fraud. (Giblin, 1981, p. 22)  Per Giblin, the “dens e interpersonal 
environment of modern bureaucracy…by its very natur e, elicits and rewards a 
narcissistic response.”  (1981, p. 22)  In other wo rds, instead of focusing 
on the goals of the organization (preventing and de tecting fraud) the 
employee focuses on their personal goals (getting r aises, promotions).  
(Thompson, 1961; Giblin, 1981; Caiden, 1985) 
In the extreme, theorists say bureaupathology can c ause an employee to 
focus solely on himself or herself.  As a result, e mployees subject to these 
conditions would not be concerned with organization al fraud.  Giblin says 
organizational bureaupathology can generate “neurot ic organizational 
behavior” in workers, which causes them to be overl y concerned with their own 
“hierarchical position and power” as opposed to fra ud reporting. (Giblin, 
1981) 
In addition, employees subject to bureaupathology w ith an excessive 
hierarchical structure, decide their own job tasks.   Therefore, if employees 
decide fraud reporting will not be a part of their job, it will not occur.  
Per Giblin, excessive bureaucracy manifesting in ex cessive hierarchy gives 
employees “excessive latitude” to “determine their own roles and activities” 
and may tend to select to engage in only those acti vities, which contribute 
to their own personal power or wealth.  (1981, p. 2 3) 
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Also, where excessive hierarchy exists, bureaupatho logy theorists say 
employees spend much of their time navigating the c omplex work environment, 
rather than focus on meaningful activities, such as  fraud detection. (Giblin, 
1981) 
Furthermore, bureaupathology causes employees to be come routinized in 
their duties.  When this happens, employees may not  consider deviating from 
their regular work routine, to do something such as  reporting fraud to a 
hotline. Bureaucracy theorists have said that organ izational bureaucracy 
breeds an environment where employees become insecu re in their 
responsibilities.  As a result, employees can have a “pathological response” 
where the individual worker will tend to do only “w hat they are told.”  
(Thompson, 1961, p. 150)  Per Thompson,  
Strict control from above encourages employees to ‘ go by the 
book,’ to avoid innovations and chances of error wh ich put black 
marks on the record.  It encourages decision by pre cedent, and 
unwillingness to exercise initiative or take a chan ce.  It 
encourages employees to wait for orders, and only d o what they 
are told.”  (Thompson, 1961, p. 150). 
  
Reduced Hotline Performance 
 
Bureaupathology may also result in an ill-functioni ng hotline that is 
unable to properly handle tips.  One reason for thi s is that managers may not 
be focused on the hotline’s success.  According to theorists like Giblin, 
managers in an excessively bureaucratic organizatio n tend to devote a 
majority of their attention on navigating the organ ization, as opposed to 
process improvement.  As a result, process and peop le management become 
secondary concerns.  Giblin says “the importance of  the professional’s 
knowledge and ability…become(s) secondary to the so cial skills required in 
the job – the ability to move oneself through the d ense interpersonal 
environment” and that “the higher the jobs are in t he organization, with 
corresponding emphasis on social intercourse, the m ore difficult it becomes 
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to truly evaluate these jobs.” (1981, p. 23) 
Excessive bureaucracy can also prevent managers fro m evaluating their 
programs.  As a result, performance issues with hot lines can go unnoticed.  
Per Giblin, excessive bureaucracy can keep manageme nt focus on himself or 
herself and away from “functional job content.” (19 81, p. 24) 
Hotline management by third-party companies can als o add to program 
bureaucracy. Third-party hotline providers manage m any, sometimes thousands, 
of public and private sector hotlines.  While using  an outside provider may 
add independence, researchers find the third party provider can add an 
additional layer of bureaucracy that may hinder the  investigative process. 
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 72) 
Bureaucracy can also inhibit the collaborative proc ess associated with 
hotline success.  Deloitte, in a report about whist leblowing post-Dodd-Frank, 
says the bureaucracy in most organizations presents  a challenge for 
information sharing and oversight of fraud hotline programs. (Deloitte, 2011, 
p. 2)  
Other Relevant Literature 
Additional literature that is relevant to this stud y is recent 
literature regarding the potential effect of bureau cracy on a major hotline, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s hotline.  Also relevant is 
literature concerning the use and value of Glassdoo r data in research.  
SEC Hotline and Bureaucracy 
 
Critics have said the SEC hotline is underperformin g due to 
bureaucracy. (Siedle, 2011)  Therefore it is import ant to briefly review this 
hotline in light of organizational bureaucracy. 
The SEC hotline was established in 2011, and 2012 r epresented their 
first full year of operation.  In that year, they r eceived 3,001 reports. 
 
 
 
48
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General, 2013) 
In 2013 they received 3,238 complaints, representin g an 8% increase from FY 
2012. (p. 8) Overall, since 2011, 6,573 tips have b een received by the SEC 
Office of the Whistleblower (OWB). (U.S. Securities  and Exchange Commission, 
2013, p. 8) 
Despite the number of calls received, statistics su ggest the “success” 
rate of the hotline, to date, is low.  The SEC defi nes the success of their 
whistleblower hotline tips as “ original information…that leads to the 
successful enforcement of a covered action…[which m akes the complainant] 
eligible to apply for a whistleblower award.” (SEC OWB, 2014)  Of these tips, 
as of October 2013, six resulted in an award to the  tipster. (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2013, p. 14) With 6,573 ti ps provided to the 
hotline, the program has a .09% “success rate.” 
Meanwhile, program evaluators for the SEC Whistlebl ower Program 
identified performance issues.  Specifically, their  absence of metrics.  
After their first year of operation, the SEC Office  of the Inspector General 
(OIG) conducted a full evaluation of the Whistleblo wer Program.  Upon review, 
they noted the absence of performance metrics.  Per  the OIG, “the 
whistleblower program’s internal controls need to b e strengthened by adding 
performance metrics” to “measure process performanc e.” (2013, pp. v, 38)  
According to the OIG, the absence of performance me trics “may result in the 
degradation in performance and unnecessary long res ponse times to 
whistleblower information.” (p. 21) 
The program’s absence of attention to performance i s consistent with 
Giblin’s theory, wherein he finds “This phenomenon of complex organizations 
facilitates, indeed encourages people in managerial  and administrative 
positions to engage in non-organizational goal-dire cted behavior.” (1981, p. 
23) 
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It is possible that potential callers have avoided the hotline due to 
perceived agency bureaucracy.  Recent media reports  have said the SEC could 
not properly vet whistleblower complaints.  (Singer , 2013; Tobe, 2013) 
Experts have said tipsters are “not coming forward with even valid claims 
because they are intimidated by the length of the b ureaucratic process” one 
that Forbes called “ponderous.” (Singer, 2013; Tobe , 2013) 
Glassdoor Data in Research 
This study analyzed anonymous employee reviews subm itted to the website 
Glassdoor.com for indicators of dysfunctional burea ucracy and 
bureaupathology.  Glassdoor.com is defined by Bloom berg BusinessWeek as 
follows:  
Glassdoor, Inc. operates as a free online jobs and career 
community. The company helps employees, job seekers , employers, 
and recruiters in finding and sharing information a bout the 
companies and jobs. It offers company reviews, inte rview 
questions and reviews, office photos, salary detail s, and 
information to make career decisions. The company p rovides job 
searches in the areas of customer service, part tim e, sales, 
warehouse, accounting, construction, healthcare, re tail, human 
resources, marketing, call center, clerical, data e ntry, 
insurance, driver, education, maintenance, entry le vel, nursing, 
IT, graphic design, summer, online, and finance. Gl assdoor, Inc. 
was founded in 2007 and is based in Sausalito, Cali fornia. 
(Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 2013) 
 The use of Glassdoor as an information source is b ecoming an industry 
trend.  At present, according to a recent article i n Business Insider, 700 
employers are currently partnering with Glassdoor t o gather information on 
job seekers. (Giang, 2013)  In addition, their data  is gaining popularity as 
a key industry resource.  For instance, online Info rmation Technology news 
provider ZD Net recently published an article where  they used Glassdoor data 
as the determining factor for business outlook proj ections over the ensuing 
six months. (King, 2013)  In this article, Glassdoo r ratings of leading 
companies such as Google and Amazon, was included i n the analysis.   
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 Glassdoor is also conducting their own reporting o n major companies 
using data entered by their users as a measure of t he company’s success.  For 
instance, in May 2013, Glassdoor examined Facebook using the measures of how 
respondent employees “[felt] about their work envir onment.”  (King)  Quotes 
from reviews taken directly from the website were i ncluded in the analysis.  
In fact, Glassdoor reports, including one conducted  annually called their 
“Top 25 Companies for Work Life Balance,” have appe ared prominently in recent 
articles featured in highly respected media outlets , such as Forbes.com 
(“Glassdoor: Digital Exuberance Hampers Work-Life B alance,” Judy Martin, 
Forbes.com, July 19, 2013), CNET (“Nokia, Yahoo Ran k Among Top Companies For 
Work-life Balance,” Rachel King [Tech Culture] July  19, 2013 NBC [Bay Area] 
(“Glassdoor: 5 Companies with Best Work-Life Balanc e Sit in Bay Area, Scott 
Budman, July 19, 2013), and North Bay Business Jour nal (“Glassdoor Breaks 
Into Global Online Job Search,” Loralee Stevens, Ap ril 15, 2013). 
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Chapter 3   Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology emp loyed in this work. 
This discussion includes a detailed description of the study subjects, the 
research method, and threats to validity, variables , procedure and data. 
Subjects 
 
This study was considered by the CUNY John Jay Coll ege of Criminal 
Justice Human Research Protections Program, and it was determined this 
project does not meet the definition of human subje ct research as defined by 
the federal regulations. (45 CFR 46.102(d)(f)), IRB NET ID (reference number) 
550166-1 (John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUN Y) HRPP Office, 2013) 
 This study uses a case study research method.  The  population of this 
study consists of six organization’s hotlines – two  in the private sector, 
three in the public sector (government entities) an d one in the nonprofit 
sector.  The subjects of this study will not be nam ed.  The reason their 
identity is being withheld is because their identit y is irrelevant to the 
overall research purpose.  Additionally, the hotlin e administrators and 
interview subjects were advised their personally in definable information 
would not be provided in writing.  This study could  provide the government 
entities, as they do not have an expectation of pri vacy due to Freedom of 
Information Laws. (FOIL) 
 The two private sector companies are in the financ ial industry.  They 
are bank holding companies that are ranked in the t op ten by the United 
States Federal Reserve System, based on consolidate d assets as of June 30, 
2012.  Represented among the government sector hotl ines are hotlines in the 
Federal, State and Local government sectors, along with a City Agency level 
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hotline.  The subject of this study was named by Fo rbes as one of the top 200 
largest charities. (Forbes, 2006) 
The names of the subjects of this research will be referenced 
throughout this study as (“Private Sector,” PS) PS1 , PS2; (“Government 
Sector,” GS) GS1, GS2, GS3 and (“Non Profit,” NP) N P1. 
PS1 is a financial services firm of approximately 6 1,899 employees (per 
their most recent Form 10-K, filed February 27, 201 2).  The hotline data from 
PS1 is from the years 2006-2007 (3Q 2006 to 4Q 2007 ).  During that time, PS1 
had anywhere from 48,000-55,000 employees. 
PS2 is a financial services firm of approximately 2 66,000 employees 
(per their most recent Form 10-K, filed February 24 , 2012). The fraud hotline 
data obtained from PS2 is from the years 2004-2010.   During that time, PS2 
had anywhere from 259,000–387,000 employees. 
 GS1, a federal organization, can expect to receive  tips from anyone in 
the United States (U.S.).  The U.S. population as o f July 2011 was 
311,591,917, according to the U.S. Census.  Accordi ng to agency documents, 
GS1 had 17,359 employees as of 2011. 
 GS2, a state level government, can expect to recei ve tips from anyone 
who resides in the State, which has a population of  5,711,767 as of July 
2011, according to the U.S. Census.  According to a gency documents, GS2 had 
283,351 public workers as of 2011. 
 GS3, a city level government, can expect to receiv e tips from anyone 
who resides in their city, which has a population o f 1,326,179 as of July 
2011, according to the U.S. Census.  According to a gency documents, GS3 has 
19,500 employees.  
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Design 
 
This study used a case study research method. The u nit of analysis in 
this study is organizations.  This case study exami ned the fraud hotline 
process in six organizations. 
The case study method was appropriate for several r easons.  For one, 
there is a lack of available data. Specifically, in dividual level fraud 
hotline data is difficult to obtain.  There are no reporting requirements and 
information in the public domain is limited.  Hotli ne administrators 
sometimes make hotline data available upon request for research purposes.  
But overall, the paucity of available empirical dat a limits the scope of 
quantitative analysis.   
In addition, the data provided often lacked the gra nular detail 
necessary to establish an association based on data  alone.  Rich qualitative 
detail, provided in case study format, was necessar y to establish a 
relationship between the independent variable, orga nizational bureaucracy and 
the dependent variable, fraud hotline process. 
 In addition, case studies are appropriate for this  research endeavor, 
for their unique ability to illuminate specific inc idences of deviance.  For 
that reason, researchers often use this method when  analyzing organizations.  
In the “Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Miscon duct and Disaster,” 
researcher Diane Vaughan advances case studies, ins ofar as they “hold 
memorable lessons about how organizational processe s systematically produce 
unanticipated outcomes that deviate from formal des ign goals and normative 
standards.” (1999, p. 277)  In his book “Why Law En forcement Organizations 
Fail” Patrick O’Hara (O'Hara, 2005) used a case stu dy method to analyze 
organizational deviance. 
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The case study is a collective case study design, i n that six 
organization’s fraud hotlines were examined.  Per q ualitative researcher 
Robert E. Stake (1995), collective case studies exa mine individual matters 
yet appreciate the relationships found between the subjects.  Specifically, 
Stake finds collective case studies embrace how “ea ch case study is 
instrumental to learning about the effects of [the independent variable on 
the dependent variable] but [consider the] importan t coordination between the 
individual studies.” (p. 4)  
This study included both a primary and secondary da ta collection 
approach, insofar as the researcher collected origi nal data from interviews, 
yet used the data of the subject organization to as sess their hotline’s 
performance.  This case study is also both qualitat ive and quantitative in 
nature, although it leans primarily qualitative, du e to data limitations.   
The case study method was used to examine whether, for a set of fraud 
hotlines, the hotline was performing according to e xpectations, by analyzing 
the individual calls received against the known fra uds that occurred in the 
organization.  
Interviews 
In order to obtain organizational data, four hotlin e managers were 
interviewed.  Three of the interview subjects were hotline managers in three 
of the subject organizations (PS1, PS2, NP1) and on e interview subject was a 
hotline account manager at The Network, a third par ty hotline provider who 
provides hotline services to several of the subject  organizations (PS1, PS2, 
and GS3) and whose benchmarking data was used in th is study.   For the most 
part, in this study, the data and information was o btained in the public 
domain and therefore is also not confidential. 
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The subjects were interviewed in their capacity as the keepers of 
organizational data.  The conversations took place with the purpose of 
obtaining their data, and to gain a general underst anding of their fraud 
hotline process.  This data and information was a p art of their ordinary 
business records.  As such, this data is not consid ered to be confidential. 
Nevertheless, the identity of the interview subject s will be kept private, as 
is not relevant to the research purpose. 
Interviews for this study were primarily conducted using a convenience 
and snowball sampling method, and the subjects were  selected on the basis of 
availability to the researcher and their willingnes s to participate in the 
interview process.  Interviews were conducted betwe en 2007 and 2013.  The 
interviews were primarily conducted to obtain organ izational data (hotline 
metrics).  For organizations were interviews were n ot required to obtain 
metrics, (GS1-3) interviews were not conducted. 
For PS1, one person was interviewed in 2007; a curr ent employee of the 
company (at the time of the interview) served as ho tline administrator for 
the company. For PS2, two people were interviewed i n 2012.  The subjects 
interviewed included a hotline administrator for th e company and a 
representative of The Network, the third party comp any that manages their 
fraud hotline.  
The hotline administrator was asked questions that could not be gleaned 
directly from the data, such as; the general number  of financial services and 
government clients they manage; the way that hotlin e complaints are handled 
from the point of receipt, to the point of reportin g to the client; whether 
individual level advice/analysis is provided to cli ents about their 
organization’s reporting trends; and how their empl oyees are trained to 
manage calls. 
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Threats to Validity 
 The threats to validity in this research effort re late to the number of 
cases, self-selecting participants, descriptive val idity and interpretative 
validity.  
Number of Cases 
 
 Case study research, although a highly celebrated method for 
organizational research, has been challenged with r espect to validity, 
reliability and generalizability. (Merriam, 1995)  One of the primary reasons 
that validity is challenged is due to the isolated number of items, or cases, 
researched.  Here, to control for that challenge, s everal organizations’ 
hotlines were chosen as subjects for review (six), and represent a range of 
business, in both the private and public sectors; i ncluding a medium and 
large financial services firm, and a city, state an d federal government 
entity and a nonprofit organization.  Complete rand omization is simply not 
possible in this instance, due to a limited availab ility of data. 
 To assure validity this study’s measurements, tria ngulation was used.  
In “The Art of Case Study Research,” Robert Stake a dvances triangulation as a 
method to overcome threats to validity.  Merriam fu rther advances this 
method, which in this case, will entail conversatio ns with the sources of the 
data, where possible, and peer consultation, which will further help to 
establish validity.   
 Here, interviews were conducted with three hotline  administrators, 
including one from each private sector organization , and with a 
representative from The Network, who is the third p arty hotline provider for 
several subjects of this study. Employee review dat a from Glassdoor.com was 
also used to validate research findings. Extensive company research in the 
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public domain was also conducted on each of these o rganizations, to validate 
information gleaned from employees.   
Self-Selecting Participants 
 
The employees who submitted reviews on Glassdoor.co m can be considered 
self-selecting participants, which creates a level of bias.  Glassdoor is a 
website that is available to the general public. Em ployees provide reviews of 
companies to this website on a completely voluntary  and anonymous basis.   
Overall, Glassdoor respondents come to the website independently, and 
chose to supply information on their own and withou t compensation.  In 
Glassdoor, employees are incentivized to provide th eir review as a condition 
of gaining access to the website to conduct their o wn research (the website 
also provides salary information, interview experie nces, among other 
information).  However, due to the detailed nature of the comments, the 
respondents believe the company monitors the conten t, and believe as 
respondents, they can effect organizational changes .   
Descriptive Validity 
 
Per Maxwell, qualitative research can suffer from d escriptive validity. 
(Maxwell, 1992) Here, this potential exists, as ind ividual researcher 
interpretation of the qualitative data (the analysi s of employee reviews) is 
potentially subject to interpretation. However, Max well finds this problem 
can be overcome by having “different observers come  to agree on their 
descriptive accuracy.” (Maxwell, 1992, p. 288) Here , the original data and 
the corresponding interpretation is provided by thi s study and can therefore 
be validated by the reader. 
 
Ideally, the comments could be validated via interv iew, or otherwise.  
However, in this case, the contributors are anonymo us.  There is value in 
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anonymous information, as is the spirit of an anony mous reporting mechanism 
(fraud hotline) that is the very subject of this st udy.  Therefore, it is 
clear anonymous information has merit. 
In addition, many of the comments were quite detail ed and included 
information specific to the organization, which wou ld have been difficult to 
fabricate.  Although there is an expected margin of  error with anonymous web-
based reviews, the validity of the reviews is suppo rted by the detailed 
information supplied.  
Interpretative Validity 
 
Maxwell acknowledges the possibility of interpretat ive validity in 
qualitative research, but says that it is essential ly impossible to overcome 
because researchers are constantly interpreting inf ormation provided by 
participants.  (1992, p. 290)  And obtaining additi onal data would not 
address this issue.  Per Maxwell, “there is no in p rinciple access to data 
that would unequivocally address threats to validit y. Interpretative validity 
is inherently a matter of inference from the words and actions of 
participants in the situations studied.”  (1992, p.  290) 
 
Here, the data entry process in Glassdoor further v alidated the data.  
On Glassdoor, participants are not lead toward any particular outcome.  The 
data field is open-ended, consisting of a simple te xt box for “Pros” and 
“Cons.”  In response, as indicated in this study, e mployees typed out very 
detailed responses.  This detail served to validate  the content, and gave 
credence to the content insofar as it indicated str ong emotion on the part of 
the employee, whether negative or positive in natur e.  As a result, the fact 
respondents may have indicated an excessive bureauc racy condition is a 
significant finding, considering the options for co mment were unlimited. 
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Notwithstanding the inherent bias, from a qualitati ve research 
perspective, this data is extremely valuable, insof ar as it provides a unique 
insight into a population that is otherwise unavail able to researchers.  The 
subject organizations would not permit such intervi ews or surveys of their 
employees for research purposes.  Therefore, the us e of existing data was 
critical in establishing employee mindset regarding  the presence of the 
independent variable in this study. 
The use of social media data was an ideal method fo r this research 
endeavor.  The perception of bureaucracy by the emp loyee is essential to this 
research effort, as the employees are the target au dience of company/agency 
fraud hotlines.  Employees could not be interviewed  for this study for this 
purpose (only certain hotline administrators could be interviewed).  Here, 
social media data provided insight to the mindset o f an otherwise unreachable 
population.  Secondly, this data is publically avai lable and accessible to 
researchers.  Additionally, Glassdoor contained dat a from all of the subject 
organizations, providing consistency.  Finally, the  anonymous, online 
interviews provided rich, candid detail from the pe rspective of the employee 
that may not have otherwise been gained from a pers onal interview. 
Data interpretation was also required due to the fo rmat in which the 
data was provided.  On Glassdoor, the reviews are n ot provided in a 
spreadsheet or otherwise readily analyzable form.  Instead, they are free-
form reviews where the respondent freely chooses th e language used (not 
selected from a list, etc.).  As a result, while th e reviews can be “sorted” 
by rating level, and limited other criteria, overal l research efforts involve 
reading each individual review for the qualitative informational content.   
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Inter-Coder Reliability 
 
To establish inter-coder reliability with the socia l media data 
analyzed in this study, two external coders were us ed to verify the data.    
Coders received 10% of randomized social media comm ents, which were 
randomized using the randomization feature in Excel .  The operationalized 
definitions they coded included the “type” which re fers to comments relating 
to either “bureaucracy” or “bureaupathic” (relating  to bureaupathology), as 
defined in this work.   
Once the comment type was determined by the coders,  they then coded the 
comments according to the defined attributes of bur eaucracy and 
bureupathology, which were defined for the coders b y a description of the 
attributes, as set forth in this work.  (The state of bureaucracy: (i) 
Hierarchy of Authority; (ii) System of Rules; (iii)  Technical Expertise; (iv) 
Career Service; and (v) Insistence on the Rights of  Office.  (Thompson, 1961) 
The state of bureaupathology, determined by the pre sence of 
bureaupathic conditions, was measured using the fol lowing attributes: (i) 
Impersonal Treatment; (ii) Prolonged Role Enactment ; (iii) Resistance to 
Change; (iv) Resistance to Interrogation and Invest igation; and (v) Strict 
Reliance on Organizational Rules and Procedures.  ( Thompson, 1961, pp. 153-
177) 
It was found that there was 95% inter-coder reliabi lity with 
bureaucratic/bureaupathological designations and 92 % inter-coder reliability 
with the attributes. 
Variables 
This work explores the relationship between organiz ational bureaucracy 
and fraud hotlines, using six organizations’ hotlin es as case studies.  The 
central question of this work is: Does organization al bureaucracy affect 
fraud hotline performance?   The variables in this study are as follows: The 
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Dependent Variable is Fraud Hotline Performance, an d the Independent Variable 
is Organizational Bureaucracy.   
Additional variables are identified in the research  sub-questions. The 
research sub-questions are as follows: (i) Does dys functional organizational 
bureaucracy exist in the six subject organizations?   (ii) Do employees 
perceive bureaupathology in the six subject organiz ations?  (iii) Does 
bureaupathology result in reduced hotline functiona lity?  (iv) Does 
bureaupathology result in low number of hotline cal ls?  (v) Does 
bureaupathology result in reduced best practices co mpliance? (vi) Does 
bureaupathology result in fraud, waste and abuse? 
The variables in the sub-questions include “low hot line calls,” 
“reduced hotline functionality,” “reduced best prac tices compliance” and 
“fraud, waste and abuse.”   
Primary Research Question 
 
The central question of this work is as follows: Do es organizational 
bureaucracy affect fraud hotline performance?  The independent variable is 
organizational bureaucracy and the dependent variab le is fraud hotline 
performance.  There are also six sub-questions in t his work. 
Independent Variable 
 
 The independent variable in this study is organiza tional bureaucracy.  
The dependent variable is fraud hotline performance . The variables were 
operationalized as follows.  In this study, organiz ations are the unit of 
analysis. Organizations are, by definition, “a comp any, business club, etc. 
that is formed for a particular purpose.”  (Merriam -Webster Dictionary, 2014)  
In this study, the organizations subject to analysi s were 2 private sector 
organizations, 3 public sector/government organizat ions and 1 nonprofit 
sector organization. 
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 The organizations subject to this study are not id entified by name in 
this work, for a number of reasons.  For one, some organizations (Private 
Sector and Nonprofit Sector) provided their data fo r research purposes, yet 
others were obtained in the public domain (Public S ector).  While the 
organizations didn’t object to being identified, th is study determined their 
identity was not relevant to the research purpose, which is to determine the 
effect of organizational bureaucracy on fraud hotli ne performance. 
 The independent variable of organizational bureauc racy was 
operationalized as follows.  First, it is of intere st to note that 
Bureaucracy is not “defined” per say, but rather is  known and determined by 
the presence of a set of attributes. (Tompkins, 200 5) The state of 
bureaucracy can be measured using the following kno wn attributes: (i) 
Hierarchy of Authority; (ii) System of Rules; (iii)  Technical Expertise; (iv) 
Career Service; and (v) Insistence on the Rights of  Office.  (Thompson, 1961) 
Bureaupathology is the state of excessive bureaucra cy, which is 
determined by the presence of bureaupathic conditio ns, which represent the 
negative effects of bureaucratic leadership. (Thomp son, 1961)  This study 
establishes the state of bureaupathology in the sub ject organizations, as it 
reveals the organization exhibits an excessive stat e of organizational 
bureaucracy.  The state of bureaupathology, determi ned by the presence of 
bureaupathic conditions, was measured using the fol lowing known attributes: 
(i) Impersonal Treatment; (ii) Prolonged Role Enact ment; (iii) Resistance to 
Change; (iv) Resistance to Interrogation and Invest igation; and (v) Strict 
Reliance on Organizational Rules and Procedures.  ( Thompson, 1961, pp. 153-
177)  
The presence of the independent variable of organiz ational bureaucracy 
in the subject organizations was determined by a li terature review and also 
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via a content analysis of employee reviews of their  company on the 
Glassdoor.com.  
Employees’ comments submitted to this website were analyzed for 
indicators of bureaucracy and bureaupathology, whic h were determined by 
qualitative evaluation.  The employee statements we re analyzed for specific 
reference to the established attributes, and itemiz ed in chart form then 
tabulated. 
The analysis also included a review the language fo r general mention of 
bureaucracy, such as the words “bureaucracy” and “r ed tape.”  In addition, 
language suggesting fraud, waste or abuse was also noted, demonstrated in the 
statements “misuse of funds” and a “waste of donate d income.” 
Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable of fraud hotline performanc e was operationalized 
as follows. The dependent variable of hotline perfo rmance was measured in 
terms of the subject hotline’s metrics, functionali ty and extent of best 
practices implementation. The metrics refers to the  number of calls received 
by the hotline during the time period analyzed.  Th e functionality of the 
hotline was operationalized using the following ele ments: marketing, 
mechanics, intake/process, and incentives.   
 Hotline best practices were operationalized using the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (“guidelines”) from the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC), effective November 1991.  The USSC develope d key criteria for 
establishing an “effective compliance program.” (De sio) The guidelines were 
established as a mitigating factor in organizationa l sentencing.  Per Paula 
J. Desio, (1997-2007) Deputy General Counsel to the  USSC,  
“Criminal liability can attach to an organization w henever an 
employee of the organization commits an act within the apparent 
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scope of his or her employment, even if the employe e acted 
directly contrary to company policy and instruction s. An entire 
organization, despite its best efforts to prevent w rongdoing in 
its ranks, can still be held criminally liable for any of its 
employees’ illegal actions. Consequently, when the Commission 
promulgated the organizational guidelines, it attem pted to 
alleviate the harshest aspects of this institutiona l 
vulnerability by incorporating into the sentencing structure the 
preventive and deterrent aspects of systematic comp liance 
programs. The Commission did this by mitigating the  potential 
fine range - in some cases up to 95 percent - if an  organization 
can demonstrate that it had put in place an effecti ve compliance 
program. This mitigating credit under the guideline s is 
contingent upon prompt reporting to the authorities  and the non-
involvement of high level personnel in the actual o ffense 
conduct. Compliance standards and procedures reason ably capable 
of reducing the prospect of criminal activity are ( i) oversight 
(by high level personnel), (ii) due care (in delega ting 
substantial discretionary authority), (iii) effecti ve 
communication (to all levels of employees), (iv) re asonable steps 
to achieve compliance (which include systems for mo nitoring, 
auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing withou t fear of 
reprisal (v) consistent enforcement (of compliance standards 
including disciplinary mechanisms), and (vi) reason able steps (to 
respond to and prevent further similar offenses upo n detection of 
a violation.”(p. 1) 
 
 Per Desio, the organizational guidelines were desi gned to be flexible 
for organizations.  In other words, the guidelines are not absolute.   
“The organizational guidelines criteria embody broa d principles 
that, taken together, describe a corporate ‘good ci tizenship’ 
model, but do not offer precise details for impleme ntation.  This 
approach was deliberately selected in order to enco urage 
flexibility and independence by organizations in de signing 
programs that are best suited to their particular 
circumstances.”(p. 1) 
 
Sub-question Variables 
 
The additional research variables are defined as fo llows.  Low hotline 
calls are defined as calls below established benchm arking levels.  Reduced 
hotline functionality will be established by measur ing the hotline on the 
following criteria: (i) marketing, (ii) mechanics, (iii) intake/processing 
and (iv) incentives.  Reduced best practices compli ance will be measured 
using the standards set forth by the Sentencing Gui delines for Organizations.   
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( i) oversight (by high level personnel), (ii) due ca re (in 
delegating substantial discretionary authority), (i ii) effective 
communication (to all levels of employees), (iv) re asonable steps 
to achieve compliance (which include systems for mo nitoring, 
auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing withou t fear of 
reprisal (v) consistent enforcement (of compliance standards 
including disciplinary mechanisms), and (vi) reason able steps (to 
respond to and prevent further similar offenses upo n detection of 
a violation.  
 
In this work, “fraud, waste and abuse” is limited t o corporate crime 
that was located in the public domain during the re levant time period, 
corresponding to the hotline metrics analyzed in th is study. In this work, 
corporate crime refers to employee embezzlement. Th e Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) defines embezzlement as the “mi sappropriation or 
misapplication of money or property entrusted to on e’s care, custody, or 
control.” (2002) 
The presence of fraud, waste, and abuse will be det ermined by a review 
of organizational documents, media reports, and emp loyee statements among 
other sources.  
Procedure 
 
 Overall, the methodology of this study was planned  to evaluate whether 
organizational bureaucracy had a consistent relatio nship with hotline 
performance. The procedure evaluates the presence a nd level of the 
independent variable of organizational bureaucracy in the organizations and 
the dependent variable of fraud hotline performance . The presence of crime 
was also measured to determine the possibility of r educed fraud reporting or 
crime concealment, per Bureaucracy Theory. 
 This methodology was employed using a case study d esign method.  For 
each organization, the following procedure was foll owed.  
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  The presence of organizational bureaucracy was de termined, generally, 
from the literature.  Then the perception of employ ees was determined by 
analyzing company reviews in social media.  The ind ividual comments were 
evaluated for the presence of the defined attribute s of bureaucracy and 
bureaupathology.  Each of these comments was evalua ted and the presence of 
each attribute was measured.  The presence of burea upathology was measured, 
based on the comments, using an established scale.  The strongest presence of 
various attributes was noted. 
 Fraud hotline performance was determined using the  three performance 
criteria: (i) metrics benchmarking; (ii) functional ity assessment; and (iii) 
best practices implementation. These three performa nce criteria were measured 
using defined scales to determine an overall assess ment value. 
 Further, to determine the presence of known intern al fraud, each 
organization was analyzed in the public domain.  Th e time period of this 
analysis corresponded directly to the time period o f the hotline metrics data 
obtained from the organization.  Evidence of intern al fraud was determined 
and tabulated. 
 The historical context of each organization was al so evaluated.  Again, 
this evaluation was conducted to correspond with th e time frame of the 
hotline metrics data obtained from the organization . 
 The case studies of each of the six organizations were conducted as 
follows.  First, the organization was researched fo r information relevant to 
determine the length of operation, number of employ ees, and other relevant 
background information.  The hotline specifications  of each organization were 
gleaned from their available organizational documen ts, company website, and 
interviews with hotline administrators.  Organizati onal documents analyzed 
include company Annual Reports and Fraud Hotline Re ports.  The website for 
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each organization was also analyzed from the perspe ctive of the employee 
(i.e., was the number externally accessible, as emp loyees often call hotlines 
after business hours and from locations other than the office). This study 
evaluated whether the hotline process potentially d eterred reporting, with 
complicated processes or deterrent language. 
Using Glassdoor data, the reviews of current and fo rmer employees of 
the subject companies, for all of the case study su bjects, PS1 (sample set), 
PS2 (sample set), GS1 (entire population), the GS2 (entire population), GS3 
(entire population) and NP1 (sample set) was examin ed and measured.  The 
Glassdoor interview data was measured using the ind ices of bureaucracy and 
bureaupathology. 
The number of reviews analyzed for each organizatio n varied.  For the 
private sector organizations (PS1 and PS2) and the nonprofit entity (NP1), 
due to the large size of the population (of reviews  available for research), 
the dataset analyzed was limited to a sample set co nsisting of the reviews 
that were deemed by Glassdoor measurement criteria to be below-average for 
that organization.   
The entire population of reviews for the organizati ons identified above 
was limited to a select sample size to make the res earch effort purposeful.  
The reason for limiting the sample size to “below-a verage” reviews is because 
it was reasoned the employee reviewers were likely to use the language 
indicating dysfunctional bureaucracy and bureaupath ology in “negative” 
reviews.  The reason for this is because people ten d to associate a negative 
connotation with the word “bureaucracy.”  It was be lieved, especially in an 
online review of their employer, an employee would be more likely to use 
language indicating bureaucracy in a review that wa s categorized by Glassdoor 
as “below average.”  This sampling method was purpo seful, and is a common 
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sampling technique for researchers wherein they “ac tively seek the most 
productive sample to answer the research question.”  (Marshall, 1996) 
For the remaining subjects, GS1, GS2, and GS3, the entire population of 
data was examined and measured using the indices of  bureaucracy and 
bureaupathology. 
Upon collection, this data was analyzed as follows.   To evaluate the 
level of bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy, or bureaupathology, the 
comments indicating each one of the measurement cri teria was counted and 
tabulated.  The percentage of respondents, who indi cated each measurement 
criteria, was viewed in light of the population, or  sample size of reviews 
evaluated.   
This study separated its evaluation of respondents and comments, for 
clarity.  This method was necessary to indicate whe re a single reviewer made 
comments indicating more than one aspect of measure ment criteria.  For 
instance, if one respondent made comments indicatin g three measurement 
criteria that was tabulated as 1 respondent, 3 comm ents.  At the end of the 
analysis, a percentage of respondents vs. comments was tabulated so that the 
distinction between the number of individual respon dents and the number of 
actual comments was clear. 
 Evidence of negative employee sentiment was report ed by this study, and 
was determined via the analysis of the general cons ensus of employee 
interviews posted on Glassdoor.  
The performance of the individual hotline was furth er assessed by 
benchmarking their fraud hotline metrics using esta blished industry figures 
produced by The Network. The Network, one of the la rgest third-party hotline 
providers, produces an annual benchmarking report.   
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The Network is the hotline administrator for approx imately 3,000 
clients.  Their client base is not publicized, but research demonstrated that 
certain clients sometimes publicly reveal they are clients of The Network.  
Hence this study determined The Network is the admi nistrator for at least 
three of the hotlines to be examined as part of thi s study (PS1, PS2 and 
GS3).  As a result, it can be reasonably inferred t he benchmarking data 
provided by The Network includes the data from the aforementioned 
organizations. 
 Next, the functionality and adherence to best prac tices was assessed. 
The individual functionality of the hotline was ass essed with respect to the 
following key hotline elements: marketing, mechanic s, intake/processing, and 
incentives.  
 Best practices implementation was determined by ev aluating the presence 
of the key criteria outlined by the U.S. Sentencing  Commission Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations in the subject organiz ations by reviewing 
organizational documents, media reports and other i nformation.  These 
guidelines were used because they were identified b y industry personnel 
(including the hotline administrators interviewed f or this study) as their 
source of best practices for their hotlines.  
 The level of internal fraud in the organization wa s determined from a 
review of organizational documents, media records a nd other public sources.  
The fraud included in this analysis was limited to fraud that involved 
employees, with a particular focus on fraud involvi ng multiple parties and 
was reportedly known to many people.  In other word s, fraud that should have 
been reported to the hotline.  The timeframe of fra ud reported as part of 
this analysis corresponds to the timeframe of the h otline metrics analyzed.  
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Next, the incidence of employee fraud was establish ed for the 
organization, during the relevant time period, whic h is the time frame 
corresponding to the hotline data.  While the entir e universe of employee 
fraud cannot be established with the data available  today, the level of 
employee fraud was evaluated based on data obtained  in the public domain 
(media reports). The presence of employee fraud in the given subject 
organization established whether employees committe d internal fraud, during 
the relevant time period, which could have been rep orted via the hotline.   
 Best practices implementation was determined by ev aluating the presence 
of the key criteria outlined by the U.S. Sentencing  Commission in the subject 
organizations by reviewing organizational documents , media reports and other 
information. 
 To determine a final performance level, each perfo rmance criterion was 
measured using a scale.  The scale weighed the resu lt of the 3 performance 
criteria: (i) metrics benchmarking; (ii) the functi onality assessment; and 
the (iii) best practices implementation.    
Next, the historical context for each time period c orresponding to the 
hotline data collected was analyzed.  Here, the “hi storical context” included 
any data, which could serve to supplement the under standing of the potential 
state of hotline reporting at that time correspondi ng to the metrics.  
Historical context could include; the state of the subject industry; any 
known social or environmental conditions giving ris e to fraud; and the 
results of surveys conducted during this time perio d, among other relevant 
information. The historical context was determined by a literature review, to 
include media reports from the pertinent timeframe.  
In each case study, the focus of the organizational  analysis, to 
include the waste, fraud and abuse, was limited to the period corresponding 
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to the hotline data received.  The data used to ben chmark the case study data 
corresponded to the year of hotline data. 
When benchmarking the data, the two known benchmark ing figures were 
averaged to determine a true benchmark.  In the hot line benchmarking data, 
two different benchmarking numbers are provided – o ne for size, and another 
for industry.  Here, in each case study, an average  of these figures was 
obtained to determine a true benchmarking figure. 
Measurement Scales 
 
The measurement scales in this study were designed to interpret the 
information in the following ways.  The bureaupatho logy scale was created to 
assess the degree of comments present (indicating d ysfunctional bureaucracy 
and bureaupathology).  The remaining scales were de signed to measure the 
general presence of indicators (functionality and b est practices).  Overall, 
the scales were designed where the lower number of points was a “better” 
score for the organization and the higher number of  points was a “worse” 
score for the organization. 
The presence of bureaupathology in each organizatio n was measured using 
the following scale, corresponding to the percentag e of employee comments 
indicating the presence:  
0-10% Present 
11-20%  
21-30%  
31-40% 
41-50% Elevated 
51-60% 
61-70% 
71-80% 
81-90% 
91-100% Extreme 
 
Fraud hotline performance was determined using the three performance 
criteria: (i) metrics benchmarking; (ii) functional ity assessment; and (iii) 
 
 
 
72
best practices implementation. These three performa nce criteria were measured 
using defined scales to determine an overall assess ment value.  Overall, the 
scales were designed where the lowest score determi ned a more successful 
hotline. The scales were as follows.   
The hotline metrics were scaled as follows: (1 poin t) High- Meets or 
exceeds benchmarking in each year of analysis; (3 p oints) Low- Does not meet 
benchmarking estimates in many years of analysis;(5  points) Poor- Does not 
meet benchmarking estimates in any year of analysis  
The hotline functionality was scaled as follows: Th e functionality 
assessment criteria of (i) marketing, (ii) mechanic s, (iii) intake/processing 
and (iv) incentives were assessed on a scale where the failure in each area 
was assessed with a single point, where: 4 of 4 Fai lure; 3 of 4 Poor; 2 of 4 
Moderate; 1 of 4 Great; 0 of 4 High. 
The best practices were assessed on a scale where o ne point was 
assessed for each of the areas that were not satisf ied, including (i) 
oversight, (ii) due care, (iii) effective communica tion, (iv) reasonable 
steps to achieve compliance, (v) consistent enforce ment, (vi) reasonable 
steps to prevent future offenses: 6 of 6 Failure; 5  of 6 Poor; 4 of 6 Weak; 3 
of 6 Moderate; 2 of 6 Good; 1 of 6 Great; 0 of 6 Hi gh. 
The points for each the hotline metrics, functional ity and best 
practices were added to achieve a final performance  scale, as follows: Low: 
14-15 points; Below Average: 10-13 points; Average:  7-9 points; Above 
Average: 5-8 points; High: 0-4 points. 
The historical context was analyzed using the follo wing scale: It was 
considered conducive to fraud if it is established that conditions indicated 
there was significant employee fraud at the time of  analysis and it is 
 
 
 
73
believed to have been underreported via the hotline ; It was considered 
conducive to increased calls if it is established t hat conditions indicate 
the hotline should have been getting a higher volum e of calls, or if it is 
determined employees are underreporting; It was con sidered not conducive to 
fraud if it is established that conditions indicate  there was not significant 
employee fraud at the time of the analysis and it i s not believed to be 
underreported via the hotline; finally, it was cons idered not conducive to 
increased calls if it is established that condition s indicate the hotline was 
receiving the proper amount of calls, or if it is d etermined employees have 
reported crimes via the hotline 
 
Data 
For PS1, the hotline data supplied was from 3Q of F Y2006 to December 6, 
2007.  For PS2, the hotline data analyzed included calls received to the 
hotline from 2004-2010.  At GS1, the data analyzed was from the Fiscal Years 
2003-2012.  Data concerning the performance of the State of GS2’s hotline was 
obtained for the years 2008-2012.  The hotline metr ics analyzed for GS3 were 
between 2006 and 2012.  For NP1, the hotline metric s analyzed were from their 
FY 2012 (July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013).   
 
Table 1 Data Table Template 
 
Following each case study, the research assessments  are presented in a 
table.  Each independent and dependent variable and  their corresponding 
indices are itemized, and the presence of each is i ndicated.  The assessment 
table appears as follows: 
Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Size       
Hotline Name       
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Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Management       
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
      
Bureaucracy IV       
Bureaupathology 
IV 
      
Hotline Metrics 
(DV) 
      
Hotline 
Functionality 
(DV) 
     
 
 
Best Practices 
(DV) 
   
 
   
Historical 
Context (DV) 
      
Evidence of 
Internal Fraud 
      
Evidence of 
Negative 
Employee 
Sentiment 
      
Result IV   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Result DV   
 
    
Notes       
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Key 
Table 2 Key 
Indices 
Bureaucracy:  (a) Hierarchy of Authority, (b) System of Rules, ( c) Technical 
Expertise, (d) Career Service, and (e) Insistence o n the Rights of Office.  
 
Bureaupathology:  (f) Impersonal Treatment, (g) Prolonged Role Enact ment, (h) 
Resistance to Change, (i) Resistance to Interrogati on and Investigation, and 
(j) Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and Pro cedures.  
 
Functionality:  (k) marketing, (l) mechanics, (m) intake/processin g, and (n) 
incentives.  
 
Best practices:  (p) oversight (by high level personnel), (q) due c are (in 
delegating substantial discretionary authority), (r ) effective communication 
(to all levels of employees), (s) reasonable steps to achieve compliance 
(which include systems for monitoring, auditing, an d reporting suspected 
wrongdoing without fear of reprisal (t) consistent enforcement (of compliance 
standards including disciplinary mechanisms), and ( u) reasonable steps (to 
respond to and prevent further similar offenses upo n detection of a 
violation. 
  
Scales 
 
Hotline Metrics  
(1 point) High- Meets or exceeds benchmarking in ea ch year of analysis 
(3 points) Low- Does not meet benchmarking estimate s in many years of 
analysis 
(5 points) Poor- Does not meet benchmarking estimat es in any year of analysis 
 
Functionality Scale  
(points) 4 of 4 Failure; 3 of 4 Poor; 2 of 4 Modera te; 1 of 4 Great; 0 of 4 
High 
  
Best Practices Scale  
(points) 6 of 6 Failure; 5 of 6 Poor; 4 of 6 Weak; 3 of 6 Moderate; 2 of 6 
Good; 1 of 6 Great; 0 of 6 High 
 
Performance Scale  
Low: 14-15 points 
Below Average: 10-13 points 
Average: 7-9 points 
Above Average: 5-8 points 
High: 0-4 points 
 
Bureaupathology Scale (by % of comments)  
1.  0-10% Present 
2.  11-20%  
3.  21-30%  
4.  31-40% 
5.  41-50% Elevated 
6.  51-60% 
7.  61-70% 
8.  71-80% 
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9.  81-90% 
10.  91-100% Extreme 
 
Historical Context  
-Conducive to fraud if it is established that condi tions indicate there was 
significant employee fraud at the time of analysis and it is believed to have 
been underreported via the hotline 
-Conducive to increased calls if it is established that conditions indicate 
the hotline should have been getting a higher volum e of calls, or if it is 
determined employees are underreporting 
-Not conducive to fraud if it is established that c onditions indicate there 
was not significant employee fraud at the time of t he analysis and it is not 
believed to be underreported via the hotline 
-Not conducive to increased calls if it is establis hed that conditions 
indicate the hotline was receiving the proper amoun t of calls, or if it is 
determined employees have reported crimes via the h otline
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Chapter 4   Case Studies 
 
This chapter reviews the six case studies conducted  as part of this 
work.  The case study subjects are anonymous and ar e identified as Case 
Studies 1-6.  Case Study 1 (PS1) is a medium sized private sector 
organization in the financial industry.  Case Study  2 (PS2) is a large sized 
private sector organization in the financial indust ry. Case Study 3 (GS1) is 
a public sector/government organization in the fede ral government.  Case 
Study 4 (GS2) is a public sector/government organiz ation in the state 
government.  Case Study 5 (GS3) is a public sector/ government organization in 
the city government.  Case Study 6 (NP1) is a large , nonprofit organization. 
Case Study 1 (PS1) 
Case Study 1, PS1, is a private company - a medium sized financial 
services organization. 
Background 
 
Incorporated in 1981 with predecessor companies est ablished in 1924, 
PS1 is a well-known and established financial servi ces firm. PS1 has a global 
presence, including regional offices and branches t hroughout the U.S., along 
with principal offices in London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and other world financial 
centers; their client base includes corporations, g overnments, financial 
institutions and individuals. (Annual Report 2007)  According to their 2007 
Annual Report, as of November 2007, PS1 had 48,256 employees worldwide. This 
figure does not include contract or consultant empl oyees, which, if included, 
would increase this number.  
Bureaucracy 
 
It is evident from their organizational documents t hat PS1 operates 
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under a highly bureaucratic structure.  The instanc e of bureaucracy in the 
financial industry is well documented.  Bureaucraci es are often characterized 
by their complexity.  The complexity of PS1 is evin ced in their 
organizational structure, as enumerated in their 20 07 Annual Report.  Here, 
the organization is described as a multi-division c ompany with several highly 
specialized departments, to include Institutional S ecurities, Global Wealth 
Management Group, and Asset Management.  Within eac h department are multiple, 
complex functions. 
PS1 also says their complexity can cause employee f raud.  In their 
organizational documents, PS1 says their complexity  can cause financial loss 
to shareholders.  PS1 also says they rely on employ ees, who can be 
responsible for financial loss. Specifically, in th eir 2007 Annual Report, 
PS1 says:  
“Our businesses are highly dependent on our ability  to process, 
on a daily basis, a large number of transactions ac ross numerous 
and diverse markets in many currencies. In general,  the 
transactions we process are increasingly complex. W e perform the 
functions required to operate our different busines ses either by 
ourselves or through agreements with third parties.  We rely on 
the ability of our employees [emphasis added], our internal 
systems and systems at technology centers operated by third 
parties to process a high volume of transactions. W e also face 
the risk of operational failure or termination of a ny of the 
clearing agents, exchanges, clearing houses or othe r financial 
intermediaries we use to facilitate our securities transactions. 
In the event of a breakdown or improper operation o f our or third 
party’s systems or improper action by third parties or employees, 
we could suffer financial loss, an impairment to ou r liquidity, a 
disruption of our businesses, regulatory sanctions or damage to 
our reputation.”   [Emphasis added] Despite the business 
contingency plans we have in place, our ability to conduct 
business may be adversely affected by a disruption in the 
infrastructure that supports our business and the c ommunities 
where we are located. This may include a disruption  involving 
physical site access, terrorist activities, disease  pandemics, 
electrical, communications or other services used b y PS1, its 
employees or third parties with whom we conduct bus iness.” 
 
Upon examination of organization documents, it is c lear PS1 has a 
highly bureaucratic structure. This study will next  consider whether the 
employees of PS1 perceive the effects of organizati onal bureaucracy. 
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Next, to determine employee perception of bureaucra cy, employee reviews 
of PS1 were examined on Glassdoor. On Glassdoor, as  of July 1, 2013, 1001 
reviews of PS1 were posted by anonymous sources tha t are identified as 
current and past PS1 employees.  Overall, from thes e reviewers, PS1 received 
an average of a 3.4 on a 5-point scale.  This trans lates into an “average” 
rating by Glassdoor.   
The reviews analyzed for this examination were limi ted to those reviews 
where the respondents “rated” the company to be “be low average,” or in this 
case, rated it under 3 stars. This limited the numb er of reviews included for 
examination to 195, which constituted approximately  19.5% of all reviews. 
Of these reviewers, 45, or 23% made reference to sp ecific terminology 
related to bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy. T he number of respondents 
and comments are not equivalent, because in certain  cases, respondents’ 
comments were counted more than once when their com ments spanned multiple 
categories.  The total number of comments was 54.  Overall, the “below 
average” reviews examined referenced a bureaucratic  atmosphere, where 
employees reported having limited professional lati tude, in roles that were 
tedious, boring and repetitive.   
The comments examined were posted to the website be tween and June 12, 
2008 and May 9, 2013.  In these comments, employees  said, generally speaking, 
they did not perform beyond their job description. In addition, they also had 
a generally unfavorable view of management, who in their view largely spent 
much of their time protecting their own job.  
Overall, 23% of the sample set, which constituted 5 % of the population, 
have confirmed and validated the general existence of bureaucracy, which was 
perceived to have reached a bureaupathic level.  General and specific 
references to the attributes of bureaucracy and bur eaupathic or excessive 
bureaucracy is included in Table 3 and the Data Set  is listed in Table 4. 
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Table 3 PS1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Analysis Summa ry 
 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 6/12/08 – 5/9/13 5 year time period 
Population 1001 2.1% of all employees (48,256) 
Sample Set 195 19.5% of the population (1001) 
.40 of all employees (48,256) 
Respondents Indicating 
Bureaucracy or Bureaupathic 
Behaviors 
45 23.1% of the sample set (195) 
4.5% of the population (1001) 
.09% of all employees (48,256) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and Bureaupathology 
54  31 Bureaucracy  
23 Bureaupathic 
Bureaucracy 
 
31 General (12) 
Hierarchy of Authority (4) 
System of Rules (3) 
Technical Expertise (3) 
Career Service (3) 
Insistence on the Rights of Office (6) 
Bureaupathic 
 
23 Impersonal Treatment (6) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (9) 
Resistance to Change (1) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation 
(5) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and 
Procedures (2) 
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Table 4 PS1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set 
 
Count Type Attribute  Comment Date  
1.   Bureaucracy General “red tape”  6/12/08 
2.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
 “too many chiefs and not enough Indians”  6/12/08 
3.   Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “you are expected to… accomplish 
incredibly complex tasks.”  
6/25/08 
4.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“highly stratified environment”  9/7/08 
5.   Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“immoral practices”  1/5/09 
6.   Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “very complex”  2/6/09 
7.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“middle management too layered”  3/18/09 
8.   Bureaucracy General “feels more bureaucratic by th e day”  6/12/09 
9.   Bureaucracy General “silo[ed]”  8/18/09 
10.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “sweatshop”  11/23/09 
11.  Bureaucracy General “it was like working for govern ment”  1/8/10 
12.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“too compartmentalized; they have people 
do [sic] the same function over and over 
with little opportunity to learn outside 
small role”  
10/1/10 
13.  Bureaucracy Career Service “it is almost impossible  to get fired”   2/11/11 
14.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“work is boring and repetitive”  3/11/11 
15.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“everyday is the same thing over and over 
again”  
3/27/11 
16.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“my manager …expected a great amount of 
respect for her position”  
4/26/11 
17.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“can get stuck doing one function for a 
long time”  
5/30/11 
18.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“egos rule the roost and only those who 
stroke them get ahead”  
8/1/11 
19.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“the same exact thing everyday”  11/24/11 
20.  Bureaucracy Career Service “low attrition”  2/5/12 
21.  Bureaucracy General “there is a lot of red tape”  2 /27/12 
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Count Type Attribute  Comment Date  
22.  Bureaucracy General “the environment does not need to become 
more bureaucratic  
3/8/12 
23.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you are often ju st a number”  3/29/12 
24.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“tedious work”  4/14/12 
25.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“extremely dull, repetitive place to work”  4/17/12 
26.  Bureaucracy General “bureaucratic overhead is stagg ering here”  4/23/12 
27.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“so much corporate waste”   4/26/12 
28.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“dishonest”  4/30/12 
29.  Bureaucracy General “extremely political and bureau cratic”  5/8/12 
30.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “you will not be rewarded for innovation, 
intelligence, or even a job well done if 
it contradicts the politics that impact 
the manager’s bonus calculation” 
5/13/12 
31.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures 
“way too much politics and not very 
innovative”  
7/13/12 
32.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“repetitive tasks”  9/14/12 
33.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “[to managers] “h ave a heart; you are not 
managing robots in a production line”  
9/23/12 
34.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior managers…more often than not use 
their subordinates to bolster their 
positions  
9/23/12 
35.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“self-centered, public deceiving 
scoundrels at best; crooks and liars and 
cheats even”  
9/25/12 
36.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“wake up with cold sweats of guilt and 
shame”  
9/25/12 
37.  Bureaucracy General “increasing regulatory red tape ”  9/30/12 
38.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “cold and imperso nal…no concern for the 
individual”  
10/4/12 
39.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on “the simplest tasks  become an almighty 11/14/12 
 
 
 
8
3
Count Type Attribute  Comment Date  
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures 
chore involving multiple layers of non-
value adding bureaucracy”  
40.  Bureaucracy General “at the end of the day, you are  fully 
aware you are a small cog in a giant 
machine”  
12/3/12 
41.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you are truly he adcount here and nothing 
more”  
12/5/12 
42.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“[employees] are just peasants there to 
serve the kings”  
12/5/12 
43.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“you learn your role thoroughly”  12/26/12 
44.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“top heavy”  2/9/13 
45.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“very hierarchical, almost with military 
rigidity”  
2/9/13 
46.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “good opportunity t o learn/specialize in 
one area”   
2/28/13 
47.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you feel like a number”  3/7/13 
48.  Bureaucracy Career Service “[in the past 7 years] w orkers…[career 
longevity was] probably….10+ years  
3/7/13 
49.  Bureaucracy General “approach is segmented”  3/7/13  
50.  Bureaucracy General “it seems to be more like worki ng in a 
government organization”  
3/25/13 
51.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior management are ‘yes men’ afraid to 
disagree”  
5/6/13 
52.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “tedious processes to get even the 
simplest task done”  
5/9/13 
53.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “new systems are compl icated, cumbersome 
and difficult to navigate”  
5/9/13 
54.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “systems are compli cated, cumbersome and 
difficult to navigate”  
5/9/13 
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Now that the presence of bureaucracy and perception  of bureaucracy on 
the part of employees has been established, it is important to understand the 
specifics regarding PS1’s hotline and how it is ope rated. 
Hotline Specification 
 
PS1’s hotline is called the “integrity hotline.” Al though PS1’s hotline 
was technically operational as of May 2004, the cal ls received were so few 
that formal statistics were not maintained until 3Q  of 2006.  
The statistics concerning the number of calls made to their hotline is 
not externally publicized.  However, PS1 invites th e public in their Proxy 
Statement, dated February 23, 2007, to examine thei r hotline policy via their 
website or by requesting it in writing (p. 11).  On their corporate website, 
they describe their hotline as follows: 
Integrity Hotline 
Concerns relating to ethical or business conduct ma tters, including 
accounting, internal accounting controls or auditin g matters, may be 
brought to the Company's attention through an indep endent vendor 
engaged to receive calls regarding such concerns. T he calls may be made 
anonymously and confidentially. Click here [linked content]  to view the 
vendor's telephone numbers by country. 
 
Further research concluded the link returned a global list of hotline 
telephone numbers.  At the end of the page, users w ho experience any problems 
with the telephone numbers are asked to contact a P S1 Integrity Hotline 
contact.  However, no specific contacts were linked , named, etc. and could 
not otherwise be located.   
Interview 
 
PS1’s Hotline Administrator (HA1) was interviewed a s a part of this 
study, to obtain the organizational data.  The iden tity of the Hotline 
Administrator, known here as HA1, is being withheld  for privacy.  The 
interview was conducted on November 6, 2007 and fol low-up conversations took 
place in the ensuing days via email.   
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HA1 
 
According to HA1, hotline administrator at PS1, PS1  uses a third party 
hotline service provider, The Network, to manage th eir hotline. (Confirmed by 
a Hotline Administrator for The Network, interviewe d on September 4, 2012, 
validated this fact.) In 2007, PS1’s third party ho tline administrator was 
Global Compliance (which is now known as NAVEX Glob al).   
Internally, the Legal and Compliance department man ages their hotline. 
According to court documents filed between 2002 and  2008, PS1 employed 500 
Compliance Officers. (Complaint, p. 12)  The Legal and Compliance department 
receives the data from The Network, compiles the da ta and manages the 
complaint escalation process.  At PS1, the keeper o f the hotline data, or the 
hotline administrator, was a single employee, who w as in a non-officer title 
with the company.  
HA1 described the process for obtaining the hotline  data from the 
third-party provider.  HA1 electronically accessed a system maintained by the 
provider.  HA1 advised ten employees total from PS1  had access to this system 
“on paper” but HA1 was the only employee that actua lly used it.  As for 
disclosure, according to HA1, all calls to the hotl ine are reported to the 
firm’s audit committee and are logged in a quarterl y report. 
With respect to advertisement, HA1 advised the inte rnal advertisement 
for the fraud hotline consisted of a web posting, a  mention in an internal 
procedural manual and a monthly email reminder sent  to employees. 
In terms of external advertisement, it was noted in  their 2007 Annual 
Report, the hotline was mentioned a single time, to  say the integrity hotline 
was posted on the corporate governance page of thei r website.  However, 
additional information is provided to shareholders (and accessible to the 
general public) in their proxy statements.   
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In available public documents, the hotline number w as not provided.  
The global numbers are provided on their website.  However, research 
determined it was challenging to locate.  A simple Internet search didn’t 
yield the number, unless the researcher specificall y used the same 
terminology as the organization, “Integrity Hotline .”   
HA1 said PS1 wanted to increase advertisement of th e hotline.  
According to HA1, PS1’s attorney/managers who have knowledge of the hotline’s 
performance are very interested in efforts to make the hotline better known 
to the general employee population.  However, HA1 s aid these managers are 
also viewing the hotline as a SOX requirement.  Per  HA1, “They do not seem to 
understand why an employee would not report crimina l activity to their 
supervisor.”  However, per HA1, management had futu re plans to incorporate an 
anonymous reporting mechanism via a website. 
HA1 also provided some details concerning caller an onymity. According 
to HA1, most hotline callers chose to remain anonym ous.  Callers are given a 
reference number and are encouraged to call back to  check on the progress of 
the investigation.  However, according to HA1, most  callers, around 99%, do 
not call back.  
Hotline Metrics 
 
The sample size of the data is fraud hotline caller s, internal 
(employees) or external (i.e., vendors) persons, wh o called the fraud hotline 
from March 1, 2006 to November 31, 2007, or between  3Q FY2006 and 4Q FY2007.  
No identifying data was provided regarding the call ers (i.e., race, sex, 
age).  This time period is significant, in that it represents the first year 
that statistics were formally maintained for this h otline (which could also 
be interpreted as the first full year of the hotlin e’s operation). 
The data supplied was limited to a breakdown of the  overall number of 
calls received to the hotline, broken down by FY Qu arter, from 3Q of FY2006 
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to December 6, 2007 to reflect the total for 4Q FY 2007).  This timeframe 
corresponds to the data set obtained.  At this time , the FY, or fiscal year, 
for PS1, was from December to November.  Their fisc al year quarters were: 1Q: 
December-February; 2Q: March-May; 3Q: June-August; 4Q: September-November.  
To benchmark this data, this study used the 2009 Co rporate Governance 
and Compliance Benchmarking Report.  The Network an d BDO Consulting produce 
this report on an annual basis.  As the hotline pro vider for this 
organization, it is appropriate to use this figure to benchmark their calls. 
In the benchmarking reports, produced by The Networ k, there are an 
average number of calls expected per company size a nd per industry, per year.  
These figures were averaged to produce the ideal be nchmarking figure per 
year, tailored to the organizations industry and si ze.  It should be noted 
that the benchmarking report groups the financial i ndustry along with the 
construction and real estate industry (and they wou ld not provide 
disaggregated data).  Therefore, this figure has in herent limitations, which 
have been controlled by using the size of the compa ny to adjust the figure.  
The number was rounded to the nearest decimal. 
In summary, according to the data, this organizatio n, a major, global 
financial services firm, in the latter half of FY 2 006, received only 14 
complaints when benchmarking figures suggest they s hould have received 194.  
This means they only received 7% of the calls that they should have received, 
based on their industry and size. 
In 2007, this organization received only 35 complai nts when 
benchmarking figures suggest they should have recei ved 386.  Therefore, in 
2007, they only received 9% of the calls they shoul d have received, based on 
their industry and size.   
Although we do see an extremely slight improvement from 2006-2007, this 
organization is not receiving the number of calls t hey should receive, based 
on the level of internal fraud. 
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Table 5 on the next page depicts the hotline metric s for PS1.
 
 
 
8
9
Table 5 PS1 Hotline Metrics 
Q/FY Time Period  Number of 
Employees 
Calls  Average Benchmarking 
Figure Size, Industry 
Calls Expected per 
Benchmarking 
Delta Percentage of Actual 
vs Benchmarking 
3Q 
2006  
June – 
August 
55,310(As per 
November 30, 
2006) 
6 7.9,6.06 = 7 387/2 = 194 194-
14= 
180 
7% 
4Q 
2006  
September – 
November 
8 
1Q 
2007  
December – 
February 
48,256(As of 
November 30, 
2007) 
8 8.5,7.93 = 8 386 386-
35= 
351 
9% 
2Q 
2007  
March – May 9 
3Q 
2007 
June – 
August 
14 
4Q 
2007 
September – 
November 
4 
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Fraud Metrics 
 
Internal crime metrics for financial firms can be d ifficult to obtain.  
There are many reasons for this.  For one, internal  crimes may not be 
reported outside the organization.  Only the crimes /litigation matters that 
are determined to have a “material adverse effect” against the company are 
reported in their Annual Reports.   
For those crimes, which are reported internally, th e data is often not 
accessible by external parties.  For instance, in t he case of an 
organizational crime, the firm would be required to  file a Suspicious 
Activities Report (SAR).  However, individual firms  SARs are not made 
available for public inspection or review.   
It is possible that litigation records documenting employee crime may 
exist.  But to obtain these records for a global fi nancial firm would be an 
exhaustive task.  The records in each County, City,  State and Federal 
jurisdiction would have to be searched in all 50 st ates, along with 
individual commonwealths, just in the United States  alone.  Global litigation 
records are equally challenging to obtain, and ofte n require an individual to 
personally retrieve them.   
As a result, the indicators of fraud in the subject  organizations were 
obtained via publically available media reports.  I t should be noted that 
PS1’s 2007 Annual Report does not contain any discl osures regarding employee 
crime. 
 
It is well known that during the relevant time peri od, massive employee 
fraud was occurring in the financial industry.  In the case of PS1, specific 
evidence was located which implicated particular em ployees in the larger 
schemes taking place at the time, as well as those who were engaged in 
separate internal incidents, which resulted in majo r losses for the company.  
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Overall, the internal fraud reported in the public record which took 
place in the one year time period between March 1, 2006 and November 31, 
2007, involved 5 employees, who through embezzlemen t, data theft and 
corruption, cost the organization $9 million. 
The incidents located included the following crimes .  According to an 
SEC press release dated September 20, 2007, two PS1  employees and three 
associates/relatives, were indicted in a criminal c ase where it was alleged 
that these employees engaged in a securities fraud scheme, which was 
investigated from 2005-2007.  These employees were believed to have charged 
erroneous finder’s fees and received kickbacks. One  such employee, a PS1 Vice 
President, pleaded guilty to defrauding PS1 of over  $4 million (Chung, 2010). 
The relatives of both employees were found to have hidden the stolen money in 
shell companies. (“SEC Charges 38 Defendants,” 2007 )  This employee died in 
an accident before his sentencing, so it is unclear  whether PS1 was ever able 
to fully recoup these losses. 
In 2007, it was reported that a PS1 employee, a cli ent service 
representative, was arrested and charged with consp iracy after stealing 
proprietary information from his hedge fund clients  from 2005-2006.  It is 
believed that this employee conspired with several additional PS1 workers in 
furtherance of his crimes, including a computer con sultant. (Bosworth, 2007) 
Furthermore, during the relevant time period, anoth er PS1 employee was 
found to have been stealing client money.  Between September 2001 and 
December 2009, the former Vice President of Institu tional Securities 
Operations, created a fictitious company and wrote checks to himself from an 
in-house account totaling $2.5 million. (Kelly, 200 9)  He was charged with 
forty-three counts of grand larceny, criminal posse ssion of stolen property 
and falsifying business records. (Kentouris, 2009) The Vice President 
apparently used this money to fund vacations to tro pical locations such as 
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Aruba and Florida, and to buy jewelry. (Kelly, 2009 )  Ironically, he was on 
one of these vacations when his fraud was discovere d.   
An employee was also found to have been engaging in  corruption.  In 
March 2012, the United States Department of Justice  (DOJ) reported that 
between 2002 and 2008, a former PS1 Managing Direct or had violated Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) requirements and evade d internal controls by 
conspiring with external parties to have PS1 transf er their property 
ownership to what he claimed was an external party,  which was actually his 
own company. (Department of Justice, 2012)   
In all, the conspiracy netted a profit on paper of at least $2.5 
million.  The employee pleaded guilty and faced a m aximum of five years in 
prison and a fine of $250,000, which represented tw ice his gross gain in the 
offense. (Department of Justice, 2012)  The DOJ rep orted PS1 would not face 
charges relating to this matter, because PS1 demons trated proof their system 
of internal controls was adequate and sufficient. ( Department of Justice, 
2012) 
As evidenced, there are many examples of internal c rimes conducted by 
PS1 employees during the relevant time period.  How ever, the most egregious 
charges at this time for PS1 employees are related to the global financial 
crisis. On January 13, 2013, The New York Times Dea l book published an 
article entitled “Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Ba d Behavior at PS1” wherein 
it was reported that emails between PS1 employees o n March 16, 2007 
demonstrated that they had knowledge of the “toxic assets” which “helped blow 
up” the world economy (Eisinger, 2013).  According to the article, emails 
between PS1 investment banker team members discusse d how to “name” the “toxic 
assets” suggesting names such as “Subprime Meltdown ,” “Hitman,” “Nuclear 
Holocaust,” and “Mike Tyson’s Punchout.”  (Eisinger , 2013)  Eventually this 
fund was named and sold to a Chinese bank. (Eisinge r, 2013)  Overall, 
according to the author, these emails, which are ra rely obtained due to 
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stringent discovery thresholds, demonstrate that PS 1 bankers knew the housing 
market was in trouble, and exploited that knowledge  to dupe buyers. 
(Eisinger, 2013) 
Historical Context 
 
PS1 had a historical context conducive to increased  calls/fraud.  In 
2007, when PS1 received 35 calls to their hotline, the financial crisis 
started.  The following year, in 2008, hundreds of banks closed as a result 
of this crisis.  The Whistleblower provisions of Do dd-Frank were also enacted 
in direct response to this crisis, which many belie ved was a result of 
employee fraud at financial institutions.  
PS1 was negatively affected as a result of this cri sis.  On September 
21, 2008, PS1 was recapitalized by the U.S. Governm ent and became a bank 
holding company. (Harkay, 2009) 
Summary 
 
Overall, PS1 was assessed as having a “Low” fraud h otline performance.  
Their level of bureaupathology was assessed at a “L evel 3” (23%) out of ten.  
The strongest indicators present were Hierarchy of Authority and Prolonged 
Role Enactment.  The performance details were as fo llows: Metrics were 
assessed as “Low” the functionality was assessed as  “Poor” and the Best 
Practice compliance was assessed as “Weak.”  Table 6 provides a summary of 
these results. 
According to the evidence, PS1 has excessive bureau cracy and a hotline 
with performance issues.  A review of the literatur e (organizational 
documents, 2007 Annual Report) and an analysis of e mployee reviews found 
bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy was present i n this organization.  
Overall, 23% of the sample set (195 reviews), which  represented 4.5% of the 
total reviewers (1001) and .09% of all employees, r epresented reviews 
 
 
 
94
indicating bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy.  In sum, the comments were 
made by 45 separate respondents. Of their responses , 31 comments indicated 
bureaucracy and 23 indicated excessive bureaucracy.  
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy are 
recognized on the part of employees.  Employee comm ents indicating all 
indices evincing bureaucracy and excessive bureaucr acy were present at 
varying degrees.  While 12 respondents’ comments in dicated the general 
existence of bureaucracy, specifically, employee co mments suggest the indices 
of bureaucracy “Insistence on the Right of Office” (6 comments) and 
“Hierarchy of Authority” (4 comments) were especial ly problematic for 
employees.  In terms of excessive bureaucracy, comm ents indicated “Prolonged 
Role Enactment” (9 comments) and “Impersonal Treatm ent” (6 comments) were the 
most notable for those employees who submitted revi ews for this organization. 
As for PS1’s hotline, evidence suggests it has perf ormance issues.  For 
one, benchmarking revealed the hotline receives a l ow number of calls for the 
industry and size.  Specifically, in 2006, the hotl ine received only 7% of 
the calls that it should have received; in 2007, it  received only 9% of calls 
expected per benchmarking estimates. 
With respect to the hotline’s functionality, the ho tline underperformed 
in 4 out of 5 areas.  As for marketing, the hotline  telephone number was 
proven difficult to locate, both internally and ext ernally.  PS1, at the time 
of this analysis, also did not have fraud hotline p osters displayed.  Next, 
as for mechanics, the hotline is managed by a third  party provider and has an 
internal process for further call handling.  As a r esult, the hotline is not 
perceived to have issues with its mechanics. 
As for intake/processing, the hotline is managed in ternally by a single 
person.  Thus the intake/processing of this hotline  is lacking in that 
representatives from multiple areas of the organiza tion were not engaged in 
the process (The Network, 2008, p. 5).  With respec t to incentives, the 
 
 
 
95
hotline administrator advised PS1 management did no t understand the value of 
the hotline.  Thus it is believed that management’s  attitude toward the 
hotline negatively affected the potential reporting  incentives.   
Per the employee reviews, this organization is beli eved to have a 
dominating management (Insistence on the Rights of Office, 6 comments), which 
keeps employees in the same role for a long period of time (Prolonged Role 
Enactment, 9 comments), providing impersonal treatm ent (6 comments) and with 
a dominating hierarchy of authority (4 comments).  
This study further learned via the interview proces s that management 
believes workers will report any known internal cri mes to their supervisors.  
This belief on the part of management is shortsight ed and contrary to the 
very spirit of an anonymous hotline. 
With respect to best practices, this hotline is bel ieved to be lacking 
in several areas.  For one, the hotline should have  oversight by high-level 
personnel.  This fact could not be proven, as this study learned in the 
interview process that the hotline is accessed by t he designated hotline 
administrator, only.  As for due care, the hotline appears to be well 
managed, in that there is a clear escalation proces s.  With respect to 
communication, the hotline is not well communicated . Hotline data is not 
provided internally to employees, which is an eleme nt of best practices. 
Although the hotline administrator said the hotline  is communicated in a web 
posting, an internal procedural manual and a monthl y email, upon review, this 
study demonstrated the number was difficult to loca te externally. This factor 
is significant, given most employee hotline callers  call after business 
hours. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2 002-2012) 
As for this hotline’s “reasonable steps to achieve compliance,” that 
requirement is satisfied with their third-party hot line management, process 
of having calls reported to the Firm’s Audit Commit tee, and logging the calls 
in a quarterly report.   
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With respect to the other two best practices elemen ts, “consistent 
enforcement” and “reasonable steps to respond and p revent similar offenses 
upon detection,” this study was unable to rate this  organization on these 
factors, as the hotline was too new at the time of analysis to fully 
establish the existence of these elements. 
Furthermore, the level of internal fraud, the histo rical context and 
the perception of employees of their organization a re also factors in gauging 
the overall performance of this fraud hotline.  As for internal fraud, upon 
review of public records, this study was able to es tablish the presence of a 
high amount of internal fraud.  A review of the his torical context suggests 
the hotline should have received far more calls tha n it did, considering the 
fraud hotline data analyzed in this study represent ed the time period 
immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2008 - a time where massive 
internal crime occurred in the financial industry.   
Employee reviews also made reference to the existen ce of internal 
fraud, with employees saying he/she “wake(s) up wit h cold sweats of guilt and 
shame” that management is “self-centered, public de ceiving scoundrels at 
best; crooks liars and cheats.”  Other comments ind icating potential fraud 
include “dishonest” and “immoral practices.” 
As for employee sentiment, employee reviews suggest  employees are 
likely disgruntled.  With an overall rating of “ave rage” on Glassdoor, it is 
clear employees, in their reviews, appear to not le an positively, or 
negatively.  However, upon review of the negative c omments, it is clear 
employees who are unhappy, make very specific state ments, which should not be 
ignored by management.  Specifically, to recap, emp loyees stated “you will 
not be awarded for innovation, intelligence…” that the work was “extremely 
dull” there was “so much corporate waste” and “at t he end of the day you are 
fully aware you are a small cog in a giant machine. ”  These comments are 
suggestive that the organization’s employees are ex periencing an excessively 
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bureaucratic state, which is not otherwise discerni ble via a review of the 
commentary results as “average.”
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Table 6 PS1 Table of Results 
 
Organization PS1 
Overall Performance: Low 
Bureaucracy: Level 3 of 10 
Assessment Element 
Size 48,256 
Hotline Name Integrity Hotline 
Management 3 rd  Party and Internal 
Respondents Indicating 
IV 
23% (Sample Size 195; 45 indicated IV; 54 comments 
indicated IV) 
Assessment Level 3 
Bureaucracy IV 5 of 5 General (12); 
a (4) 
b (3) 
c (3) 
d (3) 
e (6) 
Bureaupathology IV 5 of 5 
f (6)  
g (9) 
h (1) 
I (5) 
j (2) 
Hotline Metrics (DV) Low;  
Calls below benchmarking;  
Historical context (calls were low immediately 
preceding the financial crisis) 
Hotline Functionality 
(DV) 
Poor, 3 of 4 
k (number hard to find internally and externally) 
l (not enough parties engaged)  
m (3 rd  party managed) 
n (managers didn’t understand value of hotline) 
 
Best Practices (DV) Weak, 4 of 6  
p (1 delegate only) 
q (clear process) 
r (not well communicated) 
s (yes, 3 rd  party managed) 
t (data unavailable) 
u (data unavailable) 
 
Historical Context (DV) Conducive to Fraud; Conduci ve to Increased Calls 
(Financial Crisis 2008) 
 
Evidence of Internal 
Fraud 
Yes, 5 employees responsible for loss of $9 million  
Evidence of Negative 
Employee Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV Bureaucracy, strongest attributes: Hierar chy of 
Authority; Insistence on the Rights of Office 
 
Bureaupathology, Strongest attributes: Impersonal 
Treatment; Prolonged Role Enactment  
 
Result DV DV Metrics, Functionality and Best Practi ces 
 
 
 
99
Organization PS1 
Overall Performance: Low 
Bureaucracy: Level 3 of 10 
Assessment Element 
Affected 
Metrics- poor 
Functionality- poor 
Best Practices- weak 
Evidence of Historical Context, Internal Fraud, 
Disgruntled Employees 
Notes Despite an “average” rating, comments indicat e 
fraud, massive bureaucracy 
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Case Study 2 (PS2) 
Case Study 2, PS2, is a private company - a large s ized financial 
services organization. 
Background 
 
Founded in 1812, PS2 is a global financial services  firm that has been 
in existence for over 200 years. In 2010, PS2 had a  presence in over 1,000 
Cities and 160 countries and serviced approximately  200 million customer 
accounts (Form 10K).  As of December 2010, PS2 had 260,000 full time 
employees (Form 10K). Data for the year 2010 is bei ng used in this case study 
to correspond with the time period of fraud hotline  data obtained from this 
organization (2004-2010). As with PS1, the most rec ent year will be used. 
Bureaucracy 
 
PS2, by all accounts, is considered highly bureaucr atic.  There have 
been countless books, articles, Internet postings, etc. which make reference 
to the presence of bureaucracy at PS2.  To demonstr ate the general volume of 
materials, a Google search for “PS2”and bureaucracy  yields 12,600,000 
results.  It can be reasonably inferred not all of these results speak 
specifically to bureaucracy at PS2 – each reference  would have to be read and 
validated for accuracy.  Nevertheless, this statist ic is being provided to 
demonstrate generally the large volume of results. 
PS2 has discussed publicly their bureaucracy. In a 2007 news article, 
the CEO at the time said he was making great effort s at the time to “unclog 
[PS2’s] vast bureaucracy.” (PS2 to cut at Least 10, 000 in Overhaul).  
Specifically, it was reported that the CEO called u pon PS2 to “eliminate 
overlapping jobs and unclog its vast bureaucracy, n ot just cutting back on 
magazine subscriptions and the use of company limou sines” and “questioned the 
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logic of having three separate regional headquarter s for every main business 
unit, each with its own staff.” (Dash & Timmons, 20 07)   
At this time, the CEO was facing extreme pressure f rom powerful 
shareholders who were also reeling from the effects  of PS2’s overwhelming 
bureaucracy.  News articles said certain investors were appealing to use 
“draconian measures” to cut costs. (Dash & Timmons,  2007) 
PS2’s organizational structure is set forth in thei r 2010 Form 10K (see 
Appendix for chart) where it was reported “PS2 curr ently operates, for 
management reporting purposes, via two primary busi ness segments: PS2, 
consisting of PS2’s Regional Consumer Banking busin esses and Institutional 
Clients Group; and PS2 Holdings, consisting of PS2’ s Brokerage and Asset 
Management and Local Consumer Lending businesses, a nd a Special Asset Pool. 
There is also a third segment, Corporate/Other.” 
As discussed earlier, the organizational complexity  is the hallmark of 
Bureaucracy.  The organizational structure of PS2, as they have set forth in 
their 2010 Annual Report, is evidently highly compl ex. PS2 sets forth the 
role and function of each of these segments and the ir divisions, which 
continues on for several pages.  Here the descripti on is quite voluminous and 
it is clear that the organization is extremely comp lex. In their 2010 Form 
10K, PS2 reports: 
“PS2’s businesses are highly dependent on their abi lity to 
process and monitor, on a daily basis, a very large  number of 
transactions, many of which are highly complex [emphasis added] 
across numerous and diverse markets in many currenc ies. These 
transactions, as well as the information technology  services PS2 
provides to clients, often must adhere to client-sp ecific 
guidelines, as well as legal and regulatory standar ds. Due to the 
breadth of PS2’s client base and its geographical r each, 
developing and maintaining PS2’s operational system s and 
infrastructure is challenging, particularly as a re sult of 
rapidly evolving legal and regulatory requirements and 
technological shifts. PS2’s financial, account, dat a processing 
or other operating systems and facilities may fail to operate 
properly or become disabled as a result of events t hat are wholly 
or partially beyond its control, such as a spike in  transaction 
volume, cyber attack or other unforeseen catastroph ic events, 
which may adversely affect PS2’s ability to process  these 
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transactions or provide services.” 
 
PS2 also specifically informs shareholders that the  complexity of their 
systems, which could result in Cyber attack, or oth er catastrophes, may 
originate internally, by employees.  
“In addition, PS2’s operations rely on the secure p rocessing, 
storage and transmission of confidential and other information on 
its computer systems and networks. Although PS2 tak es protective 
measures to maintain the confidentiality, integrity  and 
availability of PS2’s and its clients’ information across all 
geographic and product lines, and endeavors to modi fy these 
protective measures as circumstances warrant, the n ature of the 
threats continues to evolve. As a result, PS2’s com puter systems, 
software and networks may be vulnerable to unauthor ized access, 
loss or destruction of data (including confidential  client 
information), account takeovers, unavailability of service, 
computer viruses or other malicious code, cyber att acks and other 
events that could have an adverse security impact. Despite the 
defensive measures PS2 has taken, these threats may  come from 
external actors such as governments, organized crim e and hackers, 
third parties such as outsource or infrastructure-s upport 
providers and application developers, or may originate internally 
from within PS2 . [emphasis added]  Given the high volume of 
transactions at PS2, certain errors may be repeated  or compounded 
before they are discovered and rectified.” 
 
In yet another statement in the same report, PS2 ac knowledges and 
discloses the occurrence of employee fraud as follo ws: 
“There have also been a number of highly publicized  cases 
involving fraud or other misconduct by employees in  the financial 
services industry in recent years and PS2 runs the risk that 
employee misconduct could occur.” 
 
As discussed, the possibility of PS2 employees comm itting fraud is 
fully acknowledged by the company in their 2010 Ann ual Report.  However, they 
attempt to alleviate shareholder concerns about the  prospect of such fraud by 
informing them that employees can be whistleblowers - but that such 
protections may cost PS2 additional money.   
“While PS2 seeks to prevent and detect employee mis conduct, such 
as fraud, employee misconduct is not always possibl e to deter or 
prevent, and the extensive precautions PS2 takes to  prevent and 
detect this activity may not be effective in all ca ses, which 
could subject PS2 to additional liability. Moreover , the so-
called “whistle-blower” provisions of the Financial  Reform Act, 
which apply to all corporations and other entities and persons, 
provide substantial financial incentives for person s to report 
 
 
 
103
alleged violations of law to the SEC and the Commod ity Futures 
Trading Commission. These provisions could increase  the number of 
claims that PS2 will have to investigate or against  which PS2 
will have to defend itself, and may otherwise furth er increase 
PS2’s legal liabilities.” 
 
Employee Perception 
 
Now that the presence of bureaucracy at PS2 has bee n established on the 
part of the company, it is important to determine w hether employees perceive 
this bureaucracy at PS2. 
On the website Glassdoor, PS2was reviewed by 1,314 employees, as of 
July 8, 2013, whose overall rating of the company a veraged at 3.0 out of 5, 
which is considered to be “average” by the website.   
Of these reviews, research efforts were focused on those employees who 
rated the company “below average,” or in this case,  rated it under 3 stars. 
This limited the number of reviews included for exa mination to 403, which 
constituted approximately 31% of all reviews. These  comments were posted 
between and June 13, 2008 and June 20, 2013. 
The reviews were limited to this population because  it was believed 
this population would be more likely to have commun icated the company may 
exhibit signs of excessive bureaucracy.  
Of these reviewers, 155, or 38.5% made reference to  specific 
terminology related to bureaucracy and excessive bu reaucracy. The number of 
comments is greater than that of the reviewers, as some respondents commented 
in more than one area and in that instance, were co unted only once.  The 
total number of comments recorded was 186.  Overall , echoing the results for 
PS1, these below average reviews examined reference d a bureaucratic 
atmosphere.  The level of “bureaucracy” and excessi ve bureaucracy, or 
bureaupathic behaviors were examined together, as l aypersons often use the 
word “bureaucracy” with a negative connotation.  Th erefore, when examining 
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employee comments, this was considered a negative t erm. Terminology 
attributed to bureaucracy included the words “red t ape” and “government.” 
Here, the primary complaint centered on the limitat ions of their roles, 
in that there was little opportunity for advancemen t.  In fact, many 
respondents said their roles were unchallenging, th at management was largely 
aloof and disconnected from the “common worker.”   Many respondents also said 
management tended to be nepotistic in their hiring practices and that 
organizational connections were key to obtaining ca reer growth. 
As demonstrated, many respondents, 38.5%, made comm ents that were 
indicative of bureaucracy and bureaupathic conditio ns in their workplace.  
The most indicated category was general bureaucracy , which included reference 
to “red tape” and related terms.   
General and specific references to attributes of bu reaucracy and 
bureaupathic or excessive bureaucracy are detailed in Tables 7 and 8.
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Table 7 PS2 Social Media/Bureaucracy Analysis Summa ry  
 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 6/13/08 – 6/20/13 Five year time period 
Population 1,314 .5% of all employees (260,000) 
Sample Set 403 31% of the population (1,314) 
.2% of all employees (260,000) 
Respondents Indicating 
Bureaucracy or Bureaupathic 
Behaviors 
155 38.5% of the sample set (403) 
12% of the population (1,314) 
.06 % of all employees (260,000) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and Bureaupathology 
186 112 Bureaucracy + 
74 Bureaupathic 
Bureaucracy 
 
112 General (48) 
Hierarchy of Authority (22) 
System of Rules (7) 
Technical Expertise (5) 
Career Service (9) 
Insistence on the Rights of Office (21) 
Bureaupathic 
 
74 Impersonal Treatment (16) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (19) 
Resistance to Change (17) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation 
(13) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and 
Procedures (9) 
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Table 8 PS2 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set 
Count Type Attribute  Comment Date  
1.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “it’s genuinely possible for employees to 
completely disappear within the system”  
5/9/13  
2.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “no enthusiasm within the team”  1/9/13  
3.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “stop treating employees like robots”  3/30/12  
4.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “lack of opportunity to move”  2/24/12  
5.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “stop hiring graduates with degrees in 
robot-manufacturing rather than in people-
service management”  
8/11/11  
6.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “I feel like a little mouse in this 
gigantic company”  
6/10/11  
7.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “your just a Peabody [sic]. Not much room 
for advancement”  
3/9/11  
8.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “no one knows what’s going on ever” 5/23/10  
9.   Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “just another number”  2/18/10  
10.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “robotic environment”  2/6/10  
11.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you’re pretty much chained to your desk 
while on the clock”  
9/20/09  
12.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you will feel like a cog in a machine”  7/9/09  
13.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “as an employee, you are just a number” 12/26/08  
14.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “I feel like another ant in this huge 
company”  
10/9/08  
15.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “employee are treated like cattle instead 
of human beings”  
7/1/08  
16.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you are just a number, one of the 
headcount”  
6/13/08  
17.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“monkey trainable type of admin work”  6/17/13  
18.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“many positions have little to no 
advancement opportunities”  
6/2/13  
19.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“transferring between departments was 
extremely difficult”  
3/8/13  
20.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“career progression is slow”  3/1/13  
21.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“work is to [sic] heavy and boring”  9/18/12 
22.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“not [sic] opportunity to move up the 
ladder”  
9/16/12 
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23.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“very boring environment” 8/5/12  
24.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“jobs [are] quiet safe, routine and 
comfortable”  
3/28/12  
25.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“you will be pigeon-holed. Wherever you 
start.... expect to stay there, and at 
that salary”  
12/2/11  
26.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“work is monotonous”  7/9/11  
27.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“you can get paid decent money to work 
very little because there is so much 
redundancy in the organization. My brain 
atrophied and I had to leave”  
4/14/11  
28.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“absolutely no growth”  11/25/10 
29.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“mundane, mind numbing set of job duties”  6/12/10 
30.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“depending on the department you are in, 
it could be a dead end area where there is 
no room for advancement or growth”  
2/10/10  
31.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“virtually impossible to move to a 
different department without quitting the 
firm”  
12/26/08  
32.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“extremely vertical groups, each group 
only does their thing, and nothing else. 
Its like wearing blinders to work”  
11/21/08  
33.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“work is BORING AS ANYTHING”  11/12/08  
34.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“if you want a run of the mill cruisy 
[sic] environment where mediocrity and 
sycophancy are tacitly encouraged then 
this place is for you”  
10/15/08  
35.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“the work once you learn is very 
repetitive like most jobs and very 
tedious”  
9/10/08  
36.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “systems are so a ntiquated”  5/11/13 
37.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “no willingness to improve in any aspect. 
Although management was told how to change 
processes and procedures, they did not 
1/9/13  
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care at all” 
38.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “many systems are running 4-5 years behind 
current releases”  
10/3/12 
39.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “invest in…more up to date technology”  8/27/12  
40.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “80’s technology”  7/5/12  
41.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “stale company”  6/26/12  
42.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “systems are medieval”  4/24/12  
43.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “nothing [in terms of advice to 
management] you don’t listen to employees 
current or past anyway”  
2/24/12  
44.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “outdated systems/processes; very manual 
work for some departments”  
9/20/11  
45.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “not open to change”  4/16/11  
46.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “very far behind the curve in systems and 
practices”  
4/16/11  
47.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “in most positions you are working with 
older technology”  
10/12/10  
48.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “[uses] excuse[s] not to change”  6/3/10  
49.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “antiquated systems”  3/7/10  
50.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “middle management stuck in the stone age”  12/1/9  
51.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “the technology is outdated”  2/19/09  
52.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “change is like moving a mountain”  9/7/08  
53.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“lack of ethics”  2/25/13  
54.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
 
“the amount of waste due to mismanagement 
is absolutely staggering”  
2/22/13  
55.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“deep employee distrust in upper 
management”  
1/18/13  
56.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“[you have to] learn how to keep your 
mouth shut when you see something 
wrong/unethical”  
1/8/13  
57.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“unethical at times”  10/23/12  
58.  Bureaupathic Resistance to “senior management lost its moral compass”  3/26/12  
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Interrogation and 
Investigation 
59.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“managers are rewarded only on financial 
results, not based on how they achieved 
the results. Therefore, ethics and doing 
the right thing are sometimes secondary 
actions”  
8/19/11  
60.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“dishonest middle managers” 6/29/11  
61.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“management…prefers to hide ugly things 
under the carpet”  
1/27/11  
62.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“management is evasive”  5/8/10  
63.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“you lie and cheat your own employees”  10/29/09  
64.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“many seniors thinking they are above the 
law”  
8/21/08  
65.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“low ethical standards”  7/14/08  
66.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“work environment was very structured”  6/20/13  
67.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“the processes and systems make being 
productive very difficult”  
3/16/13  
68.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“near dysfunctional in terms of getting 
things done. Extremely process heavy and 
inefficient”  
2/25/13  
69.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“the processes were horrendously 
inefficient and time-consuming”  
1/9/13  
70.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
“decision making is moribund, changes take 
forever and are generally no longer 
10/3/12  
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and Procedures  pertinent by the time they occur”  
71.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“too many rules and restrictions”  3/30/12  
72.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“there are far too many 'channels' to go 
through to get anything of importance 
accomplished”  
4/25/11  
73.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“processes are speed bumps to achieving 
results as opposed to bridging or enabling 
results to be driven”  
8/22/08  
74.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules 
and Procedures  
“it is very hard to get things done. Lots 
of unnecessary and absurd procedures to 
follow. Some people only care about 
following company's procedures or policies 
and keep themselves out of trouble. It is 
so frustrating if you want to get 
something done”  
6/29/08  
75.  Bureaucracy Career Service “long term employment”  6/3/13  
76.  Bureaucracy Career Service “not many people are fir ed”  5/4/13 
77.  Bureaucracy Career Service “get rid of old school d inosaurs that are 
ruining your organization”  
12/4/12 
78.  Bureaucracy Career Service “it's virtually impossible to get fired 
for poor performance or even breaking 
fairly serious workplace rules”  
11/22/12  
79.  Bureaucracy Career Service “hard to get fired”  2/2 /12 
80.  Bureaucracy Career Service “easy to stay for a long  time with the 
company”  
1/11/11 
81.  Bureaucracy Career Service “you will find more idiots who managed to 
stick around for 10-20 yrs and become your 
boss”  
9/16/10  
82.  Bureaucracy Career Service “PS2 never sleeps because they are afraid 
of losing their jobs” 
1/25/09  
83.  Bureaucracy Career Service “lifers sitting in one job for too long”  9/24/08  
84.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “paralyzed by red tape”  6/14/13  
85.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucracy that rivals the federal 
government”  
5/11/13  
86.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “the company perfectly fits the stereotype 
of a massive decentralized organization 
characterized by stifling bureaucracy”  
5/9/13  
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87.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “too big and bureaucratic to be run 
efficiently”  
4/11/13  
88.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “it’s a bureaucracy, like working for 
government”  
3/16/13  
89.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “big bureaucratic machine”  3/10/13  
90.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “death by bureaucracy”  2/7/13  
91.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “too centralized” 1/26/13 
92.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucratic, tyrannical mess of a 
company to work for.  The right hand does 
not know what the left hand is doing”  
1/17/13  
93.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “because of the companies size there are a 
number of layers to all positions - which 
makes the company extremely bureaucratic”  
11/15/12  
94.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “burocratic [sic] environment…lots of red 
tape”  
11/11/12  
95.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “a bureaucratic maze”  8/16/12  
96.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “thick bureaucracy and red tape 
everywhere”  
8/13/12  
97.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “more bureaucratic than the post office”  8/11/12  
98.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “almost impossible to actually get things 
done”  
8/11/12  
99.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “disorganized and beareaucratic [sic]  4/14/12  
100.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “culture of bureaucracy”  3/28/12  
101.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “boring and bureaucratic”  3/26/12  
102.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “I felt like I worked for a government 
agency”  
3/4/12  
103.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “the business is not streamlined”  1/11/12  
104.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “super siloed even within divisions”  11/29/11  
105.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “employees are robots and are expected to 
act like robots”  
9/1/11  
106.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “takes too long to get anything done due 
to all the red tape” 
6/24/11  
107.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “…a nightmare of red tape”  5/7/11  
108.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “very bureaucratic”  3/13/11  
109.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucratic nonsense” 3/7/11 
110.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucratic nightmare”  2/9/11  
111.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “total bureaucracy”  2/1/11  
112.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucracy and politics peppered with 
manipulative tactics”  
9/29/10  
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113.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “[to work at PS2] you need to be 
comfortable with bureaucracy”  
8/3/10  
114.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “very political and bureaucratic”  7/17/10  
115.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucratic”  7/10/10  
116.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “massive bureaucracy; massive entangled 
mess”  
6/3/10  
117.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “extremely, extremely siloed.  Moving from 
one department to another is akin to 
changing companies”  
4/15/10  
118.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “full of bureaucracy”  3/14/10  
119.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “there’s a lot of bureaucracy in the 
organization” 
2/15/10  
120.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “very slow moving, bureaucratic company”  12/15/09  
121.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “burocracy [sic] is literaly [sic] whats 
[sic] killing them, you may spend most of 
your day making sure that you follow the 
procedures, it leave [sic] no time for 
actual work”  
9/27/09  
122.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucracy”  9/12/09  
123.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucracy “  7/13/09  
124.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “lots of bureaucracy”  6/28/09  
125.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucracy”  5/19/09  
126.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “bureaucratic”  5/12/09  
127.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “PS2 is a bureaucratic nightmare”  2/23/09  
128.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “too much bureaucracy”  8/20/08  
129.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “Bureaucracy…large and bloated”  8/20/08  
130.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “unnecessary long [sic] bureaucracy”  8/1/08  
131.  Bureaucracy General Bureaucracy “lots of bureaucracy  7/8/08  
132.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“bureaucracy, unnecessary management 
hierarchy”  
10/9/12  
133.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“to [sic] much hierarchy within the firm”  6/26/12  
134.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“very silo'ed [sic], segregated 
environment”  
11/29/11 
135.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“too many layers of management”  11/15/11  
136.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“lack of interaction and support from 
upper management”  
11/14/11  
137.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of “fundamentally superficial barriers 3/7/11  
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Authority inherent to the organizational hierarchy”  
138.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“extremely layered”  2/1/11  
139.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“the sheer size of the company allows for 
pockets and layers of extremely poor 
management to thrive using outdated, 
archaic management practices and defeat 
all attempts to improve the company with 
new ideas and technology”  
12/1/10  
140.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“too many layers”  9/20/10  
141.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“very hierarchical”  6/27/10  
142.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“PS2 has many layers within the 
organization”  
5/28/10  
143.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“so big and full of silos that getting 
things done takes a small miracle every 
time”  
3/14/10  
144.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“several levels/layers of hierarchy”  9/12/09  
145.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“too heavily matrixed, too siloed”  7/19/09  
146.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“working at PS2 teaches you to deal with 
bureaucracy and find your way through a 
maze of disconnected information to get an 
answer”  
2/17/09  
147.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“departments work in silos”  1/16/09  
148.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“your title is your everything. You are 
treated a certain way based on your title 
and job level”  
12/12/08  
149.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“eliminate layers”  12/10/08  
150.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“too many layers of management”  9/24/08  
151.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“layers of management that do not perform 
any job”  
9/10/08  
152.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“layers upon layers of middle management”  8/20/08  
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153.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“cut the incompetent layers”  7/8/08  
154.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“managers essentially answer to no one”  5/9/13 
155.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“managers really act like manager; [sic] 
you will definitely have the impression 
that you are ‘managed’”  
4/19/13 
156.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“very few Indians and lots and lots of 
chiefs”  
3/29/13 
157.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“eliminate 50-75% of the staff from the 
level of Director up”  
2/22/13 
158.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“too many chiefs and no indians”  2/13/13 
159.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“managers use employees as shields, so 
they have people to blame when things go 
awry”  
2/13/13  
160.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“upper management extremely out of touch 
with the rest of the company  
1/18/13  
161.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“fiefdoms”  1/6/13  
162.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“people are promoted based on Senior 
Managers needing head count under them so 
they look important and don't lose their 
jobs”  
1/4/13  
163.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“upper management is very out of the loop”  12/1/12  
164.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management ignoring market trends and 
insisting in [sic] old model of banking”  
4/24/12  
165.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“generally disinterested, absent and self 
promoting management”  
1/12/12  
166.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“decisions made at top management level 
without employee insight”  
1/20/11  
167.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management abuses power and if you are 
not a manager you have no say.  Management 
has no communication with its employees”  
1/9/11  
168.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior leadership is too insulated from 
employees”  
12/30/10  
169.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“manager was allowed to run roughshod 
[sic] over the employees, insisted on 
8/9/10  
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pagers being answered 24/7”  
170.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“arrogant management”  7/17/10  
171.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“autocratic management styles  3/8/10  
172.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“my boss didn’t know what I was employed 
to do”  
11/27/9  
173.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior management treated everyone below 
as dumb high school students”  
12/13/08  
174.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“fiefdoms”  11/21/08  
175.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “successful sales also  get a lot of 
scrutiny through compliance guidelines”  
8/25/11 
176.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “red tape associated with getting [IT-
related] access, requesting a change etc.”  
4/18/11  
177.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “streamline the many internal systems that 
exist”  
3/5/11  
178.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “systems and business processes are very 
slow”  
2/9/11  
179.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “the security protocols get in the way of 
real work at times”  
1/31/11  
180.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “access takes weeks be fore you can use 
software”  
3/4/10 
181.  Bureaucracy Systems of Rules “numerous systems existed that did not 
"talk" one another”  
4/25/09  
182.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “systems nightmare”  11/8/12  
183.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “large and complex”  10/3/12  
184.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “technology unit is hampered from 
delivering solutions to the business due 
to complex process and procedures”  
8/11/12  
185.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “[need] less processes”  3/4/12  
186.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “very large distributed systems”  6/18/11  
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Hotline Specification 
 
PS2’s hotline is called the “Ethics Hotline.”  Like  PS1, third party 
hotline provider, The Network, manages PS2’s hotlin e.  A Google search for 
“PS2 Ethics Hotline” yielded the actual hotline web page as the first result, 
which was complete with telephone number and all ot her contact information 
listed.  However, if a complainant searches for “PS 2 Fraud Hotline” the 
number is not easily located (on the 7 th  page of results, the PS2 Code of 
Conduct was linked where the hotline number could b e located at the end of 
this lengthy document).  
With respect to the external communication of their  hotline, in PS2’s 
Schedule 14A (Form DEF 14A) filed March 12, 2010, P S2 discloses the existence 
and specifics of their hotline to shareholders.  Sc hedule 14A is a disclosure 
required by the SEC for the proxy solicitation proc ess, in advance of the 
shareholder voting process.  Per their Schedule 14A : 
Ethics Hotline 
“PS2 strongly encourages employees to raise possibl e ethical 
issues. PS2 offers several channels by which employ ees and others 
may report ethical concerns or incidents, including , without 
limitation, concerns about accounting, internal con trols or 
auditing matters. We provide an Ethics Hotline that  is available 
24 hours a day, seven days a week with live operato rs who can 
connect to translators in multiple languages, a ded icated e-mail 
address, fax line, a web-link and conventional mail ing address. 
Individuals may choose to remain anonymous to the e xtent 
permitted by applicable laws and regulations. We pr ohibit 
retaliatory actions against anyone who, in good fai th, raises 
concerns or questions regarding ethics, discriminat ion or 
harassment matters, or reports suspected violations  of other 
applicable laws, regulations or policies. Calls to the Ethics 
Hotline are received by a vendor, located in the U. S., which 
reports the calls to PS2’s Ethics Office for handli ng.” (p. 15) 
Interviews 
 
To obtain their organizational data, an internal (P S2) Hotline 
Administrator (“HA2”) and an employee from The Netw ork who manages PS2’s 
hotline (“NE1”) was interviewed. The identities of these interview subjects 
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are being withheld for privacy.  They were intervie wed on June 25, 2012 (HA2) 
and September 4, 2012 (NE1).   
HA2 
 
According to HA2, hotline administrator at PS2, PS2 ’s internal hotline 
group is run by a Managing Director and has six reg ional offices and employs 
“Ethics Analysts.”  HA2 said these analysts are att orneys; and any and all 
hotline personnel employed by PS2 are always attorn eys.  Per HA2, there are 
five ways to reach the hotline, and calling is one of them.  Additional 
methods of contact include web form, fax, email and  regular mail.  All forms 
of contact were guaranteed to be confidential, and all tipsters, whether they 
are internal or external, do not have to give their  name or any other 
identifying information. 
In terms of triage, when complaints come to their o ffice, their 
analyst/attorneys immediately determine whether the  complaint suggests a 
legal, regulatory or policy violation, which are as signed to an “ethics 
investigator,” who could be a member of the Legal, Compliance, or Corporate 
Security & Investigations team, and tracked to reso lution.   
When asked whether Dodd Frank changed the way their  hotline is managed 
or advertised, HA2 said they reissued their Code of  Conduct, and continue to 
provide ongoing awareness (via email, internal intr anet, training courses, 
etc.).  For potential complainants, internal or ext ernal, looking to contact 
the hotline from home, as is the case with 41% of c allers, the hotline 
contact information can be accessed easily – that i s, if you know the hotline 
is called an “Ethics Hotline.”  According to The Ne twork, as many as 41% of 
calls to hotlines come in after business hours and on weekends. (Malone, 
2003) 
With respect to hotline best practices, HA2 further  advised their 
golden sources for best practices included the Fede ral Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 
 
118
for Organizations and materials from such sources a s The Ethics and 
Compliance Officers Association (ECOA), Ethics.org resource center and 
materials from The Network and Ethics Point, the tw o leading providers of 
third party hotlines to public and private organiza tions. 
 
NE1 
 
To better understand the role of third party hotlin e services and 
management, NE1, a hotline account manager, was int erviewed.  By way of 
background, The Network is a technology company, wh ich provides an anonymous, 
confidential reporting hotline service.  In a lette r they wrote to the SEC in 
2003, they self-reported as being “the nation’s fir st outsourced employee 
‘hotline.’ At that time, they reported having over 1,000 clients, to include 
“many” of the Fortune 500.  Today, according to ava ilable information, they 
have over 3,400 clients, including nearly half of t he Fortune 500. 
According to their website, their hotline center ne ver closes and 
offers toll-free service in over 180 languages and their call center 
employees follow a “proprietary interview methodolo gy” that offers 
“substantial incident reports.”  They also provide web intake with 
international web forms. 
As for their client list, NE1 advised The Network h andles the hotlines 
of “nearly all the financial industry” including PS 2.  According to NE1, they 
only reveal the names of their clients who have giv en them advance permission 
to do so. However, it is possible that organization s have self-disclosed 
their relationship with The Network.  According to HE1, individuals can call 
hotlines and ask the identity of the administering organization, to learn the 
third-party provider of a specific hotline. Also, a  member of the public can 
review company websites for such disclosure. 
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A review of public websites determined clients of T he Network include 
various Cities (GS3, California, Tulsa, Oklahoma, M esa, Arizona, Sacramento, 
California), colleges and universities (Lafayette C ollege in Pennsylvania, 
Arizona State University, Vanderbilt University, Pu rdue University, The 
University of Texas at Dallas and San Antonio, The University of Alabama) 
media organizations (Discovery Communications [the world’s largest nonfiction 
media company]) and travel companies, such as Norwe gian Cruise Line. 
When asked about the use of third-party hotline pro viders by the 
federal government, NE1 advised that the federal go vernment tended to manage 
their hotlines internally, rather than use a third- party provider. 
Regarding their competition, NE1 said their competi tors, Ethics Point 
and Global Compliance, are now all one company, NAV EX Global.  When asked why 
a company should chose The Network over the competi tion, NE1 said they offer 
the most complete, in depth reports with a more “de tailed, technology 
assisted interview process” with calls lasting 15-2 0 minutes.  While NE1 
acknowledged Ethics Point once said they had the be st case management 
software, “banks didn’t care about that” because th ey “have their own 
software.”  With respect to case management, NE1 sa id The Network offers 
“standard incident codes” and then banks often supp lement these with their 
own codes.   
As for information flow, NE1 advised their hotline tip intake process 
(via telephone) is as follows: The tipster makes th e call to their unique 
hotline number (each client has their own number in  each country).  The 
hotline interviewer, called the “interview speciali st” will learn the company 
and location of a given caller via a “pop up” on th eir “intake screen.”  For 
example, the interview specialist could see on thei r screen “PS2caller from 
France.”   The interview specialist also manages th e web tip intake process.  
There is one dedicated URL provided for this purpos e, per client. 
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After the tip is logged, “within 15 minutes” a “tri age team feeds [the 
tip] into the system” and an email is sent to the c lient.  Then, the client 
sends the tip to another internal designee for hand ling.  The ultimate 
resolution of the tip is tracked via The Network’s software.   
When asked about the triage process for immediate m atters, NE1 advised 
they have an “immediate escalation process for case s reported which are time 
sensitive [handled within 24 hours].  To escalate t hese matters, The Network 
is provided with telephone numbers of “key people” to be contacted by The 
Network in the event of urgent matters, such as “im mediate threat of 
workplace violence, falsification, etc.” 
If the client wishes to communicate with the anonym ous complainant, 
following the initial tip, i.e., to get further inf ormation, they will 
contact their contact at The Network who will make a note in the system to 
communicate their request for additional detail to the caller, if they call 
back.  According to NE1, most callers do not call a  second time. 
When asked about their benchmarking report and the absence of 
prosecutions listed as a result of their services, NE1 said “PS2 and others 
often don’t report back to them on resolution.”   
As for their employees, The Network’s triage team i s based in Atlanta, 
Georgia, where they have over two hundred interview  specialists.  When this 
study asked whether The Network would hire a Ph.D. student, NE1 said no, that 
candidate was “overqualified.”  Rather, according t o NE1, they hire “entry 
level” personnel; some may come straight out of col lege, yet others are hired 
without a degree, as it is not required.  Interview  specialists are paid by 
the hour and are “incentivized based on quality of report.”  All candidates 
are subject to background checks (convicted felons are not hired) and have to 
sign a non-disclosure agreement. 
A review of The Network’s website, on July 22, 2013 , under the 
“careers” section yielded several job advertisement s for Interview 
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Specialists, which were described as personnel task ed with “answer[ing] 
inbound employee assistance-type calls from employe es of out Fortune 500 
client companies.”  The Network further said Interv iew Specialists “are 
responsible for accurately documenting these calls using PC and Windows-based 
applications.” 
At this time, seven postings for these positions we re present on their 
careers page, where they were seeking speakers in t he following languages: 
(in addition to English language fluency) British/E nglish, French, German, 
Mandarin Chinese, Portuguese and Spanish.  The stat ed candidate requirements 
were “A minimum of one year customer service experi ence; Call center 
experience preferred; Ability to read, write and sp eak fluently in English 
and [in the given language].”  The job postings fur ther say the candidate 
should demonstrate “Ability to conduct a structured  interview; Minimum typing 
speed of 35+ WPM with 90% accuracy required; Excell ent grammar, spelling and 
writing skills; and a Pleasant and friendly phone p resence.” 
 As for the regional requirements and governing law s, NE1 advised they 
follow SOX and International Laws; that the laws go verning their service is a 
“Hodgepodge.”  According to NE1, “in some countries , you cannot ask certain 
questions.”  For instance, using France an example,  NE1 advised in this 
region, certain questions cannot be asked, nor can information be recorded 
regarding certain matters.  They employ a separate data privacy firm, Hunton 
& Williams, to handle/advise them on regional legal  issues. 
 When asked about the volume of calls received by f inancial firms, NE1 
said that “some financial firms rarely get a call.”   When asked why, NE1 
responded “it is an issue of promotion of the hotli ne” and that “some say to 
use the hotline as a last resort.  It’s a cultural thing.  Many want to keep 
the volume down.”  Incidentally, NE1 later revealed  the cost of service 
“depends on volume.” 
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As for the actual cost incurred to clients to have The Network manage 
their hotline, according to NE1, every “report take n [costs] between $40-60 
per report” with an “average cost of $400-500 per y ear” with “additional cost 
for translation services, etc.” and that “all in, c ompanies can expect to pay 
between $30-100k per year with a minimum cost of $1 k allowed [per year].”   
When asked how the hotline reporting process change d following Dodd 
Frank, NE1 said that Dodd Frank “didn’t change thin gs much” except that 
“companies want to keep employees from reporting ou tside, otherwise more 
money in damages…[companies are] trying to get peop le to report internally.” 
Hotline Metrics 
 
The hotline data analyzed for PS2 includes calls re ceived to the 
hotline from 2004-2010. 
 
According to organizational documents, at PS2, 2004  was the first year 
of what they called their “Five Point Plan” where t hey increased their level 
of communication and transparency for employees int o their fraud hotline 
process by publicizing to employees: the number of calls received per year by 
the hotline, the nature of complaints and how they were handled (in the 
aggregate; in general terms).  In this year, they r eceived 1619 complaints, 
which included calls from 25 different countries, w here 42% of the contacts 
were anonymous. Most of the complaints received in this year (1260) were 
categorized by the company as “HR-related” and were  said to have been 
“handled by the appropriate areas.” The 352 Busines s and Operational 
complaints were reportedly related to Sales/Service /Operational Practices, 
Fraud, Falsified or Missing Documents, Conflict of Interest and Collections.  
The actions taken in 142 matters included “retraini ng or firings, reissuing 
policies, and even taking away contracts from vendo rs.” 
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In 2005, they received 2485 complaints, including c alls from 44 
different countries where 48% of the complainants r emained anonymous.  The 
issues raised involved mainly Sales/Service/Operati onal Practices (29%), 
Fraud (15%), Falsified or Missing Documents (10%), Conflicts of Interest 
(9%), and Collections and Information Security (bot h at 7%).  The actions 
taken in 259 matters included employee terminations , to lesser corrective 
actions, including training, reissuing policies and  strengthening controls. 
In 2006, 52% of the contacts were anonymous.  The 2 405 reported matters 
in this year involved Sales, Service, and Operation al Practices (38%), 
Falsified or Missing Documents (11%), Fraud (12%), Information Security (7%), 
Retaliation (7%), Privacy (2%), Misuse of Corporate  Assets (2%), Conflicts of 
Interest (5%), Collections (4%), Bribery/Gifts (3%)  and Other (9%).  These 
complaints were said to have originated from North America (42%), Asia 
Pacific (17%), Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA ) (14%), Japan (13%), 
Mexico (9%), and Latin America (5%).  Reported acti ons taken include 
recommending training, amending policies, and disci plinary action. 
In 2007, of the 1949 total complaints, 50% of compl ainants remained 
anonymous.  Complaints included Sales, Service and Operational Practices 
(34%), Retaliation (13%), Accounting/Audit Irregula rities (1%), 
Bribery/Kickbacks (3%), Collections (3%), Conflicts  of Interest (5%), 
Falsification of Expense Reporting (2%), Falsificat ion of Time Sheets (6%), 
Falsified or Missing Documents (8%), Fraud/Theft (9 %), Gifts/Entertainment 
(7%), Misuse of Corporate Assets (2%) and Other (6% ). Actions taken in 200 
matters included recommending training, amending po licies, and disciplinary 
action. 
In 2008, of the 2277 total complaints, 43% of compl ainants remained 
anonymous.  In this year, complaints included Sales , Service and Operational 
Practices (38%), Information Security/Privacy (14%) , Retaliation (10%), 
Fraud/Theft (8%), [Falsified or Missing Documents ( 6%), Collections (4%), 
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Falsification of Time Reporting (4%), Falsification  of Expense Reporting 
(2%), Bribery/Kickbacks/Gifts/Entertainment (3%), C onflicts of Interest (3%), 
Accounting/Financial Irregularities (2%), Anti Mone y Laundering 
(AML)/Terrorist Financing (1%), Other Policy and Re gulatory Violations (1%), 
Vendor Practices (1%), Misuse of Corporate Assets ( 1%), Insider Trading (1%) 
and Other (1%).  Callers originated from North Amer ica (49%), Mexico (20%), 
EMEA (12%), Asia Pacific (10%), Latin America (5%) and Japan (4%).  Reported 
actions taken in 373 matters included recommending training, amending 
policies and business processes and disciplinary ac tion. 
In 2009, of the 1881 total complaints, 44% of compl ainants remained 
anonymous.  Complaints included Sales, Service and Operational Practices 
(38%), Information Security/Privacy (15%), Retaliat ion (10%), Fraud/Theft 
(8%), Bribery/Kickbacks/Gifts/Entertainment (5%), C onflicts of Interest (4%), 
Falsification of Time Reporting (4%), Falsification  of Expense Reporting 
(2%), Falsified or Missing Documents (2%), Addition al Policy and Regulatory 
Violations (3%), Collections (3%), Accounting/Finan cial Irregularities (2%), 
AML/Terrorist Financing (1%), Misuse of Corporate A ssets (1%) Vendor 
Practices (1%) and Other (3%).  Callers originated from North America (47%), 
Mexico (24%), Asia Pacific (10%), Latin America (7% ), EMEA (7%), and Japan 
(5%).  Reported actions taken in 278 of the matters  included training, 
amendments to policies and business processes, and disciplinary action. 
In 2010, 42% of contacts remained anonymous.  As of  2010, detailed data 
breakdowns were no longer provided.  It was noted t hat this reporting change 
coincided with a chance in departmental administrat ion, which occurred in 
this year, which could account for the change in po licy.  However, it was 
reported the 1290 employment-related complaints wer e referred to “Employee 
Relations,” which is presumably the Human Resources  Department.  The 742 
business and operational issues were said to have b een handled by PS2’s 
Ethics Office; the same department which internally  manages the fraud 
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hotline.  According to available information, 268 o f the complaints this year 
were handled with the use of training, amendments t o policies and business 
practices, and disciplinary action.  Table 9 on the  next page displays the 
hotline metrics.
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Table 9 PS2 Hotline Metrics 
 
Year Total Complaints Human Resources –
Related 
Business/Operational Issues Action Taken 
2004 1619 1267 352 142 
2005 2485  1620 865 259 
2006 2405 1424 981 350 
2007 1949 1332 617 200 
2008 2277 1383 894 373 
2009 1881 1177 704 278 
2010 2031 1290 741 268 
 
 
Complaint Type by Year 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Complaint Type 
Complainants Remaining Anonymous .42 .48 .52 .50 .43 .44 .42 
Accounting/Audit Irregularities N/A - - .01 .02 .02  N/A 
AML/Terrorist Financing N/A - - .01 .01 .01 N/A 
Bribery/Gifts N/A - .03 .10 .03 .05 N/A 
Collections N/A .07 .04 .03 .04 .03 N/A 
Conflicts of Interest N/A .09 .05 .05 .03 .04 N/A 
Falsified or Missing Documents N/A .10 .11 .16 .12 .08 N/A 
Fraud  N/A .15 .12 .09 .08 .08 N/A 
Information Security/Privacy N/A .07 .09 - .14 .15 N/A 
Insider Trading N/A - - - .01 - N/A 
Misuse of Corporate Assets  N/A - .02 .02 .01 .01 N /A 
Other N/A - .09 .06 .04 .04 N/A 
Retaliation N/A - .07 .13 .10 .10 N/A 
Sales, Service, and Operational Practices N/A .29 . 38 .34 .36 .38 N/A 
Vendor Practices N/A - - - .01 .01 N/A 
Total N/A 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 
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To benchmark the hotline metrics, the 2009 and 2012  Corporate 
Governance and Compliance Benchmarking Reports from  The Network were 
utilized.  These reports were consulted for their b enchmarking data as they 
correspond to the calls received to their hotline b etween the relevant time 
periods, which are 2004-2008, and 2007 and 2011, re spectively. 
The Network and BDO Consulting produce these report s on an annual 
basis.  It should be noted that in their reporting,  The Network groups the 
results for the financial industry along with that of the construction and 
real estate industry.   
A request made to this organization to receive disa ggregated data was 
denied.  Per email from The Network Employee (NE1) (the same employee who was 
interviewed on September 4, 2012) “To your question , we can only provide 
information in aggregated format to protect the ano nymity of our clients.  
Even to break it down by the vertical can put our c lients at risk since we 
dominate that vertical.” (Email dated September 12,  2012)  Nor would they 
provide a client list.  In response to this researc h request, the response 
from The Network was as follows: Our benchmarking r eport is compiled from 
reports generated by our global client set.  Becaus e of our commitment to 
confidentiality, we do not divulge specific client information (nor do we 
track it outside of the client-specific database.  We only show and track the 
total number of organizations, total number of empl oyees, and numbers of 
organizations per employee size.”(Email from The Ne twork Employee 2 (NE 2), 
dated August 2, 2012) 
According to their report, the hotline contact repo rt rates per 1,000 
employees for the financial industry, and for an or ganization of this size, 
during the relevant time periods, are as delineated  in Table 10. 
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Table 10 PS2 Benchmarking Data 
Time 
Period 
FY Jan-Dec 
Number of  
Employees 
(PS2’s Annual 
Reports 2004-
2010) 
Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure Size, 
Industry 
Number of 
Actual 
Complaints 
Received  
Complaints 
Expected per  
Benchmarking 
Delta Percentage 
of Actual 
vs. 
Benchmarking 
FY 2004 294,000 8.3, 3.17 = 6 1619 1764 145 92% 
FY 2005 307,000 9.5, 5.61 = 8 2485 2456 +29 101% 
FY 2006 337,000 8.5, 6.06 = 7 2405 2359 +96 102% 
FY 2007 387,000 9.30, 4.90 = 7 1949 2709 760 72% 
FY 2008 326,900 8.60, 7.93 = 8 2277 2615 338 87% 
FY 2009 269,000 7.66, 8.28 = 8 1881 2152 271 87% 
FY 2010 260,000 7.19, 6.52 = 7 2031 1820 +211 112% 
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To summarize, in contrast with PS1, according to th e data, the number 
of calls received by PS2 has met, and, at times, ex ceeded the benchmarking 
figures.  However, when examined qualitatively, it is evident that the time 
with the greatest amount of fraud, the 2007-2009 ti me period immediately 
preceding Dodd-Frank, we see that PS2 actually expe rienced a decline in the 
number of tips they received.  Also, the number of frauds being reported is 
low, in light of the complaint volume. 
To this end, according to the same benchmarking rep ort, not a single 
complaint, out of all their clients analyzed (they are the hotline 
administrator for over 3,000 public and private sec tor clients) from 2004-
2011, resulted in a prosecution.   
Historical Context 
 
The time period between 2007 and 2009, when PS2’s h otline calls 
actually declined, was considered to be the financi al crisis. Again, during 
this time, according to the Federal Deposit Insuran ce Corporation (FDIC), 
three hundred and sixty six (366) U.S. banks failed .  PS2 was also seriously 
affected by this crisis.  Indeed, PS2 was recapital ized by the U.S. 
government in November 2008. 
Fraud Metrics 
 
According to the information available in the publi c domain, PS2 has 
experienced a large amount of employee fraud during  the relevant time period. 
A review of public records determined, overall, dur ing the 6 years between 
2004-2010, employees were linked to $271.5 million worth of fraud, lost due 
to embezzlement and data theft and associated fines  and other losses. 
One noteworthy insider fraud case to have occurred at PS2 in recent 
years was dubbed by The Wall Street Journal as “the  ultimate inside job.” 
(Bray, 2011) This employee stole approximately $19. 2 million from PS2 in a 
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scheme that lasted for a year and a half (May 2009- December 2010).  During 
this time, the employee, a Vice President who monit ored derivative contracts, 
wired himself the money in a series of transactions  from PS2 corporate 
accounts to his own personal bank account at anothe r institution. (Dye, 2011; 
Bray, 2011) 
This case became well known due to the audacity of the perpetrator. 
Despite making less than $100,000 per year from PS2 , he lived lavishly and 
flaunted this wealth to coworkers.  He owned three luxury cars (Maserati, a 
BMW and a Ferrari) and owned six homes, including o ne that had a $500,000 
entertainment system, with bathroom mirrors, which doubled as video screens. 
(Bray, 2011)  Despite his flagrant display of wealt h relative to his 
position, Foster was not caught until a routine PS2  audit. 
This employee, who had worked for PS2 since 1999, w as arrested in June 
2011 and charged with bank fraud and pleaded guilty  to the crime.  In June 
2012, he was sentenced to eight years in prison. 
In 2011, it was reported that a PS2 employee, a wea lth manager in 
Indonesia, was detained by police on theft charges after stealing an 
estimated $2 million.  PS2 reportedly admitted this  theft took place. 
(Reuters)  At this time, a parallel investigation e nsued into PS2’s debt 
collection practices after a local resident died fo llowing questioning by PS2 
debt collectors for a delinquent credit card bill. (Reuters, 2011) 
Following this crime, while Indonesian authorities investigated the 
matters, the bank was barred from adding new credit  card clients in this 
country for two years, and from taking new private wealth clients for one 
year.  Authorities said if they determined PS2 comm itted crimes they would 
revoke their operating license. (Reuters, 2011)  Th e wife of the man who died 
also filed a lawsuit against PS2 for $347 million i n damages. (Reuters, 2011) 
2010, it was reported several employees of PS2’s br anch in India, 
including a relationship manager, stole between $67 -89 million from the 
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bank’s wealthy Indian clients using forged document s. (Wachtel, 2010)  At 
least thirty PS2 clients were affected by these fra uds, and it was unclear at 
the time of the reporting whether the clients would  be compensated for their 
loss. (Wilson, 2010; Wachtel, 2010)  The scheme was  perpetrated only a few 
months. (Wachtel, 2010) 
In 2011, it was reported that a PS2 employee pleade d guilty to stealing 
nearly $750,000 from twenty-two PS2 clients and fac ed one hundred and twenty 
years in prison. (Dremann)  According to the report , a PS2 employee, a 
registered general securities representative and sa les assistant, over the 
course of eight years, from 2000 to 2008, unlawfull y traded in customers’ 
accounts.  This employee targeted clients whom she believed would be least 
likely to notice her crime, due to their elderly ag e, or poor health status. 
(Dremann, 2011) 
The employee admitted to the thefts in her plea app lication, where she 
documented how she created fake authorization lette rs and transferred client 
money into her own account.  It was further reporte d she used this money to 
invest in real estate and remodel her home. (Dreman n, 2011) 
As a result of this crime, PS2 was fined by the Fin ancial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) $500,000 for failing t o detect and investigate 
the “red flags” that were produced over the course of this employee’s 
thieving transactions. 
In PS2’s Form 10k filed in 2010, they disclosed cri minal charges were 
brought against a PS2 subsidiary (CBB) and three cu rrent or former employees 
in Belgium. The court convicted all defendants unde r the Prospectus Act, 
finding they did not follow their conditions/standa rds for issuers who offer 
securities to the public, and convicted CBB under F air Trade Practices 
legislation. CBB was fined 165,000 Euro, (approx. $ 218,000 U.S.) and the 
individual defendants were also fined 427.50 Euro. PS2 was further ordered to 
compensate over sixty civil claimants, who didn’t s ettle their disputes, for 
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2.4 million Euro (approx. $3.17 million U.S.). CBB appealed the judgment, and 
in their 20120 10K, PS2 reported on May 21, 2012, t he Belgian appellate court 
dismissed all criminal charges against CBB, and the  Public Prosecutor 
appealed this decision to the Belgian Supreme Court . 
 In 2011, Reuters reported PS2 was fined $770,000 f or failing to 
identify a ponzi scheme that was orchestrated by an  employee in Hong Kong.  
According to the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), from 2004-2009, a 
PS2 employee defrauded thirteen PS2 Asia clients by  taking their money, which 
was supposed to be invested in financial products.  The SFC found that PS2 
was aware of the crime, yet did not report it to au thorities in a timely 
manner.  As a result, they vowed to hire an externa l expert to examine their 
operational practices. (“HK Regulator,” 2007)  
 In cases of employee fraud at PS2, many involved c ollusion between 
multiple employees.  In one such case in New York, in 2006, several PS2 
employees conspired to steal client account numbers  in what the media dubbed 
a “three woman fraud ring.” (SecurityWeek News, 200 1)   
 In this case, the subject employees stole over $1 million from clients 
by stealing their credit card numbers and using the  cards to buy luxury 
merchandise.  In furtherance of the crimes, the emp loyees changed the home 
addresses on the client’s accounts to retrieve the merchandise.  The three 
employees received sentences ranging from twenty on e to thirty months in 
prison and were ordered to make restitution.  
 Also, during this time, PS2 employees were accused  (and PS2 ultimately 
admitted wrongdoing) in connection with massive mor tgage fraud; a crime that 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2004 w arned was at overall 
“epidemic levels” and was capable of triggering a m assive financial crisis. 
During this time, one PS2 employee, DB, was a licen sed Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA) working as a senior vice president  in PS2’s mortgage unit 
(2002-2005).  In mid 2006, after being promoted to chief business underwriter 
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in the consumer division, DB reported “discover[ing ] that over 60% of [the 
$50 billion of prime] mortgages purchased and sold [annually] were 
defective.” (Corkery, 2010).  According to DB, “a m ortgage file that is not 
underwritten to PS2 policy, or…does not contain all  policy-required 
documents, is considered a defective file.” (Corker y, 2010). According to 
news reports, DB requested a formal investigation “ which not only confirmed 
his findings but found that the mortgage division h ad been out of compliance 
since 2005.” (Katz, Marshall & Banks, 2011) 
Nevertheless, DB said the situation was not address ed and the problem 
actually escalated to the point where as many as 89 % of loans failed to meet 
quality standards. (McCuistion)  In 2007, DB decide d to report his concerns 
to the company via email (dated November 3, 2007), which he sent directly to 
PS2’s Executive Committee Chairman, Senior Risk Off icer, Chief Financial 
Officer, and Chief Auditor - an email he characteri zed as a “Hail Mary Pass” 
(that didn’t get caught). (Lieber, 2012)  Allegedly , shortly after sending 
this email, the Chief Executive Officer of PS2 sign ed a SOX certification 
“swearing the bank’s internal controls were effecti ve.”  (Katz, Marshall & 
Banks, 2011) [Research in the public record concern ing this matter found no 
evidence DB contacted PS2’s Ethics Hotline.] 
Subsequently, DB found his “responsibilities reduce d” (Katz, Marshall & 
Banks, 2011) from “managing 220 people to overseein g two” and was eventually 
told to stop reporting to work (in January 2009, he  no longer worked for 
PS2). (MoneyScience, 2012) 
DB is considered “one of America’s first whistleblo wers on the mortgage 
crisis.” (Lieber, 2012) He was interviewed in a seg ment that aired on 60 
Minutes in December 2011 and he now lectures on Eth ics at the University of 
Texas at Dallas. 
In February 2012, the Associated Press (AP) reporte d that PS2 was 
paying $158 million to settle claims filed against its mortgage fraud unit 
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for “fraudulently misle[ading] the government into insuring risky mortgage 
loans for over six years.”  Specifically, the AP re ported PS2 Mortgage 
submitted “knowingly or recklessly false” paperwork  in connection with 30,000 
mortgages, which certified to the government “certa in loans were eligible for 
federal mortgage insurance when they were not” and the “defaulted loans 
resulted in millions of dollars in insurance claims .” 
This lawsuit, incidentally, was filed by another PS 2 Mortgage employee-
turned-whistleblower, BH, and was ultimately enjoin ed by the federal 
government.  Filing the suit under the federal Fals e Claims Act, BH was 
expected to receive $31 million after legal fees. ( Gallagher, 2012)  
According to media reports, BH complained first to her supervisor, DB (who 
included her concerns in his infamous email) and th en BH went directly to PS2 
Mortgage Human Resources and the issue was not reso lved – so BH pursued an 
outside claim, which was filed under seal.  It was during this time, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) decided to take up the case.  (This study did not 
locate evidence that DH called PS2’s Ethics Hotline  to report her concerns.) 
BH said for the first several months, PS2 never kne w it was being sued. 
(Gallagher, 2012)  BH reported keeping a “low profi le” and didn’t believe 
anyone at work was aware of her lawsuit. (Gallagher , 2012) 
In April 2008, BH was transferred to a position whe re she went from 
“supervising 65 people to managing none” in the qua lity control group. 
(MoneyScience, 2012)  In November 2009, in her new role, BH found a list of 
around 1,000 loans that the quality control team de termined may involve 
fraud.  The PS2 Fraud Prevention and Investigation Group, who was tasked with 
handling these investigations, reportedly “left som e mortgages in the queue 
for more than two years” and failed to make the pro per notifications. 
(MoneyScience, 2012) 
In a Bloomberg article published in May 2012, BH re counted her 
experience working at PS2, in PS2 Mortgage’s headqu arters in O’Fallon, 
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Michigan.  According to BH, this location consisted  of a “…a complex of three 
concrete-and-glass buildings surrounded by manicure d lawns and vast parking 
lots.  Inside are endless rows of cubicles where 3, 800 employees trade emails 
and conduct conference calls…[where she] felt like a mouse in a maze.  You 
only see people’s faces when someone brings in doug hnuts and the smell gets 
them peering over the tops of their cubicles.”  (Iv ry, 2012) 
In media documents, BH further reported the working  conditions in the 
mortgage department, which reflect discrete task sp ecialization and fixed 
duties.  According to BH,  
 
“…different teams [worked] to process mortgages, al l of them 
focused on keeping home loans moving through the sy stem.  One 
team bought loans from brokers and other lenders. A nother team, 
called underwriters, make sure loan paperwork was c omplete and 
the mortgages met the bank’s and the government’s g uidelines.  
Yet another group performed spot-checks on loans al ready 
purchased.  It was such a high-volume business that  one group’s 
assignment was simply to keep loans moving on the a ssembly line.”  
(Ivry, 2012) 
 
 Later this year, in September 2012, Bloomberg repo rted the PS2 
executives, who were named in the mortgage insuranc e fraud lawsuit filed by 
BH and the DOJ, (where she reported her concerns) w ere leaving the company.  
Summary 
 
Overall, PS2 was assessed as having an “Average” fr aud hotline 
performance.  Their level of bureaupathology was as sessed at a “Level 4” 
(38.5%) out of ten.  The strongest indicators prese nt were Hierarchy of 
Authority/Insistence on the Rights of Office and Pr olonged Role Enactment.  
The performance details were as follows: Metrics we re assessed as “High” the 
functionality was assessed as “Poor” and the Best P ractice compliance was 
assessed as “Moderate.”  Table 11 provides a summar y of these results. 
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According to the evidence, PS2 has excessive bureau cracy and a hotline 
with performance issues.  A review of the literatur e (organizational 
documents, CEO statements) and an analysis of emplo yee reviews found 
bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy was present i n this organization.    
Overall, 38.5% of the sample set (403), which was 3 1% of the population 
(1,314 reviews), made comments indicating bureaucra cy or excessive 
bureaucracy.  In sum, the comments were made by 155  separate respondents, 
with 112 comments indicating bureaucracy and 74 ind icating excessive 
bureaucracy.  
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy is 
recognized on the part of employees.  Employee comm ents indicating all 
indices evincing bureaucracy and excessive bureaucr acy were present at 
varying degrees.  While 48 respondents’ comments in dicated the general 
existence of bureaucracy, specifically, employee co mments suggest the indices 
of bureaucracy “Hierarchy of Authority” (22 comment s) and “Insistence on the 
Right of Office” (21 comments) were especially prob lematic for employees.  In 
terms of excessive bureaucracy, comments indicated “Prolonged Role Enactment” 
(19 comments), “Resistance to Change” (17 comments)  and “Impersonal 
Treatment” (16 comments) were the most notable for those employees who 
submitted reviews for this organization. 
As for PS2’s hotline, evidence suggests it has perf ormance issues, 
despite the high call volume.  Benchmarking reveale d the hotline receives a 
high number of calls for the industry and size.  Be tween FY 2004 and FY 2010, 
the calls were between 72-112% above that which is expected via benchmarking.  
However, upon examination, it was noted the number of calls received in the 
period immediately preceding Dodd-Frank, when the f inancial industry was in 
crisis, the study noted the number of calls to the hotline declined (2004-
2006, was 91%-102%; between 2007-2009, went from 72 % to 87%.  Specifically, 
it was noted the lowest percentage of calls receive d compared to benchmarking 
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was experienced in 2007 – the year immediately prec eding the height of the 
financial crisis (2008) when massive, documented in ternal fraud was occurring 
in this industry. 
Further, the number of frauds reported via the hotl ine is low, when 
compared to the number of overall calls received, a nd in light of the 
documented internal fraud in the company.   That nu mber also decreased over 
time, including during the financial crisis. For in stance, in 2005 the number 
of fraud calls received was reported to represent 1 5% of calls.  The overall 
call volume was also at its highest of the years an alyzed - 2485.  Then in 
2006, this number dropped to 12%, despite the call volume staying at a 
relatively similar rate (2405).  Then in 2007, they  experienced a decrease in 
calls, and the rate of reported fraud fell further to 9%.  Again, due to the 
historical context, fraud calls should have increas ed in this time period.  
Then, in 2008 it was even lower at 8%, despite an i ncrease in calls to 2277, 
and stayed the same in 2009, despite a decrease in calls to 1881 – the lowest 
number of calls since 2004.   
With respect to the hotline’s functionality, the ho tline underperformed 
in 4 of 5 key areas.  As for marketing, the hotline  telephone number was 
proven difficult to locate externally, unless the c aller knows to call the 
hotline the “Ethics Hotline” when searching for the  number.  Given it is 
unknown how many callers know to search on these te rms, rather than “fraud 
hotline” it must be perceived as a flaw.  Ideally, the hotline would be 
searchable on all probable terms.  PS2, at the time  of this analysis, also 
did not have fraud hotline posters displayed, nor w ere they otherwise made 
available (not on a website, etc.).  Next, as for m echanics, the hotline is 
managed by a third party provider and has an intern al process for further 
call handling.  As a result, the hotline is not per ceived to have issues with 
its mechanics. 
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As for intake/processing, interviews revealed the h otline is managed 
both externally by The Network and internally by a designated Ethics group, 
comprised solely of attorneys. While the intake/pro cessing, on the surface is 
appropriate, it is clear that the process may suffe r from its own set of 
bureaucratic process issues.  While multiple areas of the organization appear 
to be engaged in the triage process, which is seen as strength (The Network, 
2008, p. 5) the process, as described, seems to inv olve so many people that 
it borders on being overly bureaucratic and as a re sult, it is believed the 
information may lose value along the way.   Also, h otline administrators 
reported that PS2 does not report back to them on r esolution, which skews 
benchmarking results. (Per The Network, not a singl e complaint out of 3,000 
public and private sector clients from 2004-2011 re sulted in a prosecution.)   
With respect to incentives, the hotline administrat or for The Network 
advised that many financial firms, generally, “want  to keep the volume down.”  
Later, the administrator said the cost of service “ depends on volume.”   Thus 
it is believed that management’s attitude in this r egard may negatively 
affect the potential reporting incentives.   
Per the employee reviews, this organization is beli eved to have a 
dominating management (Insistence on the Rights of Office, 21 comments) which 
keeps employees in the same role for a long period of time (Prolonged Role 
Enactment, 19 comments), providing impersonal treat ment (16 comments) and 
resisting change (17 comments) with a dominating hi erarchy of authority (22 
comments).  
With respect to best practices, this hotline is bel ieved to be 
performing at a moderate level.  For one, the hotli ne has oversight by high-
level personnel. As for due care, the hotline appea rs to be well managed, in 
that there is a clear escalation process.  With res pect to communication, the 
hotline is communicated appropriately internally.  The hotline reporting 
results are also available to employees via an inte rnal website.  However, 
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this study demonstrated the number was difficult to  locate externally. This 
factor is significant, given most employee hotline callers call after 
business hours. (Association of Certified Fraud Exa miners, 2002-2012; The 
Network, 2008) 
As for this hotline’s “reasonable steps to achieve compliance,” that 
requirement is satisfied with their third-party hot line management, process 
of having calls escalated via a clear chain of comm and, and The Network 
having the contact information of key personnel for  immediate dissemination. 
With respect to the other two best practices elemen ts, “consistent 
enforcement” and “reasonable steps to respond and p revent similar offenses 
upon detection,” this study was unable to rate this  organization on these 
factors, as the data is simply not made available t o researchers to allow for 
this criteria to be established.  This resulted in a reduced score in this 
area.  Specific crimes learned via the hotline, alo ng with their 
investigation and resolution, are not reported outs ide PS2’s Ethics Office. 
Furthermore, the level of internal fraud, the histo rical context and 
the perception of employees of their organization a re also factors in gauging 
the overall performance of this fraud hotline.  As for internal fraud, upon 
review of public records, this study was able to es tablish the presence of a 
high amount of internal fraud.  A review of the his torical context suggests 
the hotline should have received far more calls tha n it did, considering the 
fraud hotline data analyzed in this study represent ed the time period 
immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2008 - a time where massive 
internal crime occurred in the financial industry.  Employee reviews also 
made reference to the existence of internal fraud, with employees saying 
management is “unethical at times” and has “lost it s moral compass.”  
Similarly, respondents said “managers are “dishones t,” have “low ethical 
standards,” “lie(s) and cheat(s),” and “lost [their ] moral compass.”  
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Overall, this lead one respondent to “learn how to keep [their] mouth shut 
when [they] saw something wrong/unethical.”  
As for employee sentiment, employee reviews suggest  employees are 
likely disgruntled.  With an overall rating of “ave rage” on Glassdoor, it is 
clear employees, in their reviews, appear to not le an positively, or 
negatively.  However, upon review of the negative c omments, it is clear 
employees who are unhappy, make very specific state ments, which should not be 
ignored by management.  Specifically, to recap, emp loyees stated there was 
“no enthusiasm [on their] team,” where they were “t reated like cattle instead 
of human beings” doing “monkey trainable type of ad min work.”  Employees 
further reporting their “brain atrophied [from the work], in an environment 
where “change is like moving a mountain” in a “bure aucratic maze” where it is 
“almost impossible to actually get things done.” 
These comments are suggestive that the organization ’s employees are 
experiencing an excessively bureaucratic state, whi ch is not otherwise 
discernible via a review of the commentary results as “average.” 
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Table 11 PS2 Table of Results 
Organization PS2 
Overall Performance: Average 
Bureaucracy: Level 4 of 10 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Size 260,000 
Hotline Name Ethics Hotline 
Management 3 rd  Party and Internal 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
38.5% (Sample Size, 403; 155 indicated IV; 186 comm ents 
indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV Bureaucracy Level 4 
5 of 5 
General (48); 
a (22) 
b (7) 
c (5) 
d (9) 
e (21) 
Bureaupathology 
IV 
5 of 5 
f (16) 
g (19) 
h (17) 
I (13) 
J (9) 
 
Hotline Metrics 
(DV) 
High;  
Calls exceeded benchmarking in each year of analysi s  
Historical Context 
Number of calls reporting fraud decreased during th e time 
preceding the financial crisis 
Hotline 
Functionality 
(DV) 
Poor, 4 of 5  
k (hard to find number externally) 
l (3 rd  party managed; dedicated internal team) 
m (heavily bureaucratic process; managers do not re port 
resolution back to The Network)  
n (The Network said financial firms like to keep ca ll 
volume low) 
 
Best Practices 
(DV) 
Moderate, 3 of 6 
P (oversight present) 
q (Ethics office) 
r (not well communicated externally)  
s (yes, 3 rd  party managed) 
t (data unavailable) 
u (data unavailable) 
 
Historical 
Context (DV) 
Conducive to Fraud; Conducive to Increased Calls 
(Financial Crisis 2008) 
Evidence of 
Internal Fraud 
Yes 
Evidence of 
Negative Employee 
Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV Bureaucracy, Strongest attributes: Hierar chy of Authority; 
Insistence on the Rights of Office 
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Organization PS2 
Overall Performance: Average 
Bureaucracy: Level 4 of 10 
Assessment 
Element 
 
 
Bureaupathology, Strongest attributes: Prolonged Ro le 
Enactment; Resistance to Change 
 
Result DV DV Functionality Affected 
Metrics- moderate 
Functionality- poor 
Best Practices- moderate 
Evidence of Historical Context, Internal Fraud, Dis gruntled 
Employees 
Notes Despite an “average” rating, comments indicat e fraud, 
massive bureaucracy 
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Case Study 3 (GS1) 
Case Study 3, GS1, is a public sector organization in the federal 
government. 
Background 
The GS1 is a federal government entity with 17,359 employees as of 
2011.  The GS1 has been in operation since 1970 and  is headquartered in 
Washington, DC.  As of 2011, their annual budget is  $8.682 billion.  Most GS1 
employees work as engineers and scientists.   
Bureaucracy 
 
The existence of bureaucracy in the United States f ederal government is 
well established.  Countless news articles and scho larly materials discuss 
the existence of bureaucracy in the federal governm ent, generally, and at the 
GS1, specifically.  As discussed, a hallmark of any  bureaucracy is its 
complexity.  In 2011, at President Obama’s State of  the Union address, Obama 
focused on the need to “merge, consolidate and reor ganize the federal 
government” finding it to be “excessively complex.”   (Gofman, 2011)   
In a 2011 issue of the Harvard Political Review, au thor Allison Gofman 
singles out the GS1 when talking about excessive bu reaucracy in federal 
agencies, saying “the GS1, tasked with protecting t he environment and human 
health, is a combination of over 14 different offic es and 10 regional 
subdivisions.”  Incidentally, this level of bureauc racy comes with a cost.  
In 2010 the GS1 requested a budget increase of 34% over their 2009 budget – 
which was the first time in eight years the agency had requested such an 
increase.  Such evidence would suggest they are mor e bureaucratic than ever. 
GS1 has been singled out by other researchers, incl uding Riley and 
Brophy-Baermann, who in their 2005 “Bureaucracy and  the Policy Process” say 
“The term bureaucratic politics takes on a whole ne w meaning when it comes to 
the GS1.”  (360) Specifically, the authors find: 
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 “The actions of the GS1 affect more people in soci ety in more 
ways than any other agency, and the extent of its p urview could 
allow it to have some influence over the activities  of everyone, 
all the time. This kind of bureaucratic reach is a panacea to 
some and a bane to others; it is the epitome of wha t government 
is all about or the epitome of what is so terribly wrong with the 
government.  It is alternatively conceived of as an  agency 
advancing against an unrelenting tide of pollution,  or an 
invasive species spreading throughout the governmen tal 
environment, taking up residence and causing destru ction wherever 
it can find a vulnerable spot in the U.S. Code.”  ( 360) 
 
The state of bureaucracy at the GS1 is well establi shed in the public 
domain.  To establish the perception of employees a s to the bureaucracy at 
GS1, employee reviews of GS1 on Glassdoor were revi ewed.  As of July 25, 
2013, there were a total of 85 reviews of the GS1 p osted on this website.  
The time frame during which these reviews were post ed spanned from June 11, 
2008 to July 6, 2013.  Based on these reviews, the GS1 was rated an overall 
score of “3.5” on a scale of 1-5. 
Overall, based on the reviews, it appears as though  the GS1 
demonstrates all of the known hallmarks of a bureau cratic and bureaupathic 
regime.  Employees’ comments demonstrated apathy an d described an environment 
where mediocrity was the norm and supervisors, who were detached.  
Nevertheless, the overall sentiment seemed to be mo re positive than that of 
the private sector organizations previously examine d. 
Table 12 and 13 on the next page, provides a summar y and detailed 
bureaucracy assessment for GS1. 
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Count  Type Attribute Comment Date 
1.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Management sees staff as bodies not as 
talent.”  
1/26/13 
2.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“They were almost too laid-back”  10/26/12 
3.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“If you're not proactive about getting work you 
could get lost in the shuffle”  
9/16/12 
4.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Advancement is not based on performance and 
results in a lazy culture in the workplace”  
8/19/12 
5.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“There are employees that only come to work two 
or three times a week.”  
6/18/11 
6.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Managers don't have a clue of what employees 
are doing and they don't care either. Most 
people in the building have a "it's just a 
paycheck" attitude and they really don't care 
about their work or the results of their 
performance”  
6/18/11 
7.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“There are a few rotten apples in the bunch. 
There are a few people who don't care, it's 
just a paycheck. They come in late, leave 
early, sleep all day (if they show up at all). 
Sometimes it's hard for the rest of us to be 
motivated to work when there is someone snoring 
in the cube next to you.”  
11/3/10 
8.   Bureaupathic Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Extra work should not be given to those who 
work on their days off, but instead to those 
who are sleeping.”  
5/18/10 
9.   Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“The work could get repetitive after a while…”  6/2 5/13 
10.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“there are somewhat limited opportunities for 
promotion after GS-13 level.”  
6/11/13 
11.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“ the job is simply not engaging/challenging 
enough--employees are not used at maximum 
potential.”  
6/11/13 
12.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Not much room to move up in the organization.”  4/13/13 
13.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Staff are well paid but not utilized to best 
extent.”  
4/13/13 
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14.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“little opportunity for lateral movement in 
certain offices”  
1/20/13 
15.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“It's hard to get rid of bad apples.”  11/17/12 
16.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“There are a lot of people with "it's good 
enough for government."  
11/17/12 
17.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Management is lacking on career development of 
employees”  
8/22/12 
18.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Most employees are just there to collect their 
paycheck and are happy to wallow in mediocrity”  
8/19/12 
19.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Many coworkers form cliques or are just 
waiting for their retirement date to come”  
8/19/12 
20.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“work is boring and your skills are not 
utilized”  
2/21/12 
21.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“There is no culture of performance or 
excellence. Mediocrity is perfectly acceptable 
and even encouraged”  
9/1/11 
22.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“No promotional potential from management”  6/26/11  
23.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“the advancement and development opportunities 
are non-existent.”  
2/5/11 
24.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Lots of dead weight”  12/21/09 
25.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Promotions past the GS-13 are dependent on 
your connections, not necessarily skills”  
12/21/09 
26.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“it is the govt so it's very bureaucratic and 
policy changes take FOREVER.”  
6/11/13 
27.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“it is the govt so you have to work with 
outdated computers and outdated IT systems that 
often malfunction.”  
6/11/13 
28.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“Old and outdated equipment.”  5/30/13 
29.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“too few resources to succeed”  5/6/13 
30.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“The environment is moribund and slow”  11/17/12 
31.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“slow, many many people do nothing” 5/15/12 
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32.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“Work and progress can be slow and frustrating”  1/6/12 
33.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“Most people are unmotivated career public 
servants, they are usually never very bright 
and rarely committed to working past 5pm (and 
this is after daily 2 hour lunch breaks)”  
2/5/11 
34.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“Progress on issues can be slow due to huge 
number of in house stakeholders and concomitant 
number of meetings”  
6/8/10 
35.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“GS1 generally has poor information/IT systems 
that are outdated.”  
8/8/09 
36.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Change 
“…plenty of lazy people in the GS1”  3/21/09 
37.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“Turf protection and CYA too much a part of the 
culture.”  
11/14/12 
38.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“A lot of internal politics and CYA.”  1/26/13 
39.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“ improve the behaviour of some in your ranks 
(angry outbursts, inability to receive 
feedback, retaliation, etc. )”  
11/14/12 
40.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“public distrust for the agency”  5/11/12 
41.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“For some reason, contractors are treated with 
disdain. We are not made to feel like we 
belong. If someone makes a mistake, there is 
always a major investigation to find someone to 
blame. If the GS1 person makes a mistake it's 
no big deal.”  
9/3/11 
42.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“Senior managers are far too isolated from 
legitimate feedback”  
6/8/10 
43.  Bureaupathic Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“Even though senior management might know 
someone is not performing up to par, they will 
not confront that person in fear of the union.”  
3/21/09 
44.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
“Ridiculous (month-long) standard HR/background 
check red-tape for interns”  
5/21/13 
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Procedures 
45.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“Fairly rigid resource organization policies.”  3/3 0/13 
46.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“I had a lot of problems when starting: no 
login to system, no security badge, computer 
issues. ”  
10/26/12  
47.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“As a term employee I didn't qualify for a 
security pass - had to take my belt off in the 
pat-down line every morning (This was actually 
pretty significantly annoying)”  
9/16/12 
48.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“Many bureaucratic policies and procedures 
prevent real work from getting done.”  
3/31/11 
49.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Lots of 65 and up, who won't retire, but won't 
perfom [sic] either.”  
6/18/11  
50.  Bureaucracy Career Service “There is some difficult in career advancement 
given the nature of the government”  
6/28/11  
51.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Need to [hire] new recruits, many need to 
retire”  
10/17/11  
52.  Bureaucracy Career Service “It is a very difficult and slow process in 
advancement.”  
4/15/12  
53.  Bureaucracy Career Service “You need to know the right people to move up.”  4/15/12  
54.  Bureaucracy Career Service “there are a lot of people just there for the 
stable job and benefits.”  
4/30/12  
55.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Some of the older staff are retired in place 
and not helpful.”  
8/31/12  
56.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Not too much upward mobility”  8/31/12  
57.  Bureaucracy Career Service “A lot of people are not excited/passionate 
about their work.”  
4/1/13  
58.  Bureaucracy Career Service “employees can be lazy and jaded”  4/4/13  
59.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Opportunities for advancement can be limited”  4/1 5/13  
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60.  Bureaucracy Career Service “Low turnover leads to many "lifers" with 
minimal motivation or interest in self-
improvement”  
5/21/13  
61.  Bureaucracy Career Service “it is not apparent how you can get promoted 
into upper management positions unless you stay 
there for a really LONG time (three decades or 
more).”  
6/11/13  
62.  Bureaucracy Career Service “too many life-long bureaucrats”  6/16/13  
63.  Bureaucracy General “A level of bureaucracy”  11/7/08  
64.  Bureaucracy General “red tape”  12/21/09  
65.  Bureaucracy General “red tape”  1/4/10  
66.  Bureaucracy General “too much red tape”  6/29/10  
67.  Bureaucracy General “By definition, everything is bureaucratic”  1/27/1 1 
68.  Bureaucracy General “very bureaucratic an [sic] incredibly slow.”  2/26 /11  
69.  Bureaucracy General “the bureaucracy can be stifling”  3/31/11  
70.  Bureaucracy General “mind numbing and sclerotic bureaucracy”  9/1/11  
71.  Bureaucracy General “career GS1 bureaucrats were not always 
friendly or helpful”  
1/25/12  
72.  Bureaucracy General “dealing with the bureaucracy from time to time 
can be challenging”  
2/9/12  
73.  Bureaucracy General “there are some of the standard bureaucratic 
employees that give government employees a bad 
name here”  
8/27/12  
74.  Bureaucracy General “GS1 is a huge agency and is very bureaucratic”  9/3/12  
75.  Bureaucracy General “too much red tape”  11/8/12  
76.  Bureaucracy General “bureaucracy makes it impossible to be 
efficient, too much red tape to get anything 
done. worked on one project that was done 
separately by four different departments.”  
11/8/12  
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77.  Bureaucracy General “red tape”  2/15/13  
78.  Bureaucracy General “Felt like scenes from Office Space quite a few 
days”  
3/5/13  
79.  Bureaucracy General “gov’t red tape”  3/19/13 
80.  Bureaucracy General “Everything takes forever to get done because 
of the bureaucracy”  
4/1/13  
81.  Bureaucracy General “Very bureaucratic, as expected.”  5/30/13  
82.  Bureaucracy General “Very bureaucratic”  6/11/13 
83.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“There are almost no promotional opportunities 
for non-supervisors and fewer and fewer in a 
steep pyramid scheme.”  
1/24/12  
84.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“The department if [sic] GS1 consists of many 
levels of management.”  
4/15/12  
85.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior managers have inordinate power to 
negatively affect careers with very little fear 
of recourse”  
6/8/10  
86.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management was miserable and ineffective”  6/29/10  
87.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“There are a few supervisors here that are 
bullies, they will harass people to make them 
quit.”  
11/3/10  
88.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“Incompetent useless and downright cruel 
management. Bosses who are no better than 
school yard bullies”  
11/3/10  
89.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“Sometimes attorneys doing enforcement were 
thwarted because of upper management ideas 
about what should and should not be enforced 
(regardless of what the law says).”  
2/26/11  
90.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“Managers care more about themselves than their 
staff.”  
1/26/13  
91.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“A Republican President of Congress brings work 
at this agency to a virtual standstill.”  
2/17/13  
92.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management is awful and incompetent, quality 
of work isn't important they only care about 
filling FTEs and having the biggest groups”  
4/4/13  
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Table 12 GS1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Analysis Summ ary 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 6/11/08-7/6/13 5 year time period 
Population 85 .48% of all employees (17,359) 
Respondents Indicating 
Bureaucracy or Bureaupathic 
Behaviors 
61 72% of the population (85) 
.35% of all employees (17,359) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and Bureaupathology 
99 51 Bureaucracy + 
48 Bureaupathic 
93.  Bureaucracy Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“Many bureaucratic policies and procedures 
prevent real work from getting done.”  
3/31/11  
94.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “Sometimes it is difficult to make things 
happen within such a large agency where there 
is so much paperwork to make anything happen.”  
6/11/08  
95.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “slow processes”  1/4/10  
96.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “It takes a LONG time to get a job with GS1 and 
the HR department is pretty bad with 
communication.”  
9/12/10  
97.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “Slow to do things in office, computer changes 
and paperwork.”  
12/7/10  
98.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “Go through six procedures to tie your shoe”  1/27/ 11 
99.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “Many hours wasted on transition between 
systems.”  
5/30/13  
100.  Bureaucracy Technical 
Expertise 
“It is a very phony work place where people 
know very little about [the subject]. The 
actual leg work goes to contractors.”  
11/4/10  
101.  Bureaucracy Technical 
Expertise 
“Managers in positions they are not technical 
enough to fill”  
4/19/13  
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Attribute Data Analysis 
Bureaucracy 
 
51 General (20) 
Hierarchy of Authority (2) 
System of Rules (6) 
Technical Expertise (1) 
Career Service (14) 
Insistence on the Rights of Office (8) 
Bureaupathic 
 
48 Impersonal Treatment (8) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (17) 
Resistance to Change (11) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation 
(7) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and 
Procedures (5) 
 
Table 13 GS1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set  
 
 
 
 
 
153
Hotline Specification 
 
The GS1’s hotline, managed by the Office of Inspect or General (OIG) is 
called, simply, the OIG Hotline. According to their  website, it is staffed by 
federal law enforcement agents whom the GS1 says ar e the only people who are 
permitted to receive a complaint within the agency.   Upon receipt of a 
complaint, the OIG will either open an investigatio n/audit, or refer the 
matter to GS1 management or another Federal agency,  such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
With respect to hotline accessibility, the hotline number is easy to 
find with a simple Google search for “GS1 Fraud Hot line” or “GS1 Ethics 
Hotline.”  A Hotline Poster is also made available to the potential 
complainant at the top of the webpage and is downlo adable via a quick link. 
From a user perspective, it is challenging to navig ate the hotline 
complaint process.  Although there is a lot of info rmation provided, it seems 
to hinder reporting rather than facilitate it.  On the hotline website, to 
begin, there is a copious amount of information on how to recognize fraud, 
waste and abuse, with links to further information in the form of brochures. 
In terms of their means of advertisement, one of th e links provided on the 
website leads to the GS1’s hotline poster, which re ads “Report Fraud, Waste 
or Abuse” and provides an email address, a physical  address, fax, telephone 
number and website link.   
Upon further review, the webpage contains an additi onal abundance of 
information about whistleblower protections, and th e existence (as of 2012) 
of the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman.  Then, f inally, at the end of the 
page, there is a web form where an actual complaint  can be lodged. 
With respect to confidentiality, it doesn’t appear to be guaranteed in 
all cases.  At the heading of their web form, in bo ld red letters, it reads 
“warning” and a disclosure is listed which informs potential internet 
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complainants they do not have the ability to remain  anonymous.  There is an 
additional email address provided, where the same l ack of confidentiality 
applies.  However, the site informs complaints whic h are logged in person , by 
telephone, or U.S. Mail, where confidentiality is requested , will be honored. 
Before entering a complaint, the complainant if fir st directed to view 
a link entitled “What to Report to the GS1 OIG Hotl ine” in order “to 
determine whether [their] information is appropriat e for [reporting].  When 
this link is clicked, it takes the user back to a p oint earlier in the 
website (which the user will have already scrolled past to arrive at that 
directive).  Here, they inform the complainant of t he purpose of the hotline, 
which is to “receive complaints of fraud, waste or abuse in GS1 programs and 
operations including mismanagement or violations of  law, rules, or 
regulations by GS1 employees or program participant s.”   
The GS1 further provides examples of reportable vio lations, to include: 
“Contract, procurement and grant fraud, Bribery and  acceptance of gratuities, 
significant mismanagement and waste of funds, Confl ict of interest, Travel 
fraud, Abuse of authority, Theft or abuse of Govern ment property or Computer 
crime.”  They ask that “minor incidents, such as, m inor time and attendance 
abuse, or misuse of Government property” instead be  reported to “appropriate 
program managers” and that “personnel matters invol ving requests for 
individual relief” be “handled through the appropri ate grievance process with 
management, and offices of personnel, equal employm ent and civil rights.” 
Overall, this process was determined to be very com plex and believed to 
be designed to reduce the number of complaints rece ived. 
Hotline Metrics 
 
Data analyzed was from the Fiscal Years 2003-2012.  It is clear from 
the data, per benchmarking, the GS1 is meeting and exceeding expectations 
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with respect to the number of inquiries received.  Table 14 provides the 
metrics for GS1’s hotline. 
 
 
 
 
1
5
6
Table 14 GS1 Hotline Metrics 
 
FY Number of 
Employees 1 
Inquiries 
Per GS1’s 
Annual 
Performance 
Review 
(Annual 
Report). 
Referral to 
Other 
Offices 
Closed Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure, Size, 
Industry 2 
Calls Expected 
per Benchmarking 
Delta 
2003 17,939 3 638 N/A 571 4.7, 13.6 = 9 161 +477 
2004 17,939 4 927 N/A 26 N/A 5 8.8 = 9 161 +766 
                         
1The GS1’s Annual Performance Reviews only speak to full time employees (FTE) in terms of expenditure a nd 
percentage of usage.  They do not provide the actua l number of employees present in the agency in a gi ven 
year.  Instead, the number of employees per year wa s located for certain years in other organizational  
documents, such as their special reports, including  a 2011 Evaluation Report, entitled “APA Needs Bett er 
Agency-Wide Controls Over Staff Resources” which ga ve the number of employees for the years 2006-2010.   
Other organizational documents were utilized, where  indicated.  Where an exact number of employees for  a 
given year could not be located, an average figure was used (as noted).  It should be noted the slight  
fluctuation in figures does not affect the benchmar king numbers used in this instance, as the applicab le 
ranges is Group 3, 10,001-20,000 employees.  
2In the benchmarking reports, produced by The Networ k, there are an average number of calls expected pe r 
company size and per industry, per year.  These fig ures were averaged to produce the ideal benchmarkin g 
figure per year, tailored to the organizations indu stry and size.  Here, the industry comparison used was 
“Public Administration.”  The number was rounded to  the nearest decimal. 
3This figure was unavailable; an average figure, com puted using (17,359; 18,518) was utilized. 
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FY Number of 
Employees 1 
Inquiries 
Per GS1’s 
Annual 
Performance 
Review 
(Annual 
Report). 
Referral to 
Other 
Offices 
Closed Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure, Size, 
Industry 2 
Calls Expected 
per Benchmarking 
Delta 
2005 17,939 6 474 N/A 18 N/A, 8.8 = 9 161 +313 
2006 18,461 564 377 30 4.76, 9.1 = 7 129 +435 
2007 18,327 798 603 9 3.18, 9.6 = 6 110 +688 
2008 18,109 838 647 8 6.32, 9.9 = 8 145 +693 
2009 18,306 568 529 N/A 8.66, 7.93 = 8 146 +422 
2010 7 18,518 N/A N/A N/A 4.85, 8.35 = 7 130 N/A 
2011 17,359 8 252 252 150 5.28, 8.29 = 7 122 +130 
2012 17,939 9 225 N/A 125 N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
                                                                                                             
4This figure was unavailable; an average figure, usi ng the highest and lowest number of employees (17,3 59; 
18,518) was utilized. 
5 Benchmarking figures by size were not available fo r years 2004/2005; Industry benchmark was rounded t o the 
next whole number. 
6This figure was unavailable; an average figure (17, 359; 18,518) was utilized. 
7 The hotline statistics for 2010 were not available . 
8This figure was unavailable; an average figure (17, 359; 18,518) was utilized. 
9This figure was unavailable; an average figure (17, 359; 18518) was utilized. 
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Historical Context 
 
Here, a recent employee survey suggests although th eir benchmarking 
demonstrates the call level for their industry and size is appropriate, 
employees may not be calling at expected rates.  Sp ecifically, in this 
survey, employee responses reflect they are not com fortable reporting 
internal violations.   
In 2012, in a Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (EV S) (also known as 
the “Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS)” or the An nual Employee Survey 
(AES)” [pre-2010]) GS1 employees were asked several  job-related questions, 
including one question regarding their feelings abo ut reporting suspected 
internal violations.  In response to the statement “I can disclose a 
suspected violation of any law, rule or regulation without fear of reprisal” 
8,020 employees (of 8,847) responded.   
While the agency reports a 60.8% “positive” respons e rate to this 
question, according to the facts presented, 3,848 e mployees, out of the 8,847 
who completed surveys, or 43.5% 10of respondents answers reflect they are 
either unsure, or know they can’t report without fe ar of reprisal.  This 
result suggests the GS1 has some work to do in comm unicating, and 
demonstrating, that internal reporting, especially via the hotline, is 
encouraged and welcomed. 
The breakdown of their responses is as follows: 
Response Number of Respondents Percentage of Total 
Strongly Agree 1,873 22.6% 
Agree 3,092 38.2% 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
1,721 22% 
Disagree 714 9.1% 
Strongly Disagree 620 8.2% 
                         
10 Percentages add up to more than 100% because, acco rding to the report, the 
percentages were weighted to represent the Agency’s  population. 
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Total 8,020 100% 
Do Not Know:  793  
 
 Yet another survey, conducted in December 2008 [1, 050 respondents] 
designed specifically to measure the GS1 employee’s  understanding of the GS1 
OIG had results, which per an OIG report demonstrat ed “troubling perceptions” 
about them amongst the employees.  Here, a majority  of employees, 83%, 
indicated they “were either not aware, or didn’t kn ow, of any policies or 
procedures governing interaction with the OIG.”  (G S1, Office of Inspector 
General, 2009)  These findings are problematic beca use the OIG manages the 
GS1 fraud hotline. 
 In addition, survey results seem to indicate emplo yees do not believe 
their complaints would be anonymous.  In summary, t he OIG found that 45% of 
respondents “either agreed or did not know whether they would face 
retribution if they provided information or documen tation in response to an 
OIG request without the approval from their program  manager or supervisor.” 
Additional employee surveys located further measure d whether employees 
believed they worked in a “Results-Oriented Perform ance Culture” which 
indicated the “extent employees believe their organ izational culture promotes 
improvement in processes, products and services, an d organizational 
outcomes.”  This metric is useful in this analysis,  as it can indicate 
whether employees believe they are subject to burea upathic conditions, which 
as posited here, could negatively influence fraud r eporting. 
 The results of the survey per this indicator are a s follows: 
Metric 2011 EVS 2010 EVS 2009 AES 2008 FHCS 2007 AES 2006 FHCS 
Results-
Oriented 
Performance 
Culture 
56% 56% 56% 57% 56% 55% 
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 As evidenced, the survey indicates an average of 5 6% of employees from 
2006-2011 believed their employer, the GS1, demonst rated a results-oriented 
performance culture.  This metric is relevant when considering whether an 
employee believes their complaint to the hotline wo uld be addressed and/or 
resolved. 
Fraud Metrics 
 
 The government sector also experiences its share o f fraud, despite 
having fraud hotlines in place to receive tips.  Th eir hotlines are also more 
widely publicized than those in the private sector,  allowing for increased 
fraud-reporting possibilities. Unfortunately, despi te such measures, GS1 has 
experienced internal fraud, waste and abuse, which appears to have gone 
largely unreported, and was also determined to have  been improperly 
investigated and punished by GS1.  
 Overall, this study was unable to determine a tota l amount of fraud 
loss, as it was not reported in the public domain.  However it was determined 
that at least 69 employees were involved in employe e misconduct during the 
relevant time period. 
 Although the entire universe of crime committed by  GS1 employees is not 
publicized or otherwise known to researchers, the f ollowing information was 
located in the public domain.  According to a repor t conducted by the GS1 
Office of the Inspector General (GS1 OIG), between October 1, 2002 and 
September 30, 2006, 69 cases of employee misconduct  were investigated by the 
GS1 - which equates to around 17 cases per year.  
The cases identified in the GS1 OIG Report suggest their crimes were 
lengthy and repetitive in their duration, and invol ved collusion with others, 
including bank fraud, (which included forgery and i mproper check deposits) 
pay stub alteration, and participation in a food st amp trafficking scheme. 
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(2012, p. 6)  Ideally, these cases would have been reported to the fraud 
hotline.   
However, even if employee crimes were made known to  the GS1, 
available evidence seems to indicate they may not h ave been sufficiently and 
appropriately handled. Overall, according to OIG re ports, the crimes 
investigated by the agency lacked timely and adequa te review and the subjects 
were under-punished, for unknown reasons (Office of  Inspector General Access 
Survey Results).   
For instance, in one case, an internal fraudster, w ho pleaded guilty 
to bank fraud for stealing income tax checks, recei ved only a 14-day 
suspension from the GS1.  In other matter, where an  employee was found to 
have altered pay stubs, received only a 10-day susp ension.  In a matter of 
particular concern to the GS1 OIG, where an employe e systematically stole 
computer equipment from the GS1 for a period of 10 years, the agency ordered 
only an “official reprimand.”  (2009, p. 6) 
Evidence demonstrates government contract employees  were also 
committing fraud. In 2005, a former GS1 contractor,  a computer systems 
administrator, was sentenced to four months in pris on after he accessed GS1 
systems following his termination and caused the GS 1 great harm by deleting 
files, changing user passwords and effectively shut ting the entire system 
down. (GS1, 2005)   
Today, despite recommendations made by the GS1 OIG following their 
investigation, it seems as though the GS1 is still suffering from internal 
problems, which adversely affected their investigat ions process.  According 
to research conducted by Public Employees for Envir onmental Responsibility 
(PEER), in 2011, the GS1 criminal enforcement divis ion experienced an 
unusually high number of special agents leaving the  agency.  Subsequent 
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review by PEER noted “personnel abuse” among other reasons, as a catalyst for 
agent turnover.   Yet another review by PEER in the  same year disclosed 
Deloitte conducted a study into the internal proble ms at the GS1’s Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR). Deloitte’s evaluation concluded  inferior investigation 
practices were occurring within the agency.  Ironic ally, these practices 
inhibited the proper investigation of complaints.  
According to their study, the OCR “has struggled to  track, 
investigate and resolve… EEO violations,” finding “ The Office of Civil Rights 
lacks “the rudiments of organizational infrastructu re,” such as established 
procedures, defined staff duties or the ability to track cases.  Its handling 
of employee complaints “is known for poor investiga tive quality and a lack of 
responsiveness,” dismally “poor performance” with b acklogs and long delays in 
investigations of discrimination complaints.   
Deloitte’s review of complaints from GS1 employees found that none 
received a final agency decision on time, with many  several months overdue; 
and a confused “fire drill mentality [which] result ed in significant 
financial and reputational consequences for the Age ncy” in the form of large 
cash settlements from botched discrimination invest igations. (Deloitte, March 
21, 2011) 
In the same year, further individual personnel abus es were noted, 
such as a GS1 criminal investigator from Dallas who  was indicted for failing 
to disclose a prohibited personal relationship with  an FBI agent.  
Summary 
 
Overall, GS1 was assessed as having an “Above Avera ge” fraud hotline 
performance.  Their level of bureaupathology was as sessed at a “Level 8” 
(72%) out of ten.  The strongest indicators present  were Career Service and 
Prolonged Role Enactment.  The performance details were as follows: Metrics 
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were assessed as “High” the functionality was asses sed as “Moderate” and the 
Best Practice compliance was assessed as “Moderate. ”  Table 6 provides a 
summary of these results. 
 
 
According to the evidence, GS1 has excessive bureau cracy and a hotline 
with performance issues.  A review of the literatur e (organizational 
documents, President Obama’s State of the Union Add ress in 2011, media 
articles) and an analysis of employee reviews found  bureaucracy and excessive 
bureaucracy was present in this organization.  Over all, 72% of the population 
(85), which was .35% of all employees (17,359), mad e comments indicating 
bureaucracy or excessive bureaucracy.  In sum, the comments were made by 61 
separate respondents, with 51 comments indicating b ureaucracy and 48 
indicating excessive bureaucracy.  
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy are 
recognized on the part of employees.  Employee comm ents indicating all 
indices evincing bureaucracy and excessive bureaucr acy were present at 
varying degrees.  While 51 respondents’ comments in dicated the general 
existence of bureaucracy, specifically, employee co mments suggest the indices 
of bureaucracy “Career Service” (14 comments) and “ Insistence on the Right of 
Office” (8 comments) were especially problematic fo r employees.  In terms of 
excessive bureaucracy, comments indicated “Prolonge d Role Enactment” (17 
comments), “Resistance to Change” (11 comments) and  “Impersonal Treatment” (8 
comments) were the most notable for those employees  who submitted reviews for 
this organization. 
As for the GS1’s hotline, evidence suggests it perf ormed at an above-
average level.  Benchmarking revealed the hotline r eceives a high number of 
calls for the industry and size. In every year anal yzed, FY 2003-2012, the 
GS1 exceeded performance standards per benchmarking .  (However, based on the 
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historical context (survey results) it is believed the number of calls 
received from employees could be low.) 
According to employee surveys conducted from 2008-2 012, employee 
respondents indicated they had a fear of reporting internal crime.  In the 
2008 survey, of 1,050 respondents, 45% indicated th ey would, or were unsure, 
whether they would face retribution for internal re porting.  In the 2012 
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (EVS), of the 8,8 47 respondent GS1 
employees, 43.5% reported they were either unsure o r believed they cannot 
submit a hotline report without fear of reprisal.  The results of these 
surveys suggest all known crime is likely not being  reported. 
With respect to the hotline’s functionality, the ho tline performed well 
in most key areas.  As for marketing, the hotline t elephone number was easily 
located with a quick Google search for “GS1 Fraud H otline” or “GS1 Ethics 
Hotline.”   The GS1 also had a downloadable Hotline  Poster available via the 
same search terms.  Next, as for mechanics, the hot line is managed by the 
Office of Inspector General with a robust internal process for further call 
handling.  As a result, the hotline is not perceive d to have issues with its 
mechanics. 
As for intake/processing, interviews revealed the h otline is well-
managed, with a very detailed intake process.  Howe ver, the details of the 
process also make it a bit overly complex, which ma y cause the process to 
suffer from its own set of bureaucratic issues.  It  was noted on the Hotline 
website that the user must navigate through a copio us amount of information 
before they are able to lodge a complaint.   
With respect to incentives, it is believed employee s might not be 
incentivized to report.  First, surveys in 2008 and  2012 demonstrated as many 
as 45% of respondents questioned the confidentialit y of the hotline when 
indicating their fear of reporting without reprisal .  Further, employees are 
informed on the website that only tips received in person, by telephone or 
 
 
 
165
U.S. Mail where confidentially is requested, is hon ored.  They advise any 
report taken via web form may not be kept anonymous .  On their website, the 
GS1 also advises the user at length about the repor ts they wish not to 
receive.  It is believed this may further serve as a deterrent to reporting. 
Per the employee reviews, this organization is beli eved to have a 
strong presence of Career Service (14 comments) wit h a dominating management 
(Insistence on the Rights of Office, 8 comments), p roviding Prolonged Role 
Enactment (17 comments) and resisting change (11 co mments).  
With respect to best practices, this hotline is bel ieved to be 
performing at a moderate level.  For one, the hotli ne has oversight by high 
level personnel. As for due care, the hotline appea rs to be well managed, in 
that there is a clear escalation process.  With res pect to communication, the 
hotline is communicated appropriately externally.  The hotline also has a 
poster they make widely available.   
As for this hotline’s “reasonable steps to achieve compliance,” that 
requirement is satisfied with their third-party hot line management, process 
of having calls escalated via a clear chain of comm and, and The Office of 
Inspector General having the contact information of  key personnel for 
immediate dissemination. 
With respect to the other two best practices elemen ts, “consistent 
enforcement” and “reasonable steps to respond and p revent similar offenses 
upon detection,” this study was unable to rate this  organization on these 
factors, as the data is simply not made available t o researchers to allow for 
this criteria to be established.  Specific crimes l earned via the hotline, 
along with their investigation and resolution, are not reported outside of 
the GS1. 
Furthermore, the level of internal fraud, the histo rical context and 
the perception of employees of their organization a re also factors in gauging 
the overall performance of this fraud hotline.  As for internal fraud, upon 
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review of public records, this study was able to es tablish the presence of a 
high amount of internal fraud.  A review of the his torical context suggests 
the hotline might not be receiving the level of emp loyee calls that it 
should, due to their perception of potential retali ation for reporting.  
As for employee sentiment, employee reviews suggest  employees are 
likely disgruntled.  With an overall rating of 3.5 out of 5 on Glassdoor, 
which is “above average,” suggests that employees, in their reviews, appear 
to lean slightly positively.  However, upon review of the negative comments, 
it is clear employees who are unhappy, make very sp ecific statements, which 
should not be ignored by management.  Specifically,  to recap, employees 
stated there was “lots of dead weight” and “most [e mployees] are unmotivated 
career public servants” subjected to “fairly rigid resource organization 
policies” which “prevent real work from getting don e.”  Indeed, one 
respondent said working for the GS1 “felt like scen es from [the movie] Office 
Space most days.”   
These comments are suggestive that the organization ’s employees are 
experiencing an excessively bureaucratic state, whi ch is not otherwise 
discernible via a review of the commentary results as “above average.” 
 
Table 15 on the next page provides a full summary o f the results for 
GS1.
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Table 15 GS1 Table of Results 
Organization GS1 
Overall Performance: Above Average 
Bureaucracy: Level 8 of 10 
Assessment Element 
 
Size 17,359 
Hotline Name OIG Hotline 
Management Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
72% (Population 85; 61 indicated presence of IV; 99  
comments indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV Level 8  
5 of 5  
General (20) 
a (2) 
b (6) 
c (1) 
d (14)  
e (8) 
Bureaupathology IV 5 of 5  
f (8) 
g (17) 
h (11) 
i (11)  
j (5) 
 
Hotline Metrics (DV)  Moderate; Calls exceed benchmarking standards, yet 
quality of reporting on the part of employees is 
expected to be low due to survey results and due to  high 
level of internal fraud 
Hotline 
Functionality (DV) 
Moderate, 3 of 5 
k (easily found via a Google search for GS1 Fraud 
Hotline or GS1 Ethics Hotline” a Poster is availabl e) 
l (managed by OIG) 
m (process seems overly bureaucratic and difficult to 
navigate) 
n (avg. 44% emp. said they fear of retaliation, 
anonymity is not guaranteed)  
 
Best Practices (DV) Moderate, 3 of 6 
p (high level oversight) 
q (clear escalation process) 
r (data communicated externally) 
s (OIG managed, however, surveys say employees fear  
reprisal) 
t (data unavailable) 
u (data unavailable) 
 
Historical Context 
(DV) 
Conducive to Fraud; Conducive to Increased Calls 
(2008; 2012 emp. surveys; average 44% believe 
retaliation for reporting) 
Evidence of Interna l 
Fraud 
Yes 
Evidence of Negative 
Employee Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV Bureaucracy, Strongest indicator: Career Service; 
Insistence on the Rights of Office 
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Organization GS1 
Overall Performance: Above Average 
Bureaucracy: Level 8 of 10 
Assessment Element 
 
 
Bureaupathology, Strongest indicator: Prolonged Rol e 
Enactment; Resistance to Change 
 
Result DV DV Performing Moderately 
Metrics- moderate 
Functionality- moderate 
Best Practices- moderate 
Evidence of Historical Context, Internal Fraud, 
Disgruntled Employees 
Notes Employee reviews contained information that c ould be 
actionable to managers.  Specific jobs positions an d 
departments were referenced. 
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Case Study 4 (GS2) 
Case Study 4, GS2, is a public sector organization.   The subject is a 
state government. 
Background 
 
According to the U.S. Census, GS2, a state entity, had 70,891 workers 
as of March 2011.  Located in the Midwest, GS2 is t he 20 th  most populous 
state. GS2 is known as “America’s Dairy land” due t o their high level of 
dairy production. Most GS2 residents were reportedl y born in the state.  The 
current Governor of GS2 is “SW.” 
Bureaucracy 
 
 As a State Government Agency, a certain level of b ureaucracy might be 
assumed to exist in the State of GS2, and several a rticles have been written 
to this effect, including “Republicans Destroy Loca l Control, Create Massive 
Partisan Regulatory Bureaucracy, June 28, 2013;” an d “At a Loss: The State of 
GS2 After Eight Years Without the Public Intervenor ’s Office,” Winter 2004.   
It is important to determine the perception of empl oyees of GS2 as to 
the state of bureaucracy in their organization.  Em ployees of the State of 
GS2 reviewed their employer on Glassdoor.  Overall,  29 employees submitted a 
review of the agency, where they overall evaluated their employer at a 3.5 
rating, on a scale from 1-5.  Only 7% of respondent s indicated they “approve” 
of the “CEO” who is the Governor, SW. 
 The respondents’ comments were submitted between M arch 12, 2010 and 
March 27, 2013.   Overall, the reviewer sentiment i s largely one that 
indicates a tough working environment.  Several res pondents cautioned any 
future applicants they must have a “thick skin” in order to tolerate the job.  
Many also indicated they were not trusted, nor were  they treated fairly in 
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several respects.  One even hinted at internal crim e issues, describing 
coworkers as “criminals.” 
As demonstrated, a majority of respondents, 64%, ma de comments that 
were indicative of bureaucracy and bureaupathic con ditions in their 
workplace.  The most indicated categories included Insistence on the Rights 
of Office and Impersonal Treatment. 
Table 16 and 17 provide a summary and a detailed pr esentation of the 
social media analysis results. 
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Table 16 GS2 Social Media/Bureaucracy Analysis Summ ary  
 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 3/12/10-3/27/13 3 year time period 
Population 29 .04% of state employees (70,891) 
Respondents Indicating 
Bureaucracy or Bureaupathic 
Behaviors 
1811 64% of the population (29) 
.03% of state employees (70,891) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and 
Bureaupathology 
32 15 Bureaucracy + 
17 Bureaupathic 
Bureaucracy 
 
15 General (4) 
Hierarchy of Authority (3) 
System of Rules (0) 
Technical Expertise (0) 
Career Service (3) 
Insistence on the Rights of Office (5) 
Bureaupathic 
 
17 Impersonal Treatment (7) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (3) 
Resistance to Change (3) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation (3) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and Procedu res 
(1) 
 
Table 17 GS2 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set  
 
Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
1.   Bureaucracy General “government bureaucracy”  9/22/11 
2.   Bureaucracy General “red tape”  9/22/11 
                         
11 The number of respondents will not be equal to the  number of comments, as a single respondent may hav e 
commented more than once.  In the instance where th eir additional comment was included in a separate 
category, there will be more than one comment logge d per respondent. 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
3.   Bureaucracy General “we function in a large 
bureaucracy”  
4/10/12 
4.   Bureaucracy General “red tape, red tape, red 
tape”  
10/2/12 
5.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “Legislature sh ould 
reduce depth of 
management employees”  
2/25/11 
6.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “no more collec tive 
bargaining for state 
workers”  
5/12/11 
7.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “the top manage ment is 
not in touch with the 
real world.  The things 
that come down from there 
is [sic] laughable”  
12/27/11 
8.   Bureaucracy Career Service “most careers have a long 
shelf life”  
5/12/12 
9.   Bureaucracy Career Service “stable employer, 
virtually no chance of a 
layoff”  
11/13/12 
10.  Bureaucracy Career Service “stop paying those who 
don’t work and just suck 
up the money”  
6/18/10 
11.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“too often people are 
appointed to their 
positions an do not have 
the right experience”  
9/3/10 
12.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“people in positions they 
aren’t qualified to be 
in”  
9/22/11 
13.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“upper management dislike 
and distrust you”  
12/2/11 
14.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“promotions and other 
opportunities based on 
personal relationships & 
who you know”  
1/18/12 
15.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“decisions at high levels 
are made primarily with a 
focus on political 
4/10/12 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
outcomes/advantages not 
because they make good 
business sense”  
16.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “poor internal ta lent 
development”  
8/3/10 
17.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “sometimes [perfo rmance] 
reviews do not take place 
for 3-5 years”  
11/9/10 
18.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you better have a thick 
skin”  
12/1/11 
19.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you have to have a thick 
skin”  
4/10/12 
20.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “basically chaine d to 
your desk/phone. don’t 
ask if I’m on break when 
I go to the bathroom”  
11/28/12 
21.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “you better have thick 
skin”  
2/27/13 
22.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “trust employees”   2/27/13 
23.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role Enactment “not much roo m for 
growth”  
11/9/10 
24.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role Enactment “not much cha nce for 
upward mobility since 
most employees have been 
there so long they never 
leave and gradually work 
their way up in 
management based on 
seniority not performance 
[sic]  
12/14/12 
25.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role Enactment “repetitive w ork”  3/27/13 
26.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “culture is too r elaxed, 
no impetus to get things 
done”  
12/26/11 
27.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “change is slow to occur” 8/3/10 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
28.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change “quantity and qua lity of 
work  unimportant”  
1/18/12 
29.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Interrogation and 
Investigation 
 
“Waste a lot of money, 
typical government run 
facility.”  
6/18/10 
30.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Interrogation and 
Investigation 
 
“no real threat of 
disciplinary action for 
anything less than a 
felony”  
1/18/12 
31.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Interrogation and 
Investigation 
 
“some negative coworkers 
since the whole budget 
issue.  Dealing with 
criminal is its own can 
of worms”  
6/14/12 
32.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on 
Organizational Rules and 
Procedures 
“paperwork is almost 
impossible to keep 
current”  
3/12/13 
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Hotline Specification 
 
The GS2 Act 126 established the GS2 state hotline, managed by the GS2 
Legislative Audit Bureau, in 2007.  The hotline is called the “Fraud, Waste 
and Mismanagement Hotline.”  The toll-free hotline number has been 
operational since April 2008.  The hotline telephon e number, containing the 
word “fraud” is provided on their hotline website.  This website was easily 
located with an Internet search for the terms “GS2 Fraud Hotline.”  According 
to the website, their hotline is staffed “primarily  by a Certified Fraud 
Examiner.” In terms of reporting popularity, in the ir 2008 report, the State 
Auditor advised most tips to their hotline are rece ived via telephone. 
In 2009, a secure web-based form was also created.  This form is 
available on their hotline website, along with a fo rm that can be printed and 
mailed.  The printed form guides respondents by sug gesting examples of how to 
include the major elements of a complaint (i.e., wh o, what, when, where, how 
and why).  The State Auditor logs and tracks all ho tline reports, regardless 
of how they are received. 
The website further guides complaints by providing a brief set of “tips 
for callers” to include the suggested complaint par ameters (complaint should 
involve state government), and requests complaints be as specific and 
inclusive of facts as possible.  Complainants are a lso urged to supply a name 
and telephone number for follow-up, and are reminde d this information will 
remain confidential by law.  
Hotline Metrics 
 
The State of GS2 produces biennial special reports that summarize their 
hotline activity.  Data is also included in their r egular biennial reporting.  
Data concerning the performance of the State of GS2 ’s hotline was obtained 
for the years 2008-2012. In their 2008 report, they  specify 75 out of 140 
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hotline reports “involved state programs, agencies,  employees or 
contractors.”  This report was part of their regula r, biennial reporting.  In 
the following year, 2009, and again in 2012, the St ate created a separate, 
dedicated hotline report. 
Overall, benchmarking demonstrates the hotline rece ives a low number of 
reports for their size, and their industry.  It was  also noted that recently, 
the number of tips received regarding Employee Misc onduct and Agency 
Mismanagement have increased. 
Table 18 on the next page provides the hotline metr ics for GS2. 
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Table 18 GS2 Hotline Metrics 
FY Number of 
Employees 
Inquiries Unfounded/ 
No Action 
Resolved Pending Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure, 
Industry 12, 
Size 
Calls Expected 
per 
Benchmarking 
Delta 
2008 13 70,891 14 140 15 30 22 23 6.32, 8.60 = 7 496 -356 
2009 79 16 18 16 19 8.66, 7.66 = 8 567 -488 
2010 17 87 18 30 19 9 4.85, 7.19 = 6 425 -338 
                         
12 Here, the industry category is Public Administrati on. 
13 For their 2008 report, the reporting began in Apri l 2008, which was the advent of the hotline. 
14 U.S. Census. March 2011.  This figure was used for  all benchmarking, as detailed, historical state 
employee breakdowns were not immediately available.   Nevertheless, for benchmarking purposes, any numb er of 
workers over 50,000 is considered in the same categ ory range. 
15 Of these, the majority, 41, pertained to Waste/Ine fficiency issues, next, 17, related to Agency 
Mismanagement, 5 dealt to Ineligible Beneficiaries,  5 dealt with Vendor/Contractor Issues, 4 were 
categorized as “other,” and 3 were allegations rela ted to Employee Misconduct.  (It is unclear from th e 
data provided which complaints were classified, and  which were not, as the figures do not add up to th e 
total number of reports.)  
16 Of these, the majority, 30, pertained to Waste/Ine fficiency issues, next, 12, related to Agency 
Mismanagement, 7 dealt with Vendor/Contractor Issue s, 2 were allegations related to Ineligible 
Beneficiaries and 2 were categorized as “other.” (I t is unclear from the data provided which complaint s 
were classified, and which were not, as the figures  do not add up to the total number of reports.) 
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FY Number of 
Employees 
Inquiries Unfounded/ 
No Action 
Resolved Pending Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure, 
Industry 12, 
Size 
Calls Expected 
per 
Benchmarking 
Delta 
2011 79 19 38 46 28 5.28, 7.52 = 6 425 -346 
2012 20 83 21 5.28, 7.52 22 = 
6 
425 -342 
                                                                                                             
17 Since these reports are produced biennially, and 2 009 hotline figures were provided in a special repo rt, 
the 2010 figures were deduced by subtracting the 20 09 figures from the 2009/2010 biennial reports. 
18 Since these reports are produced biennially, and 2 009 hotline figures were provided in a special repo rt, 
the 2010 figures were deduced by subtracting the 20 09 figures from the 2009/2010 biennial reports.   
19 Of these, the majority, 18 were Ineligible Benefic iaries, next, 17, were Agency Mismanagement, 15, we re 
Waste/Inefficiency issues, 5 were related to Employ ee Misconduct, and 3 were “other.” (It is unclear f rom 
the data which complaints were classified, as the f igures do not add up to the total number of reports .) 
20 Since these reports are produced biennially, and 2 011 hotline figures were provided separately, the 2 012 
figures were deduced by subtracting the 2011 figure s from the 2011/2012 biennial report. 
21 Since these reports are produced biennially, and 2 011 hotline figures were provided separately, the 2 012 
figures were deduced by subtracting the 2011 figure s from the 2011/2012 biennial report.  Of these, th e 
majority, 19 were Waste/Inefficiency issues, next, 16 were Ineligible Beneficiaries, 10, related to Ag ency 
Mismanagement, 7 were Vendor/Contractor Issues, and  7 “other.” (It is unclear from the data provided w hich 
complaints were classified, as the figures do not a dd up to the total number of reports.) 
22 Since 2012 benchmarking figures are unavailable, a nd since the data for 2011/2012 was aggregated in t heir 
reporting, the 2011 benchmarking figures were used for both data sets. 
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Historical Context 
 
A review of public records and media articles demon strates the state 
employees in GS2 are very disgruntled.  They are re portedly extremely upset 
about the Governor (referred to herein as “SW”) SW’ s cuts to public employee 
rights and benefits.  In March 2011, SW confirmed t hat collective bargaining 
would end for most public workers.  In that year, s tate workers also didn’t 
receive a pay increase. (Bauer, 2013) According to State documents, for the 
2009-2011 bienniums, state workers were further sub jected to hour reductions 
and furloughs, also implemented by the Governor, to  decrease state 
expenditures.  These furloughs applied to all state  employees, full and part 
time.  Articles in the New York Times discussed the  “unrest” and “protests” 
which were mounting in this state, and spreading to  others as fear of similar 
cuts among those employees worsened. (Cooper & Seel ey, 2011)   
Generally, the public outrage over the policy chang es made by SW and 
other State lawmakers have resulted in an unprecede nted amount of public 
discontent and counterattacks.  Media articles repo rt ammunition being found 
outside the GS2 State Capitol, death threats sent t o Republican State 
Senators, thefts and boycotts of business who made contributions to SW’s 
campaign. (FoxNY.com, 2011; Murdock, 2011; Newby, 2 011) 
Several protests also occurred, including one at th e GS2 State Capitol, 
which police estimated was larger than protests dur ing the Vietnam era, 
containing up to 100,000 people in a single demonst ration (Kelleher, 2011).  
In fact, USA Today reported GS2 state police said t he March 26, 2011 protest 
was the largest they had ever seen. (Contorno, Bens on, & Jones, 2011) 
Such negative employee sentiment is likely to conti nue.  Although State 
employees recently received a pay increase (as of J uly 26, 2013; 1%), this 
raise is unlikely to satisfy most State workers, wh o have not received an 
increase in four or five years.  According to the A ssociated Press, democrats 
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have called this increase “paltry” in light of “inc reased pension and 
healthcare costs over the past two years, [which] e quated to a 12-14% pay 
cut.” (Bauer, 2013)  Incidentally, the Governor’s o wn salary increase was 
double that of the average state employee, rising f rom $144,423 to $147,328 
(rising by $2,905, a 2% increase). 
Overall, disgruntled employees are often perpetrato rs of workplace 
crime.  (Wells, 2001; Willis, 2006; PwC, 2011; Conn er 2012) The state of 
unrest, which exists in the State of GS2, should be  considered when marketing 
and evaluating the fraud hotline. 
Fraud Metrics 
 
According to the U.S. Census, as of July 2011, the state of GS2 had a 
population of just over 5.7 million, and 5 percent of those residents are 
serving GS2 as public workers. Despite having a fra ud hotline in place, which 
is designed to receive tips from state workers and residents alike, the 
fraud, waste and abuse on the part of public worker s is ongoing. 
Overall, this study concluded during the relevant t ime period, from 
2008-2012, over 4 years, $428k was lost by GS2 due to embezzlement, data 
theft and corruption.   
 A review of the news archives reveals the State of  GS2 has had its 
share of public employee theft, waste and mismanage ment on the part of former 
governors, among other officials, dating back to th e 1800s.  Such scandals 
caused the author to caution state residents that “ power corrupts” and to 
“always keep a watchful eye over the public servant s whom they hire...” 
(Scandals, Scandals, Scandals, 2006) 
The specific internal fraud instances located are a s follows.  In 
July 2012, an employee, who was a public worker for  seven years, was indicted 
with federal fraud charges after using an assumed n ame, fake social security 
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number, and a falsified passport, among other fabri cated documentation, to 
fraudulently obtain a home in a low income housing complex intended for more 
deserving residents. In all, the worker stole at le ast $18,000 worth of 
benefits. (Mohr)  It was later determined this empl oyee obtained her job 
using an alias. (Mohr, 2012) 
This employee worked in the Secretary of State’s of fice, where she 
would have been tasked with accurately and securely  maintaining important 
state records, including municipal records, state l aws and deeds, dating back 
100 years. To have crime committed in his office is  contrary to their 
professional philosophy of the current Secretary of  State, which is, to “[be] 
there when you need help.” (SOS Website)  
In another case involving multiple employees, it wa s reported three 
employees of the Milwaukee County Department of Hea lth Services from 2008-
2011, systematically stole more than $350,000 from the state’s food 
assistance program, FoodShare.  Collectively, accor ding to State records, the 
three workers had logged over 60 years of service t o the State of GS2, and 
each collected salaries that were the cost of livin g equivalent to making 
$60k in New York City.    
It was reported the three workers opened benefits a ccounts in the names 
of persons who were fictitious, incarcerated or oth erwise ineligible for 
benefits, and used the benefits for themselves, and  sold the cards to others 
for profit.  The scheme was complicated and involve d outside collaborators, 
all of whom sold fraudulent cards, falsified record s, bribed residents, and 
stole cash. (Garza, 2011)   
In all, the two complaints filed against the worker s document 30 
charges with multiple counts, including fraud, forg ery and misconduct in a 
public office.  When the employees’ homes were sear ched, 1000 social security 
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numbers and other Personally Identifiable Informati on was retrieved. (Garza, 
2011)     
It was later determined these workers’ crimes were known by certain 
State residents. According to one, who was intervie wed in connection with the 
investigation, he paid the women $50 per month to e xtend his own FoodShare 
benefits and advised they were bribing countless ot her residents in the same 
manner.  In his words, they “had the whole east sid e hooked up.”  (Garza, 
2011) 
In yet another more recent case, in late July 2012,  a trusted Milwaukee 
official was arrested for misconduct after it was l earned she embezzled money 
from the state in collusion with an outside party.  According to the search 
warrant, this employee, in her capacity as Director  of Milwaukee County’s 
Community Business Development Partners Agency (CBD P), is believed to have 
created fake contracts and incurred erroneous expen ses which were billed to 
the federally funded program and made payable to he r and the accomplice. 
(DeLong, 2012)  She also double-billed accounts and  received kickback money. 
(Journal Sentinel, 2012)  Ironically, this person w as tasked with contract 
oversight, which would have entailed the prevention  and avoidance of such 
theft.  The employee, again, was a trusted, long-te rm public worker (nearly 
ten years) who made $89k per year (the cost of livi ng equivalent of $157k in 
New York City).   
This case called into question the hiring practices  of Governor (and 
former County Executive) SW.  SW, who hired this wo rker, has been the target 
of a separate, long-term, massive probe into his ad ministration as County 
Executive, which has spanned over two years. The al legations against SW 
include “campaign finance malfeasance, embezzlement  of veterans’ funds, bid-
rigging, and even child enticement.” (Schultze, 201 2) 
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According to his website, Governor SW was elected t o a GS2 County 
Executive position in 2002 “to reform the scandal-r idden city government.” 
(SW.org) In 2010, while SW was campaigning to becom e Governor, a “John Doe” 
investigation was quietly launched into SW’s admini stration, after $60k 
became missing in connection with an annual event t hat SW sponsors to benefit 
area veterans. (Schultze, County Official Gets Out of Jail, 2012)  Since 
then, it expanded as additional issues surfaced; in cluding allegations of 
criminal activity on the part of key workers in his  administration (during 
his tenure as Milwaukee County Executive).  
Originally, six people were charged with 15 felonie s; one person, who 
turned himself in to prosecutors, was convicted on two counts. (Bottari, 
2011).  In all, six people were charged, including three key members of SW’s 
staff, including his former staff in GS2 County Exe cutive office, deputy 
chiefs of staff and constituent services director, who were all convicted of 
wrongdoing. (Hall & Spicuzza, 2013).  This investig ation expanded to the 
state level before it was ultimately closed in Marc h 2013.  Although the 
investigation uncovered “illegal campaign contribut ions to SW's campaign, 
illegal campaign activity by [SW’s] taxpayer-funded  staffers and embezzlement 
of veterans' funds and other misdeeds….since…before  [SW] was elected governor 
in November 2010,” the investigation closed without  finding sufficient 
evidence of wrongdoing beyond those charged. (Hall & Spicuzza, 2013)   
Despite the lack of official charges, there are man y critics who say SW 
evaded prosecution with expensive legal defense.  ( Hall & Spicuzza, 2013)  
Now that the scandal is behind him, sources have sa id SW may now be preparing 
to run for additional offices, including reelection  to his current post in 
2014 and a possible presidential run in 2016.  (Hal l & Spicuzza, 2013) 
Summary 
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Overall, GS2 was assessed as having a “Below Averag e” fraud hotline 
performance.  Their level of bureaupathology was as sessed at a “Level 7” 
(64%) out of ten.  The strongest indicators present  were Insistence on the 
Rights of Office and Impersonal Treatment.  The per formance details were as 
follows: Metrics were assessed as “Low” the functio nality was assessed as 
“Poor” and the Best Practice compliance was assesse d as “Good.”  Table 19 
provides a summary of these results. 
According to the evidence, the State of GS2 has exc essive bureaucracy 
and a hotline with performance issues.  A review of  the literature 
(organizational documents, media articles) and an a nalysis of employee 
reviews found bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy  was present in this 
organization.    Overall, 64% of the population (29 ), which was .03% of all 
employees (70,891), made comments indicating bureau cracy or excessive 
bureaucracy.  In sum, the comments were made by 18 separate respondents, with 
15 comments indicating bureaucracy and 17 indicatin g excessive bureaucracy.  
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy are 
recognized on the part of employees.  Employee comm ents indicating 3 of 5 
indices evincing bureaucracy and 5 of 5 indices ind icating excessive 
bureaucracy were present at varying degrees.  While  15 respondents’ comments 
indicated the general existence of bureaucracy, spe cifically, employee 
comments suggest the indices of bureaucracy “Insist ence on the Rights of 
Office” (5 comments) as having the strongest presen ce, followed by “Career 
Service” (3 comments) and “Hierarchy of Authority” (3 comments).  The 
remaining comments (4) were suggestive of the gener al existence of 
bureaucracy.  With respect to bureaupathology, all five indices were present, 
especially “Impersonal Treatment” (7 comments). 
As for GS2’s hotline, evidence suggests it may have  performance issues.  
Benchmarking revealed the hotline receives a low nu mber of calls for the 
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industry and size. In every year analyzed, FY 2008- 2012, GS2’s hotline 
performed below performance standards per benchmark ing.   
With respect to the hotline’s functionality, the ho tline performed 
poorly.  As for marketing, the hotline telephone nu mber was easily located 
with a quick Google search for “GS2 Fraud Hotline.”  Next, as for mechanics, 
the hotline is reportedly managed by a single Certi fied Fraud Examiner.  This 
suggests this hotline is not available 24-7 and ass istance is not provided in 
multiple languages, due to understaffing.  As a res ult, this hotline may not 
be operating well from a mechanics perspective. 
As for intake/processing, organizational records re veal the hotline 
only has one person handling calls.  As a result, t he intake and processing 
is performed by a single actor, which suggests the potential for a perceived 
reporting and process bias.  However, the website o ffers clear reporting 
guidelines that are not overly bureaucratic.  Confi dentiality is also 
assured.  It is further reported the State Auditor logs and tracks all 
hotline reports.   
The historical context suggests employees of the St ate of GS2 at this 
time would be especially disgruntled – a condition that is known to give rise 
to fraud and can further inhibit fraud reporting. I n 2011, The Governor, SW 
announced collective bargaining would end for most public workers.  Many 
State Employees also reportedly went a long time (4 -5 years) without a pay 
increase, and were subject to hour cuts and furloug hs.  Poor employee 
sentiment resulted in a number of unprecedented pub lic demonstrations. 
(Contorno, Benson, & Jones, 2011) 
In addition, per the employee reviews, this organiz ation is believed to 
have a dominating management (Insistence on the Rig hts of Office, 5 
comments), providing Impersonal Treatment (7 commen ts).  
With respect to best practices, this hotline is bel ieved to be lacking 
in several areas.  For one, the hotline does not ap pear to have a clear, 
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reported oversight process conducted by high-level personnel. As for due 
care, the hotline does not appear to have a well-ma naged, clear escalation 
process.  With respect to communication, the hotlin e is communicated 
appropriately externally.  The hotline does not mak e a poster available to 
external parties.  It is unknown whether a poster i s provided internally.   
As for this hotline’s “reasonable steps to achieve compliance,” that 
requirement is satisfied with their third-party hot line management, process 
of having calls escalated via a clear chain of comm and, and The Office of 
Inspector General having the contact information of  key personnel for 
immediate dissemination. 
With respect to the other two best practices elemen ts, “consistent 
enforcement” and “reasonable steps to respond and p revent similar offenses 
upon detection,” this study was unable to rate this  organization on these 
factors, as the data is simply not made available t o researchers to allow for 
this criteria to be established.  Specific crimes l earned via the hotline, 
along with their investigation and resolution, are not reported outside of 
the State of GS2. 
Furthermore, the level of internal fraud, the histo rical context and 
the perception of employees of their organization a re also factors in gauging 
the overall performance of this fraud hotline.  As for internal fraud, upon 
review of public records, this study was able to es tablish the presence of a 
high amount of internal fraud.  Furthermore, employ ee reviews on Glassdoor 
also indicated the presence of internal fraud, with  one respondent describing 
his/her coworkers as “criminals.”   
As for employee sentiment, employee reviews suggest  employees are 
likely disgruntled.  With an overall rating of 3.5 out of 5 on Glassdoor, 
which could be construed as “above average” (overal l evaluation not provided 
by Glassdoor), their reviews could be interpreted a s leaning slightly 
positively.  However, when specific comments and ot her indicators are 
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considered, it is clear the organization’s employee s are experiencing an 
excessively bureaucratic state.  For example, a sep arate metric on Glassdoor 
indicates only 7% of the population of respondents (29) indicated they 
“approve” of Governor SW.  This statistic suggests employees are generally 
unhappy with the regime, despite having potentially  indicated they might be 
satisfied with their job. 
Employees who submitted reviews to Glassdoor docume nt a highly 
bureaucratic environment, which affects their abili ty to advance in the 
organization.  Specifically, indicating “people are  in positions they are not 
qualified to be in” and “promotions are based on pe rsonal relationships and 
who you know” and there is “not much room for growt h” “since most employees 
have been there so long they never leave and gradua lly work their way up in 
management based on seniority not performance.”   
Further, employees who submitted negative comments on Glassdoor say the 
organizational bureaucracy has created poor working  conditions and 
organizational waste and mismanagement.  Respondent s warn potential future 
employees to “have a thick skin;” “upper management  dislike(s) and 
distrust(s) you,” you are “basically chained to [yo ur] desk/phone” in an 
organization that “waste[s] a lot of money.” 
When the historical context is evaluated, in light of comments posted 
to Glassdoor, it is clear that the current politica l climate had a negative 
effect on employees.  Employee respondents indicate d there was low morale due 
to Governor SW’s removal of the collective bargaini ng process (“some negative 
co-workers since the whole budget issue.”).  This c omment validates that 
employees were disgruntled; a condition giving rise  to fraud and also 
inhibiting fraud hotline reporting per Bureaucracy Theory.  Per Caiden, 
excessive bureaucracy conditions “promote organizat ional sabotage.” (1985, p. 
25) 
  Table 19 provides a summary of the results for GS 2.
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Table 19 GS2 Table of Results 
Organization GS2 
Hotline Functionality: Below Average 
Bureaupathology: Level 7 of 10 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Size 17,891 
Hotline Name Fraud, Waste and Mismanagement Hotline  
Management GS2 Legislative Audit Bureau 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
64% (Population 29; 18 indicated presence of IV; 32  
comments indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV Level 7 
General (4) 
a (3) 
b (0) 
c (0) 
d (3)  
e (5) 
 
Bureaupathology 
IV 
5 of 5 
f (7)  
g (3) 
h (3) 
I (3) 
J (1) 
 
Hotline Metrics 
(DV) 
Low, Calls received are far below benchmarking figu res 
Hotline 
Functionality 
(DV) 
Poor, 4 of 5 
k (easily located externally) 
l (hotline only has a single person handling calls)   
m (a single actor adds a perceived reporting and pr ocess 
bias)  
n (employees especially disgruntled due to historic al 
context) 
 
Best Practices 
(DV) 
Good, 2 of 6 
p (high level oversight) 
q (escalation process is unclear) 
r (data is communicated externally) 
s (a single staffer is noted) 
t (reports indicate enforcement) 
u (reports indicate escalation) 
Historical 
Context (DV) 
Conducive to Fraud; Conducive to Increased Calls 
(2011 end of collective bargaining; unprecedented l evel of 
protests and other demonstrations during this time)  
Evidence of 
Internal Fraud 
Yes 
Evidence of 
Negative Employee 
Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV Bureaucracy, Strongest indicators: Hierar chy of Authority; 
Career Service; Insistence on the Rights of Office 
 
Bureaupathology, Strongest indicators: Impersonal 
Treatment; Prolonged Role Enactment; Resistance to Change; 
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Organization GS2 
Hotline Functionality: Below Average 
Bureaupathology: Level 7 of 10 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation 
 
Result DV DV Metrics, Functionality Affected 
Metrics- low 
Functionality- poor 
Best Practices- good 
Evidence of Historical Context, Internal Fraud, Disgruntled 
Employees 
Notes The historical context suggests employees of the State of 
GS2 at this time would be especially disgruntled – a 
condition that is known to give rise to fraud and c an 
further inhibit fraud reporting. 
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Case Study 5 (GS3) 
Case Study 5, GS3, is a public sector organization in the city 
government. 
 
Background 
 
According to the GS3 website, they have 19,500 empl oyees working for 
the City.  GS3, located in the Western part of the United States, is the 8 th  
largest City in the United States.  Their primary e conomy is driven by the 
military, tourism and manufacturing.  According to the Farmer’s Almanac, GS3 
has one of the top ten best climates.  The interim Mayor of GS3 is TG. 
Bureaucracy 
 
News articles have documented the presence of massi ve bureaucracy in 
GS3’s City government.  However, more recently, the  issue moved to the 
forefront, indicating the City bureaucracy had beco me especially problematic.  
In a Press Release dated November 15, 2011, with th e headline “Local 
Businesses List Top Solutions to Cut City Red Tape”  it was reported, for the 
first time in ten years, a special forum was held f or interested parties to 
voice their concerns regarding the City’s bureaucra cy directly to the City 
Council.  During this meeting, one speaker likened the City’s bureaucratic 
red tape to “trying to get into a speakeasy with th e wrong password.” (Awbry, 
2011) 
Additional articles chronicle the City’s bureaucrac y, with titles such 
as “Insane…Mindless Bureaucracy” (UY, 2010) where r esidents discuss their 
inability to park overnight in front of their apart ment complex due to City 
restrictions, “The Bureaucracy of the ‘Awful Tower, ’” (Dillon, 2011) which 
discusses the “the city of GS3’s bureaucratic moras s slow[ing] down road and 
other infrastructure repairs” and “Government Burea ucracy Impedes Growth in 
the Construction Industry” (Rico, 2012) which discu ssed how challenges 
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relating to “bonding, workers’ compensation and gov ernment regulations” were 
raised by construction officials at a recent roundt able discussion. (Uy, 
2010; Dillon, 2011; Rico, 2012) 
To gain a unique insight into the presence of burea ucracy and 
bureaupathic conditions, as they are observed by Ci ty employees, the website 
Glassdoor.com was reviewed, where 18 past and prese nt employees provided 
detailed, unsolicited reviews of their employer.  O verall, the 18 respondents 
rated their employer an average of 3.1, on a scale of 1-5. These reviews were 
provided between February 20, 2009 and July 8, 2013 .  Overall, the strongest 
indicators of bureaucracy noted by employees were “ Insistence on the rights 
of Office” and “Impersonal Treatment.” 
 
Table 20 and 21 on the next page provide a summary and detailed listing 
of these results.
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Table 20 GS3 Social Media/Bureaucracy Analysis Summ ary  
 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 2/20/09-7/8/13 4 year time period 
Population 18 .09% of city employees (19,500) 
Respondents Indicating 
Bureaucracy or Bureaupathic 
Behaviors 
1223 .06% of city employees (19,500) 
67% of the population (18) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and 
Bureaupathology 
22 11 Bureaucracy + 
11 Bureaupathology 
Bureaucracy 
 
11 General (1) 
Hierarchy of Authority (3) 
System of Rules (1) 
Technical Expertise (1) 
Career Service (1) 
Insistence on the Rights of Office (4) 
Bureaupathic 
 
11 Impersonal Treatment (3) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (2) 
Resistance to Change (3) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation (1) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and Procedu res 
(2) 
 
Table 21 GS3 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set 
Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
1.   Bureaucracy General “bureaucratic”  
 
12/10/12 
2.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “top heavy in u pper 
management”  
12/21/11 
3.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “top heavy”  2/ 7/13 
                         
23 The number of respondents will not be equal to the  number of comments, as a single respondent may hav e 
commented more than once.  In the instance where th eir additional comment was included in a separate 
category, there will be more than one comment logge d per respondent. 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
4.   Bureaucracy Hierarchy of Authority “very structure d and 
hierarchical”  
3/6/13 
5.   Bureaucracy System of Rules “poor upper 
management, they [sic] 
regulations they put 
out seem un-
compeditive [sic]  
12/21/11 
6.   Bureaucracy Technical Expertise  
 
“top heavy salaries in 
IT”  
 
10/17/12 
7.   Bureaucracy Career Service  
 
“seniority kind of 
sucks.  You don’t have 
to do a good job…”  
 
8/22/10 
8.   Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“top management plays 
favorites”  
3/16/09 
9.   Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“..hiring departments 
conduct interviews, 
but they already have 
someone in mind for 
them to hire, and its 
usually the person 
they want to promote 
within their 
department”  
4/14/10 
10.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“the city salary is 
top heavy for 
appointments by the 
Mayor and Council.  So 
many upper management 
making over $100,000 a 
year.  The 
Union/Classified 
employees are going 
without to support 
upper management pay”  
10/17/12 
11.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the Rights of 
Office 
“senior management 
with big egos that 
don’t like to have 
5/7/13 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
their opinions 
challenged”  
12.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “un-friendly [sic ] 
area managers that do 
no [sic] do anything”  
12/21/11 
13.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “terrible managem ent 
that don’t know how to 
interact with and 
communicate with 
employees”  
6/8/13 
14.  Bureaupathic Impersonal Treatment “don’t ignore 
[employees] and treat 
them like they are 
invisible”  
7/8/13 
15.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role Enactment  
 
“Lack of promotional 
opportunities”  
 
5/11/10 
16.  Bureaupathic Prolonged Role Enactment  
 
“they do not hire very 
often”  
 
4/6/12 
17.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change   “hard to make a  
successful program, 
City really just want 
[sic] to offer the 
basics and not 
anything more”  
12/21/11 
18.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change  “allow the free flow 
of ideas”  
1/15/12 
19.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Change  “limiting on 
creativity”  
12/10/12 
20.  Bureaupathic Resistance to Interrogation and 
Investigation  
 
“increasing mistrust”  
 
12/10/12 
21.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on Organizational 
Rules and Procedures 
“it’s all paperwork 
for the City”  
3/27/09 
22.  Bureaupathic Strict Reliance on Organizational 
Rules and Procedures 
“Pools are restricted 
from serving their 
individual community 
needs, instead have to 
12/21/11 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
operate as a whole 
which really doesn’t 
work cause some 
programs work better 
in communities than 
others”  
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Hotline Specification 
 
GS3’s fraud hotline is called a “Fraud, Waste and A buse Hotline.”  An 
Internet search for “GS3 Fraud Hotline” easily resu lts in their hotline page, 
which is the first search result.  One notable qual ity of this website is how 
the City immediately (3 rd  sentence) tells the user they would prefer they 
reported their concern in person, by saying: “Face to face reporting is 
always the best form of communication, although tha t is not always feasible. 
Current City procedures and/or department instructi ons state that all 
complaints should be sent through the chain of comm and.” 
The City Auditor manages GS3’s hotline.  However, t he City Auditor uses 
a third party hotline provider, namely, The Network , to manage their fraud 
hotline.  This fact is disclosed on their hotline w ebpage.  Similar to the 
GS2 State hotline, GS3 provides materials and other  guidance for users to 
guide them through the complaint process, including  a list of sample “fraud” 
“waste” and “abuse” issues.  On their hotline websi te, they also have a link 
to more information about The Network, which is a l argely promotional piece, 
where they advise potential users The Network is “t he leading provider of 
hotlines to complex organizations.”  
In addition to The Network, callers can submit comp laints to the City 
Auditor, direct.  According to City documents, as o f 2008, they were 
contracted to pay The Network $12,000 per year for these services. (GS3 
Office of the City Auditor, October 20, 2008) 
According to their organizational documents, the ho tline was 
established on December 2, 2005, per GS3 Municipal Code §26.1703(c).  After 
some organizational transitioning, the Office of th e City Auditor assumed 
responsibility for the hotline as of July 21, 2008 and it was opened to the 
public on August 25, 2008.   
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In terms of triage, it is reported that The Network  sends the City 
Auditor “instant email notification of all complain ts” to the City Auditor, 
Audit Manager and Audit Analyst. (GS3 Office of the  City Auditor, October 20, 
2008)  Then, the City Auditor conducts investigatio ns on “all material 
complaints received related to fraud, waste, and ab use.” (Luna, City Auditor 
Letter to Members of the Audit Committee, 2008) Any  non fraud-related 
complaints are said to go before the City Auditor’s  Hotline Intake and Review 
Committee (City Auditor, Personnel Director, Office  of Ethics and Integrity 
designee and Labor Relations Director).   
This committee, which meets every two weeks, is tas ked with reviewing 
the complaints and deciding whether further investi gation is warranted.  In 
this instance, referrals are made via written memor andum to the appropriate 
Department Director, who must, in turn, provide wri tten proof back to the 
City Auditor the matter was handled. (Luna, City Au ditor Letter to Members of 
the Audit Committee, 2008) 
Hotline Metrics 
 
The hotline metrics analyzed for GS3 were between 2 006 and 2012.  In FY 
2009, the average number of calls received to the h otline was 12 per month.  
During this time, the hotline was exceeding its exp ected level of calls via 
benchmarking.  However, from 2010 forward, a signif icant drop in calls is 
noted, bringing them under the expected call levels . 
Table 22 on the next page provides the hotline metr ics for GS3. 
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Table 22 GS3 Hotline Metrics 
 
FY Number of 
Employees 
Inquiries Fraud, 
Waste 
and 
Abuse 
Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure, 
Industry 24, Size 
Calls Expected 
per Benchmarking 
Delta 
2006 25 19,500 26 180 N/A 13.6, 4.7 = 9 175 +5 
2007 27 140 N/A 3.18, 9.6 = 6 117 +23 
2008 28 176 N/A 6.32, 9.9 = 8 156 +20 
2009 29 140 17 8.66, 7.93 = 8 156 +16 
2010 61 N/A 4.85, 8.35 = 7 136 -75 
2011 76 N/A 5.28, 8.29 = 7 136 -60 
2012 115 19 5.28, 8.29 = 7 30 136 -21 
 
                         
24 Here, the industry category is Public Administrati on. 
25 Reported for the calendar year. 
26 Since annual breakdowns are difficult to obtain du e to their Fiscal Year reporting schedule, the most  
recent figure is being used for this analysis.  For  benchmarking purposes, slight fluctuations are not  
material to the outcome.  Here, they are in Group 3 , (10,001-20,000 employees).  
27 Reported for the calendar year. 
28 Reported for the calendar year. 
29 July 2008-June 2009. 
30 2012 figures are not yet available.  As a result, 2011 figures were used, since they are the most rec ent 
numbers, and similar economic conditions, and thus most likely to be similar. 
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Historical Context 
 
The City Auditor publishes quarterly reports docume nting the 
performance of their fraud hotline.  They also prov ide special reports in 
response to request, and following certain investig ations conducted, which 
will be discussed later in this work. Data concerni ng the performance of the 
hotline dates back to 2006. 
One detail that was noted in their first (publicall y available) hotline 
performance report, which was dated October 16, 200 8 (and provides a summary 
of call volume dating back to 2006) was a suggested  limit placed on call 
volume by The Network.   
Specifically, in this report, it reads “In 2008, we  estimate 176 
complaints will be made to the hotline if the quart erly trend continues.  
Based on the estimated number of complaints that wi ll be filed in 2008, The 
Network’s cap limit of 288 calls per year will not be exceeded.  However, if 
the number of complaints per month averages more th an 24 in 2009, the 
complaint cap limit will be exceeded.” (Luna, Quart erly Fraud Hotline Report 
Q1 2009, p. 3) 
This information was confirmed in this study during  an interview with a 
representative from (NE1) wherein it was learned or ganizations were charged 
on a “per report” basis.   
The information from GS3 suggests that “caps” are f urther placed on 
volume, presumably to keep within a certain service  guideline.  This pricing 
model seems to work against the spirit of the hotli ne, which is to foster 
open communication for the purpose of reducing inte rnal fraud. 
In addition, in a designated section of this report , the City Auditor 
discussed the value of the reporting received, yet says it has created a 
strain on internal resources.  This section reads a s follows: 
Number of Fraud Complaints 
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From the Hotline’s inception in December 2005 throu gh June 2008, 
the City received 13 fraud complaints (3 percent of  all 
complaints), including accounting or audit irregula rities 
complaints. Since assuming responsibility for the H otline in July 
2008, we have received ten calls in the first three  months that 
require investigation by City Auditor staff. During  the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2009, fraud-related complain ts requiring 
City Auditor investigation represent 15 percent of all complaints 
filed. There has been a significant increase in the  number of 
fraud-related complaints compared to previous years .  The number 
of fraud and accounting complaints made in the firs t quarter is 
of concern in terms of the number hours required to  investigate 
these complaints. Based on the 13 fraud and account ing complaints 
filed in 2006 and 2007, we estimated allocating 600  staff hours 
in fiscal year 2009 to investigate up to 15 fraud c omplaints or 
about 40 hours per complaint. If the number of frau d and 
accounting complaints received in the first quarter  continues to 
trend for the remainder of the fiscal year, we esti mate receiving 
a total of 40 fraud-related complaints and exceedin g our planned 
staff hours by 1,080 hours. As of October 3, 2008, we had used 
approximately 147 of 600 staff hours investigating complaints.” 
(Luna, Quarterly Fraud Hotline Report Q1 2009, Octo ber 16, 2008, 
p. 5) 
 
 
The budgetary constraints placed on the hotline wer e further noted 
later in their report, where they conclude a discus sion of resource issues 
with a value proposition, saying “…if the current t rend in the number of 
complaints continues, the Auditor’s Office will be required to either reduce 
the number of hours spent on planned performance au dits, or hire an 
investigator to examine the fraud related complaint s received.” (October 16, 
2008, p. 6) This statement suggests an unfortunate tradeoff must occur, where 
City administrators must make a decision of whether  to investigate fraud 
hotline tips or conduct audits - both of which are top ways that 
organizational fraud is discovered. (Association of  Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2002-2012) 
In light of the evidence, the complaint cap is trou bling.  This 
hotline, per their own reports, appears to be gener ating valid and actionable 
complaints.  There are 17 special reports posted in  the public domain that 
document investigations conducted following hotline  complaints. These reports 
are provided publically per State Government Code §  53087.6(e)(2).  Stating 
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substantiated allegations, and others, which contai n information “deemed 
necessary [for disclosure] to serve the interests o f the public” are made 
publically available.  All others are kept confiden tial. Overall, there were 
4 reports created in 2012, 3 in 2011, 2 in 2010, an d 8 in 2009.  Of these, 
82% of the allegations (14) on which the reports we re based, were 
substantiated. 
Despite their demonstrated interest in reducing the  number of 
complaints received to the hotline, the City docume nted plans to raise 
awareness of their hotline.  In City documentation,  it was reported they 
planned to expand their fraud hotline marketing eff orts in Q3 2012, to 
“remind employees of their obligation under the Cit y’s Administrative 
Regulation 95.60” and “increase the level of employ ee confidence in [the] 
Fraud Hotline as a viable means to address fraud, w aste and abuse in City 
operations.”  Regulation 95.60 encourages employees  to fulfill their own 
moral obligations to the City by disclosing imprope r governmental activities 
within their knowledge.   
Such efforts include: (i) Posting a link of the Cit y Net webpage to the 
Fraud Hotline Quarterly Report, (ii) Sending a broa dcast email to all 
employees reminding them that the Fraud Hotline is a viable method of 
reporting fraud, waste and abuse, and (iii) Mailing  a memo, business card, 
and Fraud Hotline Brochure titled “Doing What’s Rig ht” to employees. (Luna, 
City Auditor Letter to Members of the Audit Committ ee, 2008, p. 1) 
Table 23 on the next page documents the complaints investigated by GS3.
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Table 23 GS3 Hotline Reports 
Count Report Date  Details Status Notes 
1.   6/18/12 A City employee was accused of 
conflict of interest; 
conducting a side business at a 
City location for profit. 
Unsubstantiated  
2.   6/4/12 An allegation was submitted 
regarding the improper use of 
Special Use Permits for 
personal gain. 
Unsubstantiated Oversight weaknesses 
were discovered and 
addressed as part of 
this investigation. 
3.   1/29/09 A City facility was accused of 
mishandling scrap metal. 
Unsubstantiated Although this 
allegation was 
unsubstantiated, 
certain 
recommendations were 
made based on 
conditions discovered 
upon inspection. 
4.   8/21/12 A City convention center was 
accused of inflating attendance 
numbers to justify a recent 
expansion. 
Substantiated  
5.   3/29/12 A City employee was reported 
for using the City internet to 
conduct non-City business. 
Substantiated Five City employees 
were recommended for 
discipline. 
6.   12/15/11 An allegation was submitted 
that a City department was 
operating in violation of its 
contract with the City. 
Substantiated  
7.   10/25/11 It was alleged a nonprofit 
organization filed to receive a 
false reimbursement from the 
City. 
Substantiated The City was 
erroneously billed for 
$20,000 and a demand 
for the return of 
funds was initiated. 
8.   3/3/11 A City employee was accused of 
stealing money, making false 
accounting entries and 
concealing/destroying 
associated records. 
Substantiated Missing funds totaled 
$100,998 
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Count Report Date  Details Status Notes 
9.   11/5/10 A complaint alleged contract 
administration abuse. 
Substantiated  
10.  7/21/10 A City employee was accused of 
selling City scrap metal to 
fund employee events. 
Substantiated It was determined 
official procedures 
surrounding the sale 
of such metals didn’t 
exist.  Consistent 
records regarding the 
sale of $21,000 worth 
of such metals from 
2004-2010 could not be 
located. 
11.  11/23/09 A City employee was accused of 
submitting false information to 
fraudulently receive health 
benefits. 
Substantiated Issue highlighted 
greater weaknesses in 
benefit documentation 
submission process. 
12.  6/30/09 It was alleged a City employee 
stole items from a City 
inspection site. 
Substantiated  
13.  6/29/09 A City nonprofit organization 
was accused of accounting 
irregularities and possible 
misuse of City funds. 
Substantiated Duplicate billings in 
the amount of $112,070 
were located and the 
City sought 
restitution. 
14.  5/28/09 A City program was accused of 
delaying fundraiser money 
deposits. 
Substantiated  
15.  4/7/09 A City organization was accused 
of accounting irregularities, 
misuse of funds and assault. 
Substantiated The City employee had 
two civil judgments 
filed against them, 
and $1,085 was paid 
using City funds. 
16.  2/23/09 The City was performing 
duplicate and unnecessary 
replacement of water meter 
boxes. 
Substantiated 92 potential water 
meter boxes 
replacement was 
avoided, saving the 
City $30,728. 
17.  1/16/09 
 
A City employee was accused of 
misusing their position to 
Substantiated  
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Count Report Date  Details Status Notes 
obtain confidential documents 
for personal gain. 
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Fraud Metrics 
 
As of 2010, the population of the City of GS3 was a pproximately 1.3 
million, making it the eighth largest city in the U nited States.  In the same 
year, GS3 was lauded as one of the “Top 10 Safest C ities in the U.S.” by 
Forbes magazine. (Levy)  However, despite this desi gnation, which was 
bestowed upon GS3 due to their low rate of violent crime, research reveals 
this city is not immune to fraud, waste and abuse.  In fact, certain crimes 
previously committed by GS3’s city employees have b een so egregious; they 
were viewed as a contributory factor in the City’s financial crisis of 2002-
2003. October 2010, the SEC announced this fraud le ad to a “first” for them - 
never before had the SEC ever secured financial pen alties against city 
officials in a municipal bond fraud case. (Securiti es and Exchange 
Commission, October 27, 2010) 
Overall, during the relevant time period, from 2006 -2012, this study 
determined over a six-year period, $180k was lost t o this City due to 
embezzlement and corruption. 
A review of the frauds at GS3 will begin with a dis cussion of the SEC 
matter.  According to their complaint, the SEC foun d that from 2002 to 2003, 
GS3 officials, knowing the City had financial chall enges, misrepresented the 
financial health of the City’s pension funds and he alth plans, thereby 
misleading investors.  
 On April 7, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Comm ission (SEC) filed 
securities fraud charges against the high-ranking G S3 city officials 
responsible for this fraud, including the former De puty City Manager, 
Treasurer, Auditor & Comptroller, and Finance Manag er.  On October 27, 2010, 
the SEC announced that four of the employees agreed  to pay financial 
penalties for their crimes.  The City of GS3, as a collective, had been 
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previously charged in 2006 with this crime.  At tha t time, experts expressed 
displeasure with the fact the individual employees – who were directly 
responsible for the violations – were not charged. (Walsh, 2006) 
In yet another case, in 2012, a City council member  (referred to herein 
as “RI”) and Deputy Mayor, (referred to herein as “ MZ”), who in 2005 were 
forced to resign from the City Council in a salacio us scandal that was coined 
“Stripper-Gate.” (Moran)  In 2005, RI and MZ were c onvicted of extortion, 
wire fraud and conspiracy after they were caught ac cepting bribes from a 
local strip club owner in exchange for using their political influence to 
repeal “no touch” laws, which had lowered strip clu b profits. (Moran, 2012)  
In June 2005, the two resigned from their political  positions.   
After being sentenced to twenty-one months in feder al prison, RI 
remained free on bail while he continued to file ap peals for the next six and 
a half years.  Finally, after the Supreme Court dec lined to hear his case, in 
January 2012, he was sent to a minimum-security sat ellite camp at Atwater 
Federal Prison, where he was said to remain until A ugust 2013 (RI Sentenced 
21 Months).  Earlier this year, it was reported RI was being transferred to a 
halfway house where he will serve out the remainder  of his sentence. (Moran, 
2013) 
In yet another case, RI’s brother, NI, former mayor  of National City 
in GS3 County, also resigned in 2006 after a news r eport revealed his low-
income rental properties, containing 100 units, had  serious health code 
violations. (“NI Voted,” 2009) NI responded to the press, blaming these 
violations on his owner-wife, to whom he had transf erred two of ten units in 
the previous week. (Branscomb & Sierra, 2005)  Resi dents of the units, who 
complained of vermin, lack of heat and hot water an d non-working appliances, 
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among other problems, were often evicted shortly fo llowing their complaints. 
(Branscomb & Sierra, 2005)   
Despite his past, it was later announced NI was bro ught on to serve as 
Chairman of GS3 County’s Hispanic Chamber of Commer ce (SDCHCC).  The SDCHCC 
was reportedly not concerned over NI’s past, findin g “...he has a lot of 
experience with finances, and that could be really helpful right now.” (Soto, 
2009) It should be noted the SDCHCC was recently su bject to massive financial 
crime at the hands of an internal fraudster, who re cently stole $70k from the 
organization’s bank accounts. (Soto, 2009) 
 In another more recent case, in March 2011, a Park s and Recreation 
Department (PRD) employee with fiduciary responsibi lity for the agency was 
arraigned on charges of grand theft by an employee for stealing more than 
$100k from various recreation centers from 2004-200 8.  He acted in collusion 
with another employee, who was later charged with t wo counts of felony 
charges of creating false accounts with public mone y.  The two men reportedly 
wrote themselves checks and swiped reimbursement pa yments, membership fees, 
and other payments intended for the PRD. (Gustafson , 2011)   
Ironically, one of the perpetrators, a 30-year City  veteran, was 
featured positively in news article about City budg et cuts (Gustafson, 2011).  
He was portrayed as a good employee and thus a pote ntial tragic casualty of a 
waning City budget.  Instead, following his fraud, the news articles are a 
mea culpa; critical of the City’s inability to susp end his pension 
eligibility, despite defrauding the City.    
As a result of this and other City-employee perpetu ated crimes, the new 
pension reforms which were amended in June 2012 und er Proposition B, to 
“eliminate pension benefits for City officers or em ployees convicted of a 
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felony related to their employment, duties or oblig ations as a City officer 
or employee.” Incidentally, a hotline tip revealed this crime. (Lowe, 2011) 
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Summary 
 
Overall, GS3 was assessed as having a “High” fraud hotline performance.  
Their level of bureaupathology was assessed at a “L evel 7” (67%) out of ten.  
The strongest indicators present were Insistence on  the Rights of Office, 
Impersonal Treatment and Resistance to Change.  The  performance details were 
as follows: Metrics were assessed as “Low” the func tionality was assessed as 
“Great” and the Best Practice compliance was assess ed as “High.”  Table 24 
provides a summary of these results. 
According to the evidence, the City of GS3 has exce ssive bureaucracy.  
A review of the literature (organizational document s, media articles) and an 
analysis of employee reviews found bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy was 
present in this organization.  Overall, 67% of the population (18), which was 
.09% of all employees (19,500), made comments indic ating bureaucracy or 
excessive bureaucracy.  In sum, the comments were m ade by 18 separate 
respondents, with 11 of their comments indicating b ureaucracy and 11 
indicating excessive bureaucracy.  
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy are 
recognized on the part of employees.  Employee comm ents indicating 5 of 5 
indices evincing bureaucracy and 5 of 5 indices ind icating excessive 
bureaucracy were present at varying degrees.  Emplo yee comments suggest the 
indices of bureaucracy “Insistence on the Rights of  Office” (4 comments) as 
having the strongest presence, followed by “Hierarc hy of Authority” (3 
comments). With respect to bureaupathology, all fiv e indices were present, 
especially “Impersonal Treatment” (3 comments) and “Resistance to Change” (3 
comments). 
As for GS3’s hotline, evidence suggests it performe d at a high level.  
However, their metrics were assessed at a “Low” lev el because their 
benchmarking numbers fell below expected levels in recent years.  
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Benchmarking revealed the hotline was performing as  expected per benchmarking 
estimates from 2006-2009.  Suddenly, in 2010, the c alls fell sharply below 
benchmarking estimates (-75) and remained below est imates in the ensuing 
years up to 2012.  
A review of the historical context provided a possi ble reason for this 
decline.  Upon reviewing organizational documents ( internal reports), it was 
learned this drop occurred immediately following do cumented budgetary 
concerns over call volume in light of The Network’s  imposed limits. Although 
their hotline shows evidence of being well operated , the limitation on 
reporting placed by The Network, and emphasis to em ployees to report in 
person, may have caused their hotline to fall short  of expectations. 
With respect to the hotline’s functionality, the ho tline performed 
great.  As for marketing, the hotline telephone num ber was easily located 
with a quick Google search for “GS3 Fraud Hotline.”  With respect to 
mechanics, the hotline is managed by a third party provider and has an 
internal process for further call handling.  As a r esult, the hotline is not 
perceived to have serious issues with its mechanics .   
However, communication of the hotline is a concern.   The hotline 
website appears to discourage hotline reporting.  I n fact, one of the first 
statements on the hotline website tells the user th ey prefer if they report 
in person. Although organizational documents state the hotline plans to 
expand marketing efforts, this effort might be futi le if their website deters 
potential complainants.  As a result, overall, this  hotline may not be 
operating as well as it could from a mechanics pers pective. 
As for intake/processing, organizational records re veal the hotline is 
managed by a third party provider The Network.  As a result, the intake and 
processing is regulated.  Organizational documents also outline a clear 
process for handling calls from their receipt by Th e Network to closure by 
the City Auditor.  The hotline website also provide s a clear statement about 
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their adherence to Whistleblower Protection Laws an d commitment to protecting 
against whistleblower retaliation.  It is further r eported the GS3 Office of 
the City Auditor logs and tracks all hotline report s.  The website also makes 
their hotline data readily available to the public,  via a link to their 
hotline reports and statistics.  
The historical context, as documented in organizati onal documents, 
suggests their hotline is subject to a “complaint c ap” by The Network, which 
limits the number of reports their hotline can rece ive.  In organizational 
documents, the City expressed great concerns over t he “significant increase 
in the number of fraud related complaints” in light  of this cap.  This fact 
is problematic, considering their hotline generates  actionable tips.  
According to one report, from 2010-2012, 82% of the ir complaints received 
were substantiated. 
In addition, per the employee reviews, this organiz ation is believed to 
have a dominating management (Insistence on the Rig hts of Office, 4 
comments), providing Impersonal Treatment (3 commen ts).  
With respect to best practices, this hotline is bel ieved to perform at 
a high level.  For one, the hotline has a clear, re ported oversight process 
conducted by high-level personnel. As for due care,  the hotline has a well-
managed, clear escalation process.  With respect to  communication, the 
hotline is communicated appropriately externally.  However, as noted 
previously, the complaint cap and the website langu age deterring reporting is 
problematic. The hotline does not make a poster ava ilable to external 
parties.  It is unknown whether a poster is provide d internally.   
As for this hotline’s “reasonable steps to achieve compliance,” that 
requirement is satisfied with their third-party hot line management, process 
of having calls escalated via a clear chain of comm and, and the Office of the 
City Auditor having a documented triage process. 
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With respect to the other two best practices elemen ts, “consistent 
enforcement” and “reasonable steps to respond and p revent similar offenses 
upon detection,” this hotline outperformed all othe rs examined in that this 
aspect could be evaluated.  The City Auditor posted  reports in the public 
domain, which documented the investigations conduct ed following hotline 
complaints and any resolution/remediation, which fo llowed thereafter.   
Furthermore, the level of internal fraud, the histo rical context and 
the perception of employees of their organization a re also factors in gauging 
the overall performance of this fraud hotline.  As for internal fraud, upon 
review of public records, this study was able to es tablish the presence of a 
high amount of internal fraud. From the City’s hotl ine reports, we learned a 
majority of the complaints received via the hotline  are substantiated, and 
that 41%, involved a City employee (7 reported matt ers).  In one matter, the 
employee had stolen over $100,000. Furthermore, emp loyee reviews on Glassdoor 
also indicated the presence of disgruntled employee s, with one respondent 
saying there was an atmosphere of “increasing mistr ust”  
Employees who submitted reviews to Glassdoor also d ocument a highly 
bureaucratic environment, whose organizational stru cture inhibits growth and 
advancement.  Specifically, indicating it is “very structured and 
hierarchical” with “poor upper management” where yo u “don’t have to do a good 
job” to gain seniority.  Comments also suggest inte rnal communication might 
be lacking.  One reviewer said “terrible management  [does not] know how to 
interact with and communicate with employees” and y et another reported the 
City’s “senior management with big egos…don’t like to have their opinions 
challenged.”  Table 24 on the next page provides a summary of the results for 
GS3. 
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Table 24 GS3 Table of Results 
 
Organization GS3 
Bureaupathology: Level 7 out of 10 
Functionality: High 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Size 19,500 
Hotline Name Fraud, Waste and Abuse Hotline 
Management 3 rd  Party and City Auditor 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
67% (Population 18; 12 respondents indicating prese nce of 
IV; 22 comments indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV Level 7 
5 of 5  
General (1) 
a (3) 
b (1) 
c (1) 
d (1) 
e (4) 
 
Bureaupathology 
IV 
5 of 5  
f (3) 
g (2) 
h (3) 
I (1) 
J (2) 
 
Hotline Metrics 
(DV) 
Low, Exceeded benchmarking for 4 years, until 2010 (Dodd-
Frank period) calls declined to levels below benchm arking. 
Hotline 
Functionality 
(DV) 
Great, 3 of 4 
k (easily located externally) 
l (3 rd  party provider) 
m (3 rd  party provider and internal handling process; 
process well documented) 
n (reporting discouraged; potential callers urged t o report 
in person) 
Best Practices 
(DV) 
High, 6 of 6 
p (high level oversight) 
q (escalation process is clear) 
r (data is reported externally, calls are discourag ed; no 
poster) 
s (3 rd  party provider with internal escalation process) 
t (reports indicate enforcement) 
u (reports indicate escalation) 
Historical 
Context (DV) 
Conducive to Fraud; Conducive to Increased Calls 
(Calls declined after 2009 Hotline report said ther e was a 
cap on the hotline calls received by the provider) 
Evidence of 
Internal Fraud 
Yes 
Evidence of 
Negative Employee 
Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV IV Present 
Bureaucracy, Strong 
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Organization GS3 
Bureaupathology: Level 7 out of 10 
Functionality: High 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Hierarchy of Authority 
 
Insistence on the Rights of Office 
 
Bureaupathology, Strong 
 
Impersonal Treatment 
 
Resistance to Change 
 
Result DV DV Metrics Affected 
Metrics- low 
Functionality- moderate 
Best Practices- great 
Evidence of Historical Context, Inter nal Fraud, Disgruntled 
Employees 
Notes Evidence that an internal crime was reported via the 
hotline; According to one report, from 2010-2012, 8 2% of 
their complaints received were substantiated 
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Case Study 6 (NP1) 
Case Study 6, NP1, is a large, nonprofit organizati on. 
Background 
 
The subject of this case study, hereinafter known a s NP1, is a 
nonprofit organization, which is in Forbes’ list of  the top 200 largest 
charities. (Forbes.com, 2006) NP1 was incorporated in 1905, in the District 
of Columbia.  Today, they have over 500 chapters.  Their mission is “to 
prevent and alleviate human suffering in the face o f emergencies by 
mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosi ty of donors.” (Better 
Business Bureau, 2012) 
According to NP1’s 2012 tax return, they generated over $3 billion in 
total revenue and have 31,000 employees. NP1 is a t ax–exempt organization, as 
defined under 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Co de. The President and 
Chief Executive Officer and the highest paid execut ive, make a combined 
annual salary totaling over $1 million. (Better Bus iness Bureau, 2012) In 
their 2012 Form 990, they reported they were not aw are of a “significant 
diversion” of their agencies assets during that Fis cal Year. (NP1, 2012) 
As of their Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2011, NP1’s  program expenses, 
included expenditures for international relief and development services, 
domestic disaster services, health and safety servi ces, community services, 
and services to armed forces. (Better Business Bure au, 2012) In the same 
year, NP1 collected over $6 hundred million in char itable donations. 
NP1 also meets the Better Business Bureau’s (BBB) 2 0 Standards for 
Charity Accountability, earning a “meets standards”  grade in all 
subcategories within the broad categories of Govern ance and Oversight (Board 
Oversight, Board Size, Board Meetings, Board Compen sation, Conflict of 
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Interest) Measuring Effectiveness (Effectiveness Po licy, Report), Finances 
(Program Expenses, Fund Raising Expenses, Accumulat ing Funds, Audit Report, 
Detailed Expense Breakdown, Accurate Expense Report ing, Budget Plan), and 
Fund Raising and Informational Materials (Truthful Materials, Annual Report, 
Website Disclosures, Donor Privacy, Cause Marketing  Disclosures, Complaints). 
(Better Business Bureau, 2003) 
 
Bureaucracy 
 
The state of bureaucracy at NP1 is well documented.  In the case of NP1, 
particular problems with organizational hierarchy w ere noted, which were 
accompanied by an apparent resistance to inspection  and review. Per 
organizational theorist Victor Thompson, this is an  indicator of 
organizational bureaupathology. (1961, p. 155)  One  such article, dating back 
to August 7, 1990, titled “[NP1] Hindered by Bureau cracy” described “A 
lumbering bureaucracy, onerous regulations and a co mplicated chain of command 
hinder [NP1] from rushing to the scene when disaste r hits.” (Observer-
Reporter)  As evidence, the author cites a survey o f 100 emergency management 
officials undertaken by the publication where over half of the respondents 
reported “significant problems regarding who was in  charge when [NP1] was 
involved in an operation. (Observer-Reporter, 1990)  
More recently, NP1 has been subject to federal cita tions due to their 
organizational structure, which is said to lack ade quate processes for 
inspection and review.  
In 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA ) announced they 
fined NP1 $4.2 million for multiple breaches of Fed eral laws and FDA 
regulations. In their consent decree, NP1 was asked  to “establish clear lines 
of managerial control...” (FDA Fines NP1 $4.2 Milli on for Failure to Meet 
Established Blood Safety Laws) In this, and other P ress Releases, it was 
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announced the FDA placed NP1 under a consent decree  in 1993, which was 
amended in 2003 to allow the FDA to impose “signifi cant fines for failure to 
comply with agency regulations.” “(FDA Fines NP1,” 2010)  
Overall, between 2003 and 2006, the FDA reportedly sent NP1 seven 
letters and assessed a total of $5.7 million in pen alties. In 2010, the FDA 
fined NP1 another $16 million for “mismanagement” a mong other agency 
problems. In their Press Release dated June 17, 201 0, the FDA reported the 
conducted inspections of NP1 in 2008 and 2009, whic h revealed a failure to 
“identify problems” and “adequately investigate.” A s of that time, the FDA 
said it had sent twelve letters to NP1 and imposed a total of $21 million in 
fines, under the 2003 consent decree. 
Then, in 2012, The Department of Health and Human S ervices intervened 
and assessed an additional $9.5 million penalty. In  a letter dated January 
13, 2012, they documented the previous inspections of the FDA of sixteen 
different U.S. facilities and determined multiple v iolations. (Adverse 
Determination Letter)  The decree violations outlin ed included: Inadequate 
Managerial Control, Inadequate QA, Failure to Compl y with Reporting 
Requirements, Inadequate Problem Management (includ ing Look Back 
Investigations), a Failure to Follow Standard Opera ting Procedure, Inadequate 
Training and Staffing Levels, and Inadequate Record  Keeping. (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2012)  In response to th ese findings, the head of 
compliance of the Center for Biologics Evaluation a nd Research (CBER) at the 
FDA stated the problems NP1 experienced were “partl y attributed to a lack of 
continuity in the organization’s leadership team.” (Kolvea, 2012)  Critics 
said the fines against NP1 should have been even hi gher. (Kolvea, 2012) 
NP1 appears to have taken measures to rectify their  massive bureaucracy 
in the past. In 1991, NP1 an oversight committee pl anned a massive overhaul, 
to include “replacing the top-heavy Washington-domi nated structure with a 
regional operation.” Overall, the committee noted a  condition of “mistrust 
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and lack of accountability to be central problems.”  (San Francisco Examiner, 
1991) 
Although the true effects of the committee’s effort s are unknown, the 
recent actions of NP1 workers would suggest the neg ative effects of 
bureaucracy still exist. According to recent report s, 4,500 NP1 workers 
walked out on their jobs, and protested due to agen cy bureaucracy, which they 
blamed for inadequate wages. (Clarke, 2013; Ward, 2 013) 
President Obama also acknowledged the issue of bure aucracy associated 
with NP1’s line of work. When speaking to the publi c from an NP1 location in 
2012, following Hurricane Sandy, President Obama wa rned “no bureaucracy, no 
red tape.” (The White House, 2012) 
It is believed, due to a lack of organizational doc umentation, the 
bureaucratic structure of NP1 is so massive that it  cannot be easily 
elucidated or depicted. In terms of a formal organi zation structure, NP1 
doesn’t make this clear in their public facing mate rials. On their website, 
they have a Congressional Charter and a list of Cor porate Officers. Once such 
document entitled “Governance for the 21st Century”  was over 145 pages long 
and didn’t include a chart. (NP1, 2006) Likewise, a  search of their website 
for “Organization Chart” and “Organization Structur e” didn’t yield any 
charts, documents or other materials which might cl arify the overall 
organizational makeup. Few Organization Charts were  immediately located, and 
they tended to reflect small factions of the agency , such as the Office of 
Development Service, and one depicting a particular  service offered by NP1, 
which was dated November 1942. 
To examine the perception of bureaucracy on the par t of NP1 employees, 
company reviews were examined on Glassdoor. On Glas sdoor, as of February 21, 
2014, 457 reviews of NP1 were posted by anonymous s ources that identified as 
current and past NP1 employees. Overall, NP1 receiv ed an average rating of a 
3.1 on a 5-point scale. The reviews analyzed for th is examination were 
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limited to those reviews where the respondents “rat ed” the company to be 
“below average,” or in this case, rated it under 3 stars. This limited the 
number of reviews included for examination to 170, which constituted 
approximately 37% of all reviews. 
Of these reviewers, 150, or 88% made reference to s pecific terminology 
related to bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy. T he number of respondents 
and comments are not equivalent, because in certain  cases, respondents’ 
comments were counted more than once when their com ments spanned multiple 
categories. The total number of comments was 343. T he comments examined were 
posted to the website between and June 12, 2008 and  February 21, 2014. 
General and specific references to attributes of bu reaucracy and bureaupathic 
or excessive bureaucracy are set forth in Tables 25  and 26 on the next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
2
2
0
Table 25 NP1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Summary 
Attribute Data Analysis 
Time Frame 6/11/08-2/21/14 1.5% of all employees (3 1,000) 
Population 457 37% of the population (457) 
Sample Set 170 .55% of all employees (31,000) 
Respondents Indicating Bureaucracy 
or Bureaupathic Behaviors 
150 88% of the sample set (170) 
33% of the population (457) 
.50% of all employees (31,000) 
Total Comments Indicating 
Bureaucracy and Bureaupathology 
343 99 Bureaucracy 
244 Bureaupathic 
Bureaucracy 99 General (6) 
Hierarchy of Authority (23) 
System of Rules (20) 
Technical Expertise (2) 
Career Service (14) 
Insistence in the Rights of Office 
(34) 
 
Bureaupathic 244 Impersonal Treatment (113) 
Prolonged Role Enactment (15) 
Resistance to Change (35) 
Resistance to Interrogation and 
Investigation  (79) 
Strict Reliance on Organizational 
Rules and Procedures (2) 
 
 
Table 26 NP1 Social Media/Bureaucracy Data Set 
Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
1.   Bureaucracy General “bureaucracy hampers productiv ity” 6/12/08 
2.   Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “technology used t o control and monitor 
employees rather than enable them to be 
more productive” 
6/12/08 
3.   Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“they [senior management] don’t take 
advice, I wouldn’t bother” 
6/12/08 
4.   Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“management expects you to be available 
100% of the time because you are working 
for a voluntary agency” 
6/18/08 
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Count Type Attribute Comment Date 
5.   Bureaucracy System of Rules “a simple business tha t overcomplexifies 
itself to the point to dysfunction” 
7/7/08 
6.   Bureaucracy System of Rules “overcomplexification of processes makes 
work over proceduralized and 
dehumanizing” 
7/7/08 
7.   Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“always on call” 7/7/08 
8.   Bureaupathology Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“trust employees. Stop trying to document 
every second of the workday and let 
people do their jobs” 
7/7/08 
9.   Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“employee morale is low, turnover is high 
and employee recognition and work life 
balance is bad” 
7/8/08 
10.  Bureaucracy Career Service “any employee with senority is seen as 
part of the problem, and therefore is 
discounted, ignored or displaced” 
7/9/08 
11.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“significant change is required to save 
the business, and new regimes fail to 
study the situation before they enact 
solutions, which are always misdirected” 
7/9/08 
12.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“inability to empower staff to make their 
own decisions so we have to go up to the 
senior vice president sometimes for a 
routine question” 
7/11/08 
13.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“lack of accountability” 7/11/08 
14.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“tell us what you know. Don’t let rumors 
circulate for months before saying 
anything” 
7/11/08 
15.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“paying unnecessary management” 8/12/08 
16.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Investigation and 
Interrogation 
“there is a ‘waste’ of donated income” 8/12/08 
17.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“our financial situation is terrible (and 
getting worse)” 
8/21/08 
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18.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“increase communication about the 
financial solvency of the organization to 
employees and to the public.” 
8/21/08 
19.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“misuse of funds is causing [NP1] to go 
under” 
9/17/08 
20.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“the public has lost trust in [NP1] with 
all the scandals both nationally and 
locally” 
9/17/08 
21.  Bureaucracy Career Service “much dead wood is still  afloat within 
the organization” 
9/28/08 
22.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“several key executives are grossly 
unqualified and lack basic management and 
leadership skills” 
9/28/08 
23.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“there is a lot of nepotism and 
favoritism to go around” 
9/28/08 
24.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“evidence of long term patterns of 
malfeasance, discrimination, and even 
corruption” 
10/1/08 
25.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“misallocation of donor monies and 
volunteer time” 
10/1/08 
26.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“repeated violations of key federal and 
state regulations” 
10/1/08 
27.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“expensive use of PR to stifle criticism 
and dodge accountability” 
10/1/08 
28.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“deep structural cronyism” 10/1/08 
29.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“management desperately needs strict 
oversight, rigorous training in 
governance, transparency and service 
delivery” 
10/1/08 
30.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“left to flounder when called to defend 
your work, not defended by your direct 
manager” 
10/2/08 
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31.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“malfeasance, incompetence, cronyism and 
arrogance” 
10/2/08 
32.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“it is the most thankless job out there, 
management does not care about you at 
all” 
10/25/08 
33.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“incompetent leadership, lack of 
performance benchmarks, lack of 
accountability to the public, lack of 
oversight” 
11/18/08 
34.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“[NP1] needs regulatory help” 11/19/08 
35.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“the consent decree and constant warnings 
from the FDA make the work environment 
difficult and destroys morale.  I suspect 
senior management is incapable of leading 
the company out of its regulatory crisis.  
I mean its been 22 years on the consent 
decree” 
11/19/08 
36.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management governs by fear and innuendo 
when no one is looking…otherwise it 
treats employees, volunteers and like a 
used car salesman, not a philanthropic 
organization with a serious life saving 
job to do” 
12/16/08 
37.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“we need a charity cop to save the 
organization from itself” 
12/16/08 
38.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“[NP1] It’s run like a mob pizza 
restaurant where the cops eat 
free…[senior management]” turn yourselves 
in” 
12/16/08 
39.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“within 3 months of working here, even 
the most naïve and well-intentioned state 
wondering how the management goes on 
collecting paychecks and perks like 
energizer bunnies without ever being held 
to account [sic] by their superiors in DC 
12/16/08 
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or the IRS” 
40.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“the culture and embedded leadership make 
it difficult to move the organization 
into the current and necessary climate. 
Institutionalized inertia.” 
1/3/09 
41.  Bureaucracy General “there is a lot of red tape; it ’s a top 
heavy organization” 
1/16/09 
42.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“lazy about change”  1/25/09 
43.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“come for the mission, leave because of 
the ethics” 
1/25/09 
44.  Bureaucracy General “excuse people who weigh the organization 
down with negative attitudes, political 
red tape and drama” 
2/4/09 
45.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“in many way NP1 is another company with 
politics that hinder productivity, egos 
that hinder effectiveness and 
stubbornness that hinders success” 
2/4/09 
46.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“practice what you preach” 2/4/09 
47.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“the executives at headquarters are 
change resistant and disengenous” 
2/4/09 
48.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“road staff held responsible for poor 
communications and errors of management; 
little appreciation” 
3/7/09 
49.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“never any positive feedback from 
employers, you’re only aware of your job 
performance when something is wrong, and 
then it is probably too late” 
3/7/09 
50.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“treat people how you want us to treat 
the public” 
3/7/09 
51.  Bureaucracy Career Service “lack of growth potential, no 
encouragement to succeed” 
3/11/09 
52.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“total lack of respect [for employees] 3/11/09 
53.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“the organization is also stuck in the 
past, refusing to move along with the 
times” 
3/11/09 
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54.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“there are no consequences for toxic 
employees” 
7/22/09 
55.  Bureaucracy Career Service “promotions are basically not an option” 12/22/09 
56.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“inability to accommodate a life outside 
of work” 
12/22/09 
57.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“a place where you are taken for granted” 12/22/09 
58.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
Treat all employees with respect” 12/22/09 
59.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“update equipment” 12/22/09 
60.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“equipment is in poor condition and 
technology is outdating” 
12/22/09 
61.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“misuse of company funds” 12/22/09 
62.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“manager [sic] money more efficiently” 12/22/09 
63.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“start listening to folks doing the 
actual work” 
1/18/10 
64.  Bureaucracy Career Service “people are promoted based on longevity 
and politics rather than merit and 
ability” 
3/31/10 
65.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“It is common for managers to be verbally 
abusive - I will never forget the weekly, 
day-long meetings for which management 
planned nothing but kept employees 
captive for 8 hours. They would bluster, 
threaten, cajole, insult, abuse, argue, 
swear at, stomp around and pontificate to 
employees. Most employees either lost 
their temper, threatened to quit or cried 
at work at one time or another. All of 
the staff at every level were openly 
frustrated and sarcastic, and 
appropriately so. It was the most 
dysfunctional, abusive work environment 
I've ever encountered and ruined what 
3/31/10 
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could have otherwise been the most 
rewarding job imaginable.” 
66.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management tries to get you to work 
harder by using guilt and fear” 
7/1/10 
67.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “rules, rules, rules, rules, rules” 7/1/10 
68.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “staff are treated as children, with 
constant micromanagement, and tons of 
rules, by management that has absolutely 
no idea how the process works” 
7/1/10 
69.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“staff are treated as children, with 
constant micromanagement” 
7/1/10 
70.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“rarely does someone compliment you on 
your hard work, most people looks at us 
like gears in a machine” 
7/1/10 
71.  Bureaucracy Career Service “people have been here so long that they 
do not have innovation or energy” 
7/13/10 
72.  Bureaucracy General “bureaucracy” 7/13/10 
73.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“my job is not what was discussed in 
interviews. In fact, there was a 
switcheroo after I started which is 
incredibly unprofessional and speaks to 
weak organization and communication 
skills” 
7/13/10 
74.  Bureaucracy Career Service “long time staff are entrenched in a 
culture of operational loss” 
8/21/10 
75.  Bureaucracy Career Service “in this job market, there should be no 
problem hiring top talent to purge the 
current employ of the dead wood that 
permeates the organization.  We have 
plenty of people locally that are hanging 
on for retirement. Put them out to 
pasture” 
8/21/10 
76.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“current national HQ operational policies 
are outdated and unmaintained” 
8/21/10 
77.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“accountability is no where to be found” 8/21/10 
78.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “very complicated place to work” 9/14/10 
79.  Bureaupathology Resistance to “if you try to bring in fresh ideas, 9/14/10 
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Change watch out” 
80.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“…chapter leaders, many of which have 
been there FOREVER- do not have the skill 
set to change” 
9/14/10 
81.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“constantly working overtime and horrible 
managers” 
9/25/10 
82.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no career growth, no career advancement, 
low pay, horrible hours, non-supportive 
management” 
11/17/10 
83.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“provide balance between work and life” 11/17/10 
84.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“Management is 100% inflexible. There is 
a very strong "Good Ole' Boys (mostly 
gals) network which protects itself, and 
harasses people who question them or 
defend themselves against them. The Human 
Resources Department exists solely for 
the protection of the organization and is 
mean spirited, ruthless and dishonest to 
the employees. Even if you have had 
excellent job performance and multiple 
promotions, questioning the wrong person 
or the wrong policy will set you on a 
course which will in one way or another 
cause your employment to end.” 
12/19/10 
85.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“Be honest. Ask yourself how many times 
you have had to compromise your 
principles to be where you are today” 
12/19/10 
86.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“complete lack of professionalism 
permeates executive management team, 
which filters down and translates into 
extremely low employee morale and high 
attrition rate” 
1/14/11 
87.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no work/life balance including limited 
PTO/sick time” 
1/14/11 
88.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“lack of new ideas” 2/22/11 
89.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“at the mercy of a regional vice 
presidents whims” 
3/11/11 
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90.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“[the company] needs to value their 
employees.  They treat me like I am a 
number” 
3/17/11 
91.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“management showed lack of caring for 
employees” 
3/23/11 
92.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“misled in interview” 4/16/11 
93.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation or 
Investigation 
“If there were issues or problems no one 
took responsibility for their mistakes” 
4/16/11 
94.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management threats with disdain” 5/20/11 
95.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“not realistic or up-front AT ALL about 
the real hours or activities involved in 
this position…increase professionalism. 
Be honest with new hires” 
6/7/11 
96.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“poor management, lack of respect for 
employees” 
6/8/11 
97.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“the managers are not rulers or leaders 
who show no respect for the dedication of 
the employees” 
6/22/11 
98.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“this organization is corrupted by 
nepotism and waste” 
6/22/11 
99.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“you are not accountable for anything” 7/14/11 
100.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“extremely inefficient, often does not 
live up to the public trust. Not a lot of 
accountability” 
8/3/11 
101.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“if you want to work somewhere were 
people treat you like a child, step right 
up” 
8/14/11 
102.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“management treats you like a child” 8/14/11 
103.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“technology is terrible” 8/14/11 
104.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“sales methodologies and attitudes are 
very dated” 
8/14/11 
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105.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“dead end with no stability” 8/25/11 
106.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“no scope for upward mobility” 8/25/11 
107.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“constant harassment and incompetence” 9/21/11 
108.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the collections department is not 
allowed to have breaks longer than 30 
minutes, even when working long shift, 
which seems as thought it is illegal” 
9/21/11 
109.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“I heard jokes and offensive comments…I 
spoke up and nothing was done” 
9/21/11 
110.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“if you don’t do something serious, 
someone is going to file a lawsuit for a 
hostile work environment soon” 
9/21/11 
111.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management seems to only want money” 10/4/11 
112.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“learn to be nice and helpful- not mean 
and controlling” 
10/4/11 
113.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“had to deal with egotistical attitudes 
of the senior staff who felt they knew 
everything and could do everything better 
than anyone else” 
10/6/11 
114.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “so much pressure on doing everything 
right that you cant get anything done and 
one you mess up or potentially make them 
[sic] upper management mad then say good 
bye to your job” 
10/26/11 
115.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“they treat you as if you can be easily 
replaced.  No respect for anyone” 
10/26/11 
116.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“take some customer service classes.  
Hire and retain efficient and caring 
workers instead of those who just agree 
with you” 
11/22/11 
117.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“many senior management…..play politics 
and don’t really care about helping the 
customer” 
11/22/11 
118.  Bureaupathology Impersonal “there is absolutely no respect for 12/6/11 
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Treatment personal/family time” 
119.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“abusive and unhealthy management 
practices toward employees” 
12/6/11 
120.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no respect for employees” 1/25/12 
121.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“HR staff is not aware of half the things 
that management does” 
1/25/12 
122.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“untold $millions have been wasted in a 
revolving door of consultants with 
elaborate and unworkable ‘solutions’ 
which have either never been implemented 
or are only partially installed, and less 
efficient and less effective than prior 
systems, methods” 
2/26/12 
123.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“alleged ‘experts’ both consultants and 
senior leadership are clueless at 
identifying root causes of problems, 
developing expedient solutions and 
implementing needed changes” 
2/26/12 
124.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“leadership that wastes money, resources 
and opportunities” 
2/26/12 
125.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“long term employees are pushed aside, or 
terminated for presenting realistic 
assessments of the ongoing failures and 
weaknesses of the most fashionable 
‘transformation’” 
2/26/12 
126.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“HQ senior management & board of 
governors tragically clueless” 
3/1/12 
127.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“political, very less [sic] opportunities 
for growth” 
3/24/12 
128.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“and lower those crazy salaries that ceos 
are making. [current CEO] makes over 1.2 
million a year!!!??? Ridiculous for a non 
profit” 
3/24/12 
129.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“quit promotion your friends and buddys 
[sic] and promote people that have worked 
their way up from the bottom” 
4/1/12 
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130.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“do something to allow the most senior 
management to listen directly to the 
concerns and frustrations of the front-
line employees, without having to filter 
everything through the insulating layers 
of management.” 
4/13/12 
131.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“long hours, few breaks” 4/28/12 
132.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“put caring for staff above the almighty 
dollar” 
4/28/12 
133.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“treat others how you would like to be 
treated” 
4/28/12 
134.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Chapter CEO was more concerned in how 
[sic] their image reflected to volunteers 
and community rather than taking care of 
the people within the organization.” 
4/30/12 
135.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no recognition for achievements, rewards 
only to the ‘favorites’ and not to people 
that deserve it, whether it is an 
employee or volunteer” 
4/30/12 
136.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“little circles within employees looking 
out for their own agendas (promotions, 
career advancements, etc.) that trampled 
the code of conduct and the mission of an 
organization asa [sic] whole” 
4/30/12 
137.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“low morale, high turnover; refuse to 
fire underperforming/unprofessional 
staff; few opportunities for professional 
growth and advancement”  
5/8/12 
138.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “Morale is at an all time low, and tech’s 
are sick and tired of getting written up 
or talked to by problem management. Makes 
us want to work slower and more careful 
so we don’t make mistakes.” 
6/9/12 
139.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“consent decree for almost 20 years, are 
you kidding the American public??ANY 
private company would shut the heck down 
by now” 
6/9/12 
140.  Bureaupathology Resistance to “lots of restructuring needed here.  I 6/9/12 
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Interrogation and 
Investigation 
can name management but I’m sorry, I need 
my job to provide for my family.” 
141.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“very old fashioned ideals and practices” 6/18/12 
142.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“no advancement for most employees. 
However, that may depend on the location 
and if you ‘belong’ to the right click 
[sic]” 
6/25/12 
143.  Bureaucracy Career Service “no respect for the worker-ants. If you 
are the manager and above you will get 
promotions with the exact same 
responsibilities and tasks, others will 
stay in the same spot forever” 
6/28/12 
144.  Bureaucracy Career Service “if you don’t ‘shake the boat’ you can 
[sic] some job stability for a few yrs.” 
6/28/12 
145.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“upper management does not inspire any 
respect or trust.” 
6/28/12 
146.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“management very poor- not 
technologically inclined or smart, 
egoistic, lazy and can get envious of 
staff trying to rise [sic]” 
6/28/12 
147.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
Frequent layoffs and they will target 
people…who have made valid concerns about 
the process, waste, etc.” 
6/28/12 
148.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“in the last 5 years, there have been 
repeated rounds of restructuring and 
layoffs, resulting in insane amounts of 
turn-over and a staff is more worried 
about their jobs than service delivery” 
7/1/12 
149.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“you are yelled at almost daily and 
degraded” 
7/27/12 
150.  Bureaupathology Strict Reliance on 
Organizational 
Rules and 
Procedures 
“most direction is given by email so that 
a person can track their request because 
they have a lack of trust in each other” 
7/27/12 
151.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“lots of CYA and no accountability” 8/3/12 
152.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “way too many changes result in 8/9/12 
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disorganized execution and trying to make 
one size fits all results in many, many 
lost opportunities” 
153.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “stop the silos and kingdom building and 
work as one organization not little 
kingdoms inside an organization” 
8/9/12 
154.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“take the shackles off staff and let them 
do the jobs they are hired to do” 
8/9/12 
155.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“they to not listen or value [employee] 
input at a professional level” 
8/9/12 
156.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“confusing reporting structure and 
divisive relationship between chapters” 
9/17/12 
157.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“internal competition destroys the 
morale” 
9/17/12 
158.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“[to CEO] your immediate staff sends the 
message internally that you are scary and 
should be feared” 
9/17/12 
159.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “break down the silos and get people 
communicating” 
9/17/12 
160.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“stop putting underperformers and problem 
employees who lack experience in 
management positions:” 
9/17/12 
161.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
60-70 hour workweek is not only common, 
but expected.” 
10/13/12 
162.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“absolutely no work life balance” 10/13/12 
163.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the pressure is constant and employees 
regularly go weeks without one day off” 
10/13/12 
164.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the leave policy in my division is this: 
the only excusable leave is bereavement 
leave” 
10/16/12 
165.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“they treat their employees horribly” 11/2/12 
166.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“this organization strips you of your 
work ethic and degrades your skills” 
11/2/12 
167.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“a revolving door and most of those going 
out are key talent that management should 
strive to retain” 
11/2/12 
168.  Bureaupathology Resistance to “very wasteful of the resources they have 11/2/12 
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Interrogation and 
Investigation 
and not open to very simple changes to 
improve” 
169.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“loading the upper management with 
overpaid Directors and getting rid of the 
folks who do the actual work” 
11/15/12 
170.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“there is no work/life balance. If you 
have young children, keep looking” 
12/1/12 
171.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“learn how to improve work/life balance” 12/4/12 
172.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“local management was abrasive with 
employees and offered little support” 
12/12/12 
173.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“VERY poor work life balance as you are 
always expected to respond on a moment’s 
notice” 
12/12/12 
174.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“employees work very long hours and often 
7 days a week. Employees are expected to 
answer their phones and emails 
immediately at all hours” 
12/14/12 
175.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“no empowerment between line staff and 
management” 
1/10/13 
176.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“promotions are hard to come by and they 
don’t reward top talent” 
1/10/13 
177.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“anyone who gives notice to terminate is 
harassed and has it held over their head 
until they leave” 
1/11/13 
178.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“horrible career development 
opportunities and room for growth” 
1/11/13 
179.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“no accountability” 1/13/13 
180.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“executives making sweeping changes based 
on politics, then falsify numbers to look 
good” 
1/13/13 
181.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“good ol’ [sic] boy hotel” 1/13/13 
182.  Bureaucracy General “lots of tension between departments” 2/5/13 
183.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“it was impossible to get departments to 
talk and coordinate” 
2/21/13 
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184.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“management treats you like a worthless 
commodity” 
2/22/13 
185.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“there is no work/life balance” 2/22/13 
186.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
Employee turnover is high, many employees 
hired simply to be a body to fit 
scheduling purposes.” 
2/22/13 
187.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“hardworking loyal paid staff have no 
voice” 
2/25/13 
188.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“long hours kills family life” 2/25/13 
189.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“slow to respond to change” 2/25/13 
190.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“good ole [sic] boy network at its best!” 2/25/13 
191.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“treat you like little kids” 2/28/13 
192.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“basically keep your mouth shut and never 
ask questions” 
2/28/13 
193.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the people who do the work come with 
extensive knowledge and should be valued 
more than they are currently” 
3/9/13 
194.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “it is a high risk, low rewards type 
environment with bosses always hounding 
you for not doing work to their 
standards” 
3/14/13 
195.  Bureaucracy Career Service “career development is challenging and 
difficult” 
3/27/13 
196.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“upper management is disconnected” 3/27/13 
197.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“great mission often overshadowed by 
overwhelming internal concerns and 
inability to adapt to change” 
3/27/13 
198.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“very slow to adapt to changing 
technologies and trends” 
3/27/13 
199.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“loaded with upper level management” 4/26/13 
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200.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“no leadership accountability” 4/26/13 
201.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“communications- either there are very 
little or it is misleading or incorrect” 
4/26/13 
202.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“they treat you like you are in 
highschool” 
4/27/13 
203.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “you will be micromanaged” 4/27/13 
204.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“if you are a mindless sheep, then you 
will like it there” 
4/27/13 
205.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“clean house fast! This company has a 
bunch of lawsuits waiting to happen” 
4/27/13 
206.  Bureaucracy Career Service “no procedures for removing non-
performing employees leaving everyone 
else stuck cleaning up the mess” 
5/8/13 
207.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“not the best management and long hours. 
They expect you to be on their call no 
exceptions” 
5/16/13 
208.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“very vague management that used 
corporate buzz words instead of providing 
clear and concise instructions” 
5/16/13 
209.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“this organization once made me feel like 
I was making a difference and now I feel 
like I’m a cash cow and all they care 
about is the money coming in” 
5/22/13 
210.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“CEO completely out of touch” 5/24/13 
211.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “decisions are made in a vacuum” 5/24/13 
212.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no sense of neutrality and objectivity” 5/24/13 
213.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Give everyone a chance to be heard and 
express their ideas. Let people feel 
included and part of the decision making 
process when possible.  
5/24/13 
214.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“HR practices have historically been 
corrupt” 
5/24/13 
215.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“only those that suddenly fall out of the 
favorites list get investigated or 
reprimanded.” 
5/24/13 
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216.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“I have seen many good, ethical people 
leave out of disgust” 
5/24/13 
217.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
Do not turn a blind eye when you know 
someone is doing something wrong. Hold 
ethics above all else. Hold everyone 
accountable equally.” 
5/24/13 
218.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“[changes] made for a fun job to just 
being treated like a ‘widget’ making 
$$$$$ for them” 
6/15/13 
219.  Bureaucracy Career Service “…many ‘lifers’ left” 6/15/13 
220.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“stop barking orders” 6/15/13 
221.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“stop exploiting your workforce’s 
dedication” 
6/15/13 
222.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“have loyalty to employees” 6/15/13 
223.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“management quickly angered by feedback 
provided or when asked for help” 
6/15/13 
224.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“take the time to strategize with 
employee feedback how to create change” 
6/15/13 
225.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“with [CEO] making over $600k+ extensive 
benefit package and any managers/board 
meetings having catered lunches, among 
other wasted expenses, how do you expect 
anyone to donate to NP1 thinking its 
going to a good cause?” 
6/15/13 
226.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“daily added unnecessary pressure from 
management above what is required to do 
the job” 
6/17/13 
227.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“superiors were hypocrites, expected me 
to be their slave…” 
6/18/13 
228.  Bureaucracy General “now being run like a giant corporation” 6/24/13 
229.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“outdated equipment (computers, 
software).” 
6/24/13 
230.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“a lack of resources to invest in 
infrastructure” 
7/1/13 
231.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“be more passionate to your employees” 7/11/13 
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232.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“they say you can move up in the company 
but that’s not true” 
7/11/13 
233.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“they are misleading to tell you the 
donations are for a non profit, that’s a 
lie” 
7/11/13 
234.  Bureaucracy Career Service “there seems to be a heavy concentration 
in middle management of people staff that 
have been there a long time and do not 
seem qualified” 
7/19/13 
235.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“top heavy” 7/19/13 
236.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“the org charts by region are amazingly 
top heavy” 
7/19/13 
237.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“people only talk to people with the 
right title” 
7/19/13 
238.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “one of the constant aspects is change; 
there is constant change and 
micromanagement like no private sector 
company I have ever worked with” 
7/19/13 
239.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“Constant fear of reorganization & 
layoffs as they happen frequently, and if 
you’re not in the right little group, you 
are outta there!” 
7/19/13 
240.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“I believe they abuse the collections 
staff” 
7/19/13 
241.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“do a better job of saving money” 7/19/13 
242.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“there are no opportunities for career 
growth” 
7/20/13 
243.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“the chain of command and my 
responsibilities changed monthly” 
7/26/13 
244.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“poor treatment of employees” 7/26/13 
245.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“employees are not treated as people, but 
as another cog in the machine” 
7/26/13 
246.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“employees have had to sue the company 
because of their prejudices, the 
management tyrades [sic], the fear felt 
7/27/13 
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by the employees personal, emotional and 
mental, we never knew if we were going to 
have a job that day or be terminated by 
the choice of management” 
247.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“management needs to take staff 
complaints seriously and address problems 
instead of ignoring them. If an employee 
expresses concern about working in a 
hostile environment, management and HR 
should address these concerns instead of 
targeting the staff and allow future 
retaliation to the point the staff want 
to leave their job” 
7/31/13 
248.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“practice what you preach. I saw people 
get written up for the smallest of 
infractions and for things I saw managers 
doing themselves.” 
8/7/13 
249.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “quit with the micro ma nagement and all 
the ‘write ups’” 
8/7/13 
250.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“managers playing favorites with some 
employees and conversely very unfairly 
punitive with other employees” 
8/7/13 
251.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the leadership in the company is 
comprised of fallout from companies that 
had failed. Now not surprisingly the 
company had turned into the most 
unhumanitarian humanitarian 
organization.” 
8/7/13 
252.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“if you don’t mind lying to people and 
being programmed like a robot, well this 
would be a great position for you.” 
8/7/13 
253.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“seek sturdy and trustrworthy leadership 
with a proven record of success to try 
and save the company before the current 
leadership runs it into the ground” 
8/7/13 
254.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“fiscally irresponsible and failing 
fast….I would not be surprised to see the 
company gone in 5 years” 
8/7/13 
255.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of “departments work in silos and lack 8/14/13 
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Authority communication with others that would 
allow better functionality” 
256.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“high level positions are mismanaged 
resulting in layoffs and constant 
changes. 
8/14/13 
257.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the decrease in revenue caused senior 
management to pressure the employees to 
the point of verbal abuse” 
8/14/13 
258.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“formal complaints to HR not acknowledged 
or resolved” 
8/14/13 
259.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“provide opportunities for employer [sic] 
growth instead of finding ways to hinder 
their performance and looking out for 
your own back” 
8/14/13 
260.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“most of the ‘power’ to affect decision-
making, along with career growth 
opportunities are seated with those 
working at regional or national levels” 
9/3/13 
261.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“there is little appreciation from top 
management” 
9/3/13 
262.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “pay is low for the perfection the 
company demands” 
9/8/13 
263.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“position responsibilities should have 
been explained better at hiring” 
9/8/13 
264.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“no communication between departments” 9/11/13 
265.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“top heavy management” 9/11/13 
266.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“staff pay is very low, yet our regional 
CEO made $500,000” 
9/11/13 
267.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “management and scheduling act like a 
crime has taken place if you already made 
plans and can’t conform to their every 
demand” 
9/11/13 
268.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“crazy hours and white lies” 9/11/13 
269.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“impossible to have a life outside of 
work” 
9/11/13 
270.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the “elitist management t hat is only 9/24/13 
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Rights of Office concerned about their tails and ho w they 
appear.” 
271.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“management is very self-serving” 9/24/13 
272.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior management needs to stop leading 
by fear, everyone is afraid of losing his 
or her jobs [sic]” 
9/24/13 
273.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“does not care about workers” 9/24/13 
274.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“favoritism with management” 9/24/13 
275.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“they need to appreciate the workers in 
the field more and stop treating them as 
disposable and replaceable”  
9/24/13 
276.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“stop intimidating people so they can 
work” 
9/24/13 
277.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“low pay, little room for advancement, 
uncertain future, favoritism” 
9/24/13 
278.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“no room for advancement unless you are a 
favorite, it doesn’t matter your 
education or work ethic” 
9/24/13 
279.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“horrible management with too much 
favoritism and unethical actions taken” 
9/24/13 
280.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“learn to be fair and ethical” 9/24/13 
281.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“scheduling department is unethical, by 
giving friends the good hours and 
shifts.” 
9/24/13 
282.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“wasteful with resources and money” 9/24/13 
283.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“wasteful with resources and money” 9/24/13 
284.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“management sets unrealistic gols [sic] 
work till you drop atmosphere. They treat 
employees with no respect and micromanage 
9/25/13 
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them. Work mandatory long hours. I won’t 
be here too long” 
285.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“senior management gets bonuses based on 
profit management rather than client 
outcomes” 
9/26/13 
286.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“stop the bleeding” 9/26/13 
287.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“underpaid and unappreciated” 10/2/13 
288.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“work to narrow the vast communication 
void between senior management and those 
actually in the trenches” 
10/4/13 
289.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“spend months and years unraveling poor 
decisions” 
10/4/13 
290.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“your stomach twists and you feel sick” 10/6/13 
291.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“if you want stability of any kind, do 
not work for NP1” 
10/6/13 
292.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“…the best people are leaving because 
they don’t want to deal with the endless 
financial mess and the never ending 
layoffs” 
10/6/13 
293.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“financial mess with incompetent and 
entrenched executive management that are 
accountable to no one” 
10/6/13 
294.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“management hides the true financial 
disaster of the company because they are 
afraid it will hurt donations” 
10/6/13 
295.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“tell the public the true financial 
situation” 
10/6/13 
296.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“sweatshop” 10/12/13 
297.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“no room for advancement unless someone 
leaves or die [sic]” 
10/12/13 
298.  Bureaupathology Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
“Please get rid of your worthless 
directors, CEOs and VPs” 
10/12/13 
299.  Bureaupathology Resistance to “IT systems are a wre ck” 10/12/13 
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Change 
300.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“way too much management and very 
political” 
10/13/13 
301.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“decrease the layers- way too many” 10/13/13 
302.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“long hours (60+ per week)” 10/17/13 
303.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“admit you are bankrupt due to your 
practices and fold” 
10/17/13 
304.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“huge mismanagement and wasteful spending 
with very few dollars actually getting to 
clients” 
10/17/13 
305.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“only company where you can keep losing 
money and get a promotion” 
10/23/13 
306.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“beware, working here is only for the 
strong” 
10/23/13 
307.  Bureaucracy Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
“inappropriate comments often made [by 
management] 
11/4/13 
308.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “took over 3 months and  numerous calls to 
HR to be paid for last month’s work” 
11/4/13 
309.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“HR department is hard to reach and does 
not respond to employee…” 
11/4/13 
310.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“information is not shared so employees 
are often left in the dark” 
11/4/13 
311.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“it is sad how negative the culture can 
be at times.” 
11/4/13 
312.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“change seems near impossible” 11/4/13 
313.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“hire more people from outside the 
current organization” 
11/4/13 
314.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“long hours, little pay, very poor 
management, work every weekend” 
11/11/13 
315.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“very sad place to be a part of” 11/11/13 
316.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“all management cares about is numbers 
and uses natural disasters to push their 
numbers” 
11/11/13 
317.  Bureaupathology Impersonal “when hired you might wa nt to train or 11/11/13 
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Treatment tell the new employees what the job they 
are actually doing is.” 
318.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“a lot of politics in the office” 11/11/13 
319.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“lacking modern information technology” 11/13/13 
320.  Bureaucracy Technical Expertise “The latest bone he aded move is [sic] to 
allow more appointments to be made than 
we have staff to process” 
11/17/13 
321.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“horrendous hours- there is no balance. 
People dread each day and turnover is 
ongoing” 
11/17/13 
322.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“there are a lot who are lazy, inept and 
uncaring” 
11/17/13 
323.  Bureaucracy Hierarchy of 
Authority 
“extremely top-heavy” 12/31/13 
324.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“I don’t feel that they care about their 
people like they should” 
12/31/13 
325.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“poor management, treat your staff better 
and try not to overwork them” 
1/4/14 
326.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“company in constant state of flux due to 
poor financial management” 
1/13/14 
327.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“focus on where money goes in regards to 
unnecessary travel expenses” 
1/13/14 
328.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“no incentives for employees, very low 
moral [sic]” 
1/18/14 
329.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“low pay, no room for growth, the 
mentality is to use employees as much as 
possible before they move on to a better 
job” 
1/18/14 
330.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“[get your] head out of the clouds and 
listen to your employees, we have great 
ideas” 
1/18/14 
331.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“terrible management. No concern for the 
employees” 
1/21/14 
332.  Bureaupathology Resistance to “when they repeatly [ sic] get fines, it’s 2/3/14 
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Interrogation and 
Investigation 
only the workers fault never management” 
333.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“their unprofessional skills of running a 
business have been on FDA’s radar for 
years” 
2/3/14 
334.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
“take accountable [sic] for your own 
actions” 
2/3/14 
335.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“treated like a piece of crap” 2/6/14 
336.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“job security is a joke” 2/6/14 
337.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“I don’t believe they care about the 
volunteers” 
2/11/14 
338.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “the atmosphere is very strict. You are 
expected to do everything right the first 
time or there will be meetings and 
consequences about it for weeks” 
2/19/14 
339.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“work life balance is absolutely non 
existent” 
2/19/14 
340.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“a greater amount of respect for 
employees would be greatly appreciated” 
2/19/14 
341.  Bureaucracy System of Rules “micro-managed” 2/21/14 
342.  Bureaupathology Impersonal 
Treatment 
“the non profit is run like a middle 
school” 
2/21/14 
343.  Bureaupathology Resistance to 
Change 
“new ideas are not accepted and are 
ignored by ‘old timers’” 
2/21/14 
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Hotline Specifications 
 
NP1 operates two hotlines, both managed by a third party vendor, Global 
Compliance Inc. Of these hotlines, the ‘Concern Con nection Line’ (hereinafter 
referred to as “hotline”) is dedicated to receiving  complaints regarding 
fraud, waste, abuse, safety concerns, and unethical  conduct. (NP1 Employee, 
2013)  NP1 also operates a second hotline, which is  used to handle complaints 
of a specific nature, relative to a commodity suppl ied by the business. The 
statistics concerning the number of calls made to e ither hotline is not 
externally publicized, but was provided by an emplo yee for research purposes. 
Based on information provided by NP1, although thei r hotline was implemented 
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there was  no connection. According 
to an employee of NP1, the hotline was implemented in 2003 “primarily due to 
the increase in fraud cases due to the 911 fund bei ng established. NP1 needed 
a mechanism for the public as well as employees to report fraud, waste and 
abuse.” The employee said “As a nonprofit, we do no t officially fall under 
SOX, but we actually do follow all the prescribed r ecommendations as closely 
as possible i.e. ...report quarterly to the audit c ommittee of our board.” 
(EMail, 2013) 
On NP1’s website, the hotline contact information i s accessible to 
employees and the public from their “Contact Us” pa ge, where there is a link 
for “Reporting fraud, waste or abuse.” On this page , the potential tipster is 
informed the website enables the user to “report [h is/her] concern in a 
confidential and anonymous manner.” (Global Complia nce Inc.) 
On the “Submit a New Report” page, the user is prom pted to select a “primary 
issue” he/she is reporting. The available choices a re as follows: 
EEO/Diversity Issues; Environment, Health, Safety a nd Security; HR 
Administration and Actions; Legal and Regulatory Is sues; Other- Non-
allegations; Other- Violations or Concerns; Protect ing Company Assets and 
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Workplace Conduct Issues. 
According to their organizational literature, emplo yees are encouraged 
to report concerns internally, first. Specifically,  in their “New Employee 
and Volunteer Orientation and Participant Guide, “E mployees and volunteers 
are requested to first notify their supervisor, hum an resources 
representative, or any manager with whom they feel comfortable in the event a 
questionable situation arises in the workplace. If attempts to resolve the 
issue at the local level are unsuccessful, the Conc ern Connection Line is the 
next step.” (NP1, 2006) 
 
Hotline Metrics 
 
For NP1, the hotline metrics analyzed were between July 1, 2012-June 
30, 2013.  Upon analysis, it was determined the num ber of calls received were 
far above benchmarking levels.  The Table below, Ta ble 27, depicts the 
hotline metrics for NP1. 
 
Table 27 NP1 Hotline Metrics 
Fiscal 
Year 
Time 
Period 
Number of 
Employees 
Average 
Benchmarking 
Figure: Size, 
Industry 
Calls 
Expected Per 
Benchmarking 
Delta 
2013 July 1, 
2012-June 
30, 2013 
31,000 7.61 per 
1,000 
9.94 per 
1,000 
=8.78 (9) 
279 +481 
 
Historical Context 
 
During the time period of the hotline data provided , Hurricane Sandy 
occurred. (October 2012) Hurricane Sandy was one of  the most destructive and 
costly hurricanes in United States history. Accordi ng to The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA) more than $1.4 billion in individual 
assistance has been provided, and $3.2 billion in e mergency work was 
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approved. It has been reported that NP1 provided as  much as $15 million in 
relief in connection with this event. (NP1 and Hurr icane Sandy Relief Fund 
Give $15.2 Million, 2013) 
It was also reported following Hurricane Katrina in  August 2005, NP1 
employees engaged in fraud. According to Federal Bu reau of Investigation 
press releases, NP1 employees and other members of the public were charged in 
at least 30 separate frauds from 2009-2012 for crim es committed in 2005. 
Therefore, it is anticipated there will be addition al frauds against NP1 
reported in connection with Hurricane Sandy in the near future. As a result, 
the number of calls to NP1’s hotline was expected t o be above average in 
terms of volume for this time period, which it was.  
Fraud Metrics 
 
According to media reports, employee fraud has occu rred in this 
organization, during the time period of the hotline  data provided (FY 2013). 
On October 31, 2013, local news outlets in Florida reported an NP1 employee 
had been systematically stealing from a local NP1 c hapter since 2011. 
Overall, this employee reportedly stole over $200,0 00 by creating fraudulent 
benefit cards using another employee’s username and  password. (ABC WCJB TV, 
2013)  In this news report, a statement from NP1 wa s published, where they 
acknowledged this fraud, which they said was uncove red during an examination 
of one of their business operations.  It should be noted that according to 
Form 990 standards, this event should be disclosed in their next filing. 
Summary 
 
Overall, NP1 was assessed as having an “Above Avera ge” fraud hotline 
performance.  Their level of bureaupathology was as sessed at a “Level 9” 
(88%) out of ten.  The strongest indicators present  were Insistence on the 
Rights of Office and Impersonal Treatment.  The per formance details were as 
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follows: Metrics were assessed as “High” the functi onality was assessed as 
“Moderate” and the Best Practice compliance was ass essed as “Moderate.”  
Table 28 provides a summary of these results. 
The presence of bureaucracy (IV) was established, w hich has affected 
the performance of the hotline (DV) creating perfor mance issues. A review of 
the literature and an analysis of employee reviews found bureaucracy and 
excessive bureaucracy was present in this organizat ion. In sum, the comments 
were made by 150 separate respondents. Of their res ponses, 99 comments 
indicated bureaucracy and 244 indicated excessive b ureaucracy. 
Employee statements prove bureaucracy and excessive  bureaucracy are 
recognized on the part of employees. Employee comme nts indicating all indices 
evincing bureaucracy and excessive bureaucracy were  present at varying 
degrees. Specifically, employee comments suggest th e indices of bureaucracy 
“Insistence on the Right of Office” (34 comments) a nd “Hierarchy of 
Authority” (23 comments) were especially problemati c for employees. In terms 
of excessive bureaucracy, comments indicated “Imper sonal Treatment” (113 
comments) and “Resistance to Interrogation and Inve stigation” (79 comments) 
were the most notable for those employees who submi tted reviews for this 
organization. 
As for the hotline’s metrics, the hotline is receiv ing a number of 
calls that surpasses benchmarking estimates. Specif ically, in FY 2013, it 
received 760 calls, which is above the benchmarking  figure of 279. However, a 
limitation is that this study is unable to determin e from the data provided 
the number of calls made my employees, as opposed t o the general public. 
With respect to the hotline’s functionality and bes t practices, the hotline 
performed moderately. Again, a lack of available da ta hindered research 
efforts. However, it should be noted that NP1 could  make more of their 
hotline data available to the general public, and t o researchers, if they so 
chose. Here, additional data was requested but the researcher was told that 
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additional data would not be made available. 
Overall, the hotline’s specifications demonstrate t he negative effect 
of organizational bureaucracy on the fraud hotline.  This resistance by 
administrators to provide data demonstrated a “Resi stance to Investigation 
and Interrogation” as indicated by a majority of em ployees. The act of 
directing employees to speak to their manager, rath er than call the hotline, 
is further evidence of “Hierarchy of Authority” and  Insistence on the Rights 
of Office” which results in poor hotline functional ity. Employees who wish to 
not report to an internal party are thus discourage d from calling. The demand 
for employees to report internally rather than call  the hotline further 
evinces a dominating management who insists reports  come through them, rather 
than another channel. This demand is against the ho tline’s purpose, which is 
to receive fraud tips, and is thus evidence of bure aupathology. 
Overall, per the employees who provided reviews, th is organization is 
believed to have a dominating management (Insistenc e on the Rights of Office) 
who freely exercises their authority (Hierarchy of Authority), providing 
Impersonal Treatment (113 comments) and Resisting I nterrogation and 
Investigation (79 comments). It is believed that th ese conditions give rise 
to internal fraud and also hinder employee fraud re porting to the hotline. 
Comments further indicated the presence of disgrunt led employees. On a 
positive note, employees were very enthusiastic abo ut the mission of their 
organization, which they found overall to be very r ewarding. However, it was 
clear that employees felt they were mistreated. Man y employees complained 
about the working hours, which were well beyond tha t of normal positions. 
Employees also negatively discussed the “CEO salary ” and compared it to their 
own low wages. They also expressed concern over the  constant organizational 
change, “lack of communication” within the organiza tion, the “poor 
management” and resulting “low morale.” 
As a result of the negative employee sentiment, whi ch overwhelmingly 
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indicated “Impersonal Treatment” and “Resistance to  Interrogation and 
Investigation”, it is believed that not all employe es who are aware of fraud 
are reporting it to the hotline. 
As for internal fraud, upon review of public record s, this study was 
able to establish the presence of internal fraud du ring the relevant time 
period. A review of the historical context suggests  the hotline should have 
future internal fraud reported due to Hurricane San dy. Employee reviews also 
made reference to the existence of internal fraud, with employees saying 
there was “waste of donated income” “misuse of fund s” with “repeated 
violations of key federal and state regulations” an d the “financial situation 
was terrible.” 
Table 28 on the next page provides a summary of the  results for NP1. 
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Table 28 NP1 Table of Results 
Organization NP1 
Functionality: Above Average 
Bureaupathology: Level 9 of 10 
Assessment Element 
 
Size 31,000 
Hotline Name Concern Connection Line 
Management 3 rd  Party and Internal 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
88% (Sample Size 170; 150 indicated IV; 343 comment s 
indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV Level 9 
5 of 5; General(6) 
a (23) 
b (20) 
c (2) 
d (14) 
e (34) 
Bureaupathology IV f (113) 
g (15) 
h (35) 
I (79) 
J (2) 
Hotline Metrics (DV)  High; 
Calls exceed benchmarking; Historical context (cond ucive 
to fraud, yet calls were above benchmarking levels 
during a relevant time period) 
Hotline 
Functionality (DV) 
Moderate, 3 of 5 
Marketing (employees are encouraged to contact mana ger 
first) Mechanics (not enough parties engaged) Intak e 
(3
rd 
Party managed) Processing (3
rd 
party managed) 
Incentives (administrator didn’t understand value o f 
hotline)  
Moderate, 3 of 6 Oversight (internal oversight) Due  Care 
(clear process) Effective Communication (well 
communicated, but employees discouraged from callin g) 
Reasonable Steps to Achieve Compliance (yes, 3
rd 
party 
managed) Consistent Enforcement (data unavailable) 
Reasonable Steps to Respond and Prevent Similar Off enses 
(data unavailable) 
 
Best Practices (DV) Moderate, 3 of 6 Oversight (internal oversight) Due Care 
(clear process) Effective Communication (well 
communicated, but employees discouraged from 
calling) Reasonable Steps to Achieve Compliance (yes, 
3
rd 
party managed) Consistent Enforcement (data 
unavailable) Reasonable Steps to Respond and Prevent 
Similar Offenses (data unavailable) 
 
Historical Context Conducive to fraud and increased  calls (Hurricane Sandy) 
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Organization NP1 
Functionality: Above Average 
Bureaupathology: Level 9 of 10 
Assessment Element 
 
(DV) 
Evidence of Internal 
Fraud 
Yes 
Evidence of Negative 
Employee Sentiment 
Yes 
Result IV Bureaucracy  
 
Hierarchy of Authority 
 
Insistence on the Rights of Office 
 
Bureaupathology 
 
Impersonal Treatment 
 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation 
Result DV DV Metrics, Functionality and Best Practi ces Affected 
Metrics- great 
Functionality- Moderate 
Best Practices- Moderate 
Evidence of Historical Context, Internal Fraud, 
Disgruntled Employees 
Notes Despite an “average” rating, comments indicat e fraud, 
massive bureaucracy 
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Chapter 5   Discussion 
 
This chapter reviews the results of this study.  Fi rst, a summary of 
the results is provided; first addressing the prima ry questions, and the 
primary research findings.  Next, this work will ad dress the findings with 
respect to each of the sub-questions explored in th is work.  The discussion 
will also explore policy implications, the limitati ons of this study and 
recommendations for future research. 
Summary 
This work explored the relationship between organiz ational bureaucracy 
and fraud hotlines, using six organizations’ hotlin es as case studies.  The 
central question of this work was as follows: Does organizational bureaucracy 
affect fraud hotline performance?   This central qu estion was divided into a 
series of sub-questions.  In answering those sub-qu estions, this work 
identified and isolated specific indicators, which were used to measure each 
subject organization’s fraud hotline performance. 
Overall, this study determined there was no consist ent relationship 
between organizational bureaucracy and fraud hotlin e performance.  The 
answers to the sub-questions revealed the following : (i) Dysfunctional 
organizational bureaucracy existed in all of the su bject organizations, (ii) 
Employees perceive bureaupathology in all of the su bject organizations, (iii) 
Bureaupathology did not always result in low hotlin e calls, (iv) 
Bureaupathology didn’t always result in reduced bes t practices compliance, 
but Bureaupathology did always result in internal o rganizational fraud. 
Therefore, this study found there was no consistent  relationship 
between organizational bureaucracy and hotline perf ormance. 
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The literature said dysfunctional organizational bu reaucracy could have 
resulted in decreased hotline performance.  That wa s not proven in this 
study. Rather, the stronger the level of bureaupath ology in an agency, the 
better the hotline performed from a metrics, functi onality and best practices 
perspective. 
The answers to the sub-questions were as follows: 
Sub-question Answer 
1. Does Dysfunctional 
Organizational Bureaucracy Exist? 
Yes 
2. Do employees perceive 
bureaupathology? 
Yes 
3. Does bureaupathology result in 
low hotline calls? 
Not always. In 50% of cases.  In half of 
the organizations had call levels below 
benchmarking. 
4. Does bureaupathology result in 
reduced hotline functionality? 
Not always.  Hotlines had a poor-great 
functionality. 
5. Does bureaupathology result in 
reduced best practices compliance? 
Not always.  The hotlines performed at 
Weak to High levels, despite the presence 
of bureaupathology. 
6. Does bureaupathology result in 
fraud, waste and abuse? 
Yes, internal fraud was discovered in 
each organization 
 
This study demonstrated the perception of bureaupat hology by employees 
might cause them to overly rely on organizational r ules and procedures, which 
is resulting in hotlines that in many times perform  well.  This finding is 
consistent with bureaupathology literature, which s ays bureaupathology can 
cause employees to obsessively adhere to organizati onal rules and procedures.  
However, this finding is contrary to the expectatio ns of some that 
bureaucracy was causing the SEC hotline to underper form. 
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To revisit the bureaucracy literature, there were t hree possible 
outcomes of a state of organizational bureaupatholo gy that were posited at 
the onset of this work.  Those were crime concealme nt, reduced fraud 
reporting and reduced hotline performance.   
This study determined hotline performance does not have a consistent 
relationship to organizational bureaucracy.  Howeve r, per the literature, the 
possibility of crime concealment and reduced fraud reporting are still 
potential outcomes of a well functioning hotline. T his work considered 
employee sentiment, historical context and the stat e of organizational fraud, 
in the evaluation of a given hotline.  Those factor s tended to indicate the 
hotlines may not be receiving all possible fraud ti ps, despite the apparent 
functionality of several hotlines assessed in this work. 
In other words, a hotline functionality assessment may not shed light 
on the health of a company from an anti-fraud persp ective. 
Here, each of the organizations had bureaupathology  and internal fraud.  
Therefore, this study determined a relationship bet ween bureaupathology and 
employee fraud. 
General Findings 
Overall, this study determined there was no consist ent relationship 
between organizational bureaupathology and fraud ho tline performance. In 
fact, at times, where the organization had more bur eaupathology, the hotline 
tended to perform better, in terms of its metrics, functionality and 
adherence to best practices.  Organizations with a high presence of the 
bureaucracy indicator “Insistence on the Rights of Office” and “Impersonal 
Treatment” tended to have a better adherence to bes t practices. It was also 
determined the organizations with the best levels o f adherence to best 
practice had a higher instance of internal fraud.  
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Regardless of hotline performance, it is important to note that all of 
the subject organizations experienced employee crim e, had a historical 
context, giving rise to crime, and had employees wh o were disgruntled, which 
is a condition that also gives rise to crime.  Perh aps this means that 
hotlines cannot both function well and control frau d at the same time.  The 
conditions that give rise to a successful hotline m ay also give rise to 
fraud, and or inhibit fraud reporting, in the same organizations.    
As demonstrated in the table below, there were no c ases in which a 
hotline with a high level of bureaupathology perfor med poorly.  In one case 
(PS2), when the organization had lower levels of bu reaupathology, the hotline 
performed better.  In another case, when the organi zation had more 
bureaupathology, the hotline performed worse (GS2).   In yet another case, 
when the organization had lower levels of bureaupat hology, the hotline 
performed worse (PS1).  At times, when an organizat ion had worse 
bureaupathology, the hotline tended to perform bett er (NP1, GS1). 
Table 29 Primary Research Question Results 
 Bureaupathology 
Worse 
Bureaupathology 
Elevated 
Bureaupathology 
Better 
Hotline 
Performance Worse 
 GS2 PS1 
Hotline 
Performance 
Better 
NP1 
GS1 
 
 
GS3 PS2 
 
This finding is contrary to expectations.  It was a ssumed that 
bureaupathology would have a negative effect on fra ud hotline processes.  
While this happened in one case (GS2) it was not tr ue in other cases. 
Upon review, it was determined organizations with a  high presence of 
the bureaucracy indicator “Insistence on the Rights  of Office” and 
“Impersonal Treatment” tended to have a better adhe rence to best practices. 
It is believed these organizational attributes resu lted in a greater 
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adherence to organizational rules, which resulted i n better functioning 
hotlines. 
While this finding seems surprising, it is supporte d in the 
bureaupathology literature. According to the litera ture, both of these 
attributes, when prominent within an organization, can result in a firm 
adherence to organizational procedures. Thompson di scusses this in his work 
Modern Organization, where he finds that bureaupath ic officials that “insist 
on the right of office” tend to “insist on petty ri ghts and prerogatives, on 
protocol, on procedure…”  (164) Thus it is possible  this attention to 
procedure resulted in a well-functioning hotline fr om a compliance 
perspective.  
Furthermore, “insistence on the right of office” me ans authority 
figures “protect their authority and influence.” (T hompson, 165) which could 
result in the strong execution by management of sev eral best practices 
components, such as “oversight” (by high level pers onnel) and “due care” (in 
delegating substantial discretionary authority).  I n fact, Thompson finds an 
official insisting on the rights of office could ex ercise extreme control of 
a hotline, as it entails “control[ing]…particular c ommunication channel[s]…to 
protect[] authority and influence” and “exert[ing] his right to the monopoly 
of outgoing and incoming communication” and insist[ ing] that “everything go 
through ‘formal channels.’” (Thompson, 165) 
The other strong bureaupathic attribute in organiza tions with high 
bureaupathology whose hotlines performed reasonably  well was “impersonal 
treatment.”  Again, this management quality can als o contribute to a well-
functioning hotline from a compliance perspective.  According to Thompson, 
impersonal treatment of superior to subordinate is a bureaupathological 
response, which can occur when an organizational ob ligation, such as a fraud 
hotline, is carried out.  In fact, it could be cons idered a necessary way to 
implement a service, such as a fraud hotline, where  the primary “clients” are 
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one’s own employees.  Thompson addresses this issue  in Modern Organization, 
where he concludes the following: 
“A certain impersonality is necessary both to prote ct the goals 
of the organization and to secure objective and the refore 
effective service to the client.  This impersonalit y may be 
exaggerated into a cold disinterest by an insecure official.  
When officials are caught between demands or “right s” of clients 
and tight administrative controls from above, disso ciation from 
the clients and disinterest in their problems may s eem to be the 
only way out of their dilemma.” (Thompson, 162) 
 
 
 As demonstrated, the literature supports the obser ved phenomenon, that 
organizational bureaupathology can result in a well -functioning hotline from 
a compliance perspective.  However, it does not add ress the issue of fraud.  
The case studies determined organizational fraud ex isted in each organization 
despite the existence of a well-functioning hotline .  
 The data also shows a lack of relationship between  the individual 
hotline performance indicators on each other.  For instance, at times where 
the hotline metrics were low (below benchmarking) t he functionality of the 
hotline was sometimes better (GS3).  Inversely, whe n metrics were better (at 
or above benchmarking), the functionality was somet imes worse (PS2).  When 
hotline functionality was better, often times, thei r adherence to best 
practices was better (GS1, GS3, NP1).  The table al so demonstrates that when 
an organization’s hotline metrics were worse, their  level of adherence to 
best practices was better. 
Table 30 Bureaucracy Attributes and Hotline Perform ance 
 B-
Hierarch
y of 
Authorit
y 
B-
Career 
Servic
e 
B-
Insistenc
e on the 
Rights of 
Office 
BP-
Prolonge
d Role 
Enactmen
t 
BP-
Impersona
l 
Treatment 
BP-
Resistanc
e to 
Change 
Metrics 
Better 
PS2 GS1 PS2 
NP1 
PS2 
GS1 
NP1  
Metrics 
Worse 
PS1  GS2 
GS3 
PS1 GS2 
GS3 
GS3 
Functionalit
y Better 
 GS1 GS3 
NP1 
GS1 GS3 
NP1 
GS3 
Functionalit
y Worse 
PS1 
PS2 
 PS2 
GS2 
PS1 
PS2 
GS2  
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 B-
Hierarch
y of 
Authorit
y 
B-
Career 
Servic
e 
B-
Insistenc
e on the 
Rights of 
Office 
BP-
Prolonge
d Role 
Enactmen
t 
BP-
Impersona
l 
Treatment 
BP-
Resistanc
e to 
Change 
Best 
Practices 
Better 
PS2 GS1 PS2 
GS2 
GS3 
NP1 
PS2 
GS1 
GS2 
GS3 
NP1 
GS3 
Best 
Practices 
Worse 
PS1   PS1   
Fraud Worse PS1 
PS2 
 NP1 
GS2 
PS2 
PS1 NP1 
GS2 
PS2 
 
Fraud Better GS1 
 
 GS3 GS1 
GS3 
GS3  
 
The table above further demonstrates that while a h otline can function 
better, or worse, under the condition of excessive organizational 
bureaucracy, the level of fraud experienced in the organizations where 
“Insistence on the Rights of Office” and “Impersona l Treatment” are also 
particularly strong.   
This phenomenon, in part, might be due to the organ izational challenge 
of having an internal service (a fraud hotline) whe re the “clients” are also 
the employees.  While ordinarily, a highly bureaucr atic organization may have 
managers who “insist on the rights of office” in ex ecuting organizational 
duties, perhaps this approach does not work when so liciting fraud tips from 
employees.  For instance, this approach explains wh y certain organizations 
directed potential callers to first go to their sup ervisor, and then consider 
calling the hotline. A manager exerting authority m ay wish to hear all 
complaints, in his capacity as boss, for instance, rather than have them go 
to a hotline.  However, this approach fails to cons ider that the “clients” 
are employees may not wish to report crime to their  supervisor. 
This study further determined employees in the subj ect studies were 
largely subject to “impersonal treatment.”  The imp ersonal treatment of 
employees may also cause them not to report crime, which would manifest only 
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in corporate fraud statistics and not by examining hotline functionality.  
Therefore, examination of hotline metrics, function ality and best practices 
may only tell an organization whether their hotline  is successful from a 
procedural perspective.  It will not tell the organ ization whether the 
hotline is receiving all known internal crime infor mation from employees.  
This study reveals that benchmarking and functional ity assessments of 
hotlines will not tell an organization the true sta te of employee crime.  For 
that, organizations may need to take a more intuiti ve approach; examining 
their individual hotline against known crime in lig ht of historical context 
to determine whether all crime is truly being repor ted.   
Overall, organizations with fraud hotlines may find  themselves in a 
precarious position.  While it was assumed investor s, employees, and the 
general public were the potential unknowing “victim s” of ill-functioning 
fraud hotlines, it is now possible that organizatio ns who rely on hotlines 
may also themselves be victims.  Organizations are also potentially assuming 
hotlines are protecting them from crime.  By benchm arking their hotline 
statistics, following best practices, and observing  all of the other 
guidelines, they might be giving themselves a false  sense of security.  
When benchmarking their hotline, and otherwise exam ining the 
functionality, they may find, as this study found, that the hotline is 
performing like its peers, or functioning “well” an d may often conclude the 
hotline is protecting them against crime.  However,  unless they are fully 
examining the hotline against known crime, consider ing the historical context 
when benchmarking to see if the calls are actually sufficient in light of any 
known conditions giving rise to crime, and reviewin g statements of employees 
to see if they are withholding crime knowledge, per haps they will assume 
their hotline is “protecting” them.   
Again, fraud hotlines will always be a unique servi ce in any 
organization, in that the “clients” are employees a nd the information they 
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provide, helps organizations meet their goals, yet is also unpleasant news 
for the organization.  According to the literature,  bureaupathologies seen in 
the subject organizations whose hotlines performed well include management 
barriers to the natural flow of information.  Thomp son says this is a true 
organizational challenge; finding it is “one of the  great difficulties of 
modern organization aris[ing] from the inescapable fact that specialist 
communication much break through..blockades.” 
An example of this was seen in many of the fraud ho tlines managed by 
third party providers.  The caller first visits the ir company website, calls 
the number, is routed to a third party who receives  their information, routes 
that to various channels then back to the organizat ion, who routes its 
through internal channels, before it is ultimately handled.  From a fraud 
prevention perspective, this may not be the best wa y of receiving information 
about fraud.   
The bureaucracy literature is critical of a process , such as a fraud 
hotline, that relies on client information to survi ve in light of the 
excessive bureaucracy conditions seen in the subjec t organizations. 
Researchers have determined that information flow c an be hindered by the 
impersonal experience in a bureaucracy.  They recom mend a departure from 
bureaucratic process to foster information sharing.   In Exchange and Power in 
Social Life, sociologist Peter Michael Blau found t he following: 
“The situation of bureaucratic officials who provid e services to 
clients is similar to that of professionals.  Offic ials in a 
bureaucracy are expected to treat clients in a deta ched manner in 
accordance with official rules, and this requires t hat officials 
abstain with exchange relations with clients, becau se exchange 
transactions would make them obligated to and depen dent for 
rewards on clients.  Even if its only the gratitude  and approval 
of clients an official wants to earn, his concern w ith doing do 
can hardly fail to influence his decisions and may lead him to 
depart from official procedures.  If officials beco me dependent 
on clients either for rewards they personally seek or for 
services of clients the organization needs, which m ean that they 
cannot strictly follow bureaucratic procedures in t heir relation 
with clients.  Two studies found that situations in  which 
officials were dependent on clients engendered 
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debureaucratization, that is, departures from burea ucratic 
principles.  An essential element of professional a nd 
bureaucratic detachment is the absence of exchange relations with 
clients.  Exchange transactions create obligations that make it 
impossible to conform undeviatingly to professional  or 
bureaucratic standards.  Treatment of clients in ac cordance with 
these standards suppresses direct exchange with the m and 
substitutes for it a series of indirect social tran sactions 
between collectivities and their individual members  and sometimes 
also among collectivities.” (263) 
 
In the subject organizations examined, it was noted  that information 
sharing resulted in a reduced instance of fraud, co mpared to the other 
subjects.  Many subjects of this study were not ver y transparent about their 
fraud hotline process.  It was noted one organizati on was extremely 
transparent; providing hotline statistics and repor ts detailing specific 
complaints received and their outcomes, experienced  less internal fraud (GS3) 
than the other subjects in this study. 
 
Table 31 Primary Question Summary of Results 
 Bureaupathology Strongest Indicators  Hotline 
Performance 
Performance 
Details 
PS1 Level 3 (23%) Hierarchy of 
Authority; Prolonged 
Role Enactment 
 
Low Metrics: Low 
Functionality: 
Poor  
Best 
Practices: 
Weak 
PS2 Level 4(38.5%) Hierarchy of 
Authority/Insistence 
on the Rights of 
Office; Prolonged 
Role Enactment 
Average Metrics: High 
Functionality: 
Poor 
Best 
Practices: 
Moderate 
GS1 Level 8 (72%) Career Service; 
Prolonged Role 
Enactment 
Above Average Metrics: High 
Functiona lity: 
Moderate 
Best 
Practices: 
Moderate 
GS2 Level 7 (64%) Insistence on the 
Rights of Office; 
Impersonal Treatment  
Below Average Metrics: Low 
Functionality: 
Poor 
Best 
Practices:  
Good 
 
GS3 Level 7 (67%) Insistence on the High Metrics: L ow 
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 Bureaupathology Strongest Indicators  Hotline 
Performance 
Performance 
Details 
Rights of Office; 
Impersonal 
Treatment/Resistance 
to Change 
 
Functionality: 
Great 
Best 
Practices: 
High 
NP1 Level 9 (88%) Insistence on the 
Rights of Office; 
Impersonal Treatment  
Above Average Metrics: High 
Functionality: 
Moderate 
Best 
Practices: 
Moderate 
 
Detailed Findings 
Sub-questions 
 
The sub-questions explored in this work were as fol lows:  
I.  Does dysfunctional organizational bureaucracy exist  in the six 
subject organizations?  
II.  Do employees perceive bureaupathology in the six su bject 
organizations?  
III.  Does bureaupathology result in low number of hotlin e calls?  
IV.  Does bureaupathology result in reduced hotline func tionality?  
V.  Does bureaupathology result in reduced best practic es compliance?  
VI.  Does bureaupathology result in fraud, waste and abu se? 
Does dysfunctional organizational bureaucracy exist  in the six subject 
organizations? 
 
Dysfunctional organizational bureaucracy was determ ined to exist in all 
of the subject organizations. A review of their org anizational charts and 
other documents validated this finding. 
For PS1, their bureaucracy was well documented.  In  their 
organizational materials, they acknowledged the com plexity of their business 
and the resulting possibility of financial loss to clients.   
For PS2, their state of organizational bureaucracy was established.  
The CEO acknowledged their organization’s bureaucra cy in the public domain, 
finding they needed to “unclog [their] vast bureauc racy.”  
For GS1, a federal government agency, the existence  of bureaucracy was 
established.  President Obama has made public state ments regarding the 
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“excessive complex [ity]” of the federal government , and researchers have 
reported the bureaucracy at GS1. 
At GS2, their bureaucracy was established in the pu blic record, where 
several recent articles discussed the “massive” bur eaucracy.  
At GS3, their bureaucracy was also established in t he public record.  
In fact, it was reported special forums were being held where local 
businesses could discuss the City’s bureaucracy pro blem directly with the 
City Council. 
At NP1, their state of bureaucracy was also well do cumented.  News 
articles documented their problems with bureaucracy .  This agency was also 
subject to federal citations as a result of their b ureaucratic structure, 
which was determined to lack adequate processes for  inspection and review.    
Do employees perceive bureaupathology in the six su bject organizations? 
 
Bureaupathology was found to exist in each of the s ubject 
organizations. Research indicated anywhere between 23% and 88% of respondents 
indicated the presence of dysfunctional bureaucracy  and bureaupathology.  
This study determined the strongest bureaucracy ind icator in all of the 
subject organizations was Insistence on the Rights of Office (4 of 6) and the 
strongest bureaupathology indicators were Prolonged  Role Enactment (3 of 6) 
and Impersonal Treatment (3 of 6). 
Furthermore, employees in all of the subject organi zations indicated 
this bureaucracy was at a bureaupathological level.    
At PS1, 23% of employees perceived agency bureaucra cy.  This was 
evaluated as a Level 3 out of 10.  The strongest in dicator present was 
“Hierarchy of Authority.”  They further indicated b ureaupathology.    The 
strongest indicator present was “Prolonged Role Ena ctment.” 
At PS2, 38.5% of employees perceived agency bureauc racy.  This was 
evaluated as a Level 4 out of 10.  The strongest in dicators present were 
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Hierarchy of Authority and Insistence on the Rights  of Office. Employees 
further indicated bureaupathology. The strongest in dicator present was 
Prolonged Role Enactment. 
At GS1, 72% of employees perceived agency bureaucra cy. This was 
evaluated as a Level 8 out of 10.  The strongest in dicator present was Career 
Service. Employees further indicated bureaupatholog y. The strongest indicator 
present was Prolonged Role Enactment. 
At GS2, 64% of employees perceived agency bureaucra cy.  This was 
evaluated as a Level 7 out of 10.  The strongest in dicator present was 
Insistence on the Rights of Office. Employees furth er indicated 
bureaupathology. The strongest indicator present wa s Prolonged Role 
Enactment. 
At GS3, 67% of employees perceived agency bureaucra cy.  This was 
evaluated as a Level 7 out of 10.  The strongest in dicator present was 
Insistence on the Rights of Office. Employees furth er indicated 
bureaupathology. The strongest indicators present w ere Impersonal Treatment 
and Resistance to Change. 
At NP1, 88% of employees perceived agency bureaucra cy.  This was 
evaluated as a Level 9 out of 10.  The strongest in dicator present was 
Insistence on the Rights of Office. Employees furth er indicated 
bureaupathology. The strongest indicator present wa s Impersonal Treatment. 
In summary, the answers to the previous questions e stablished the 
presence of dysfunctional bureaucracy and bureaupat hology in all of the 
subject organizations. Next, it is important to det ermine whether this 
bureaucracy affected the fraud hotline process. The  following three questions 
will explore that issue. 
Does bureaupathology result in low number of hotlin e calls? 
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 In half of the cases, 3 of 6 organizations, the ca lls were below 
benchmarking levels.  Those organizations were asse ssed as having a “Low” 
level of hotline metrics.  Overall, calls were belo w benchmarking levels in 3 
of the 6 organizations, the medium-sized private se ctor organization, the 
state government organization and the city governme nt organization (PS1, GS2, 
and GS3).  In one of the three subjects that experi enced low call volumes 
(GS3), calls were above benchmarking until 2010, wh en they sharply declined 
to below benchmarking levels.  Internal documents w ere located which 
suggested agency personnel might have made consciou s efforts to reduce call 
volume due to cost concerns.  This managerial choic e was against the best 
interest of the organization, which was experiencin g internal fraud that was 
being reported via the hotline. The choice by manag ement to reduce the call 
volume is thus believed to be a result of organizat ional bureaupathology. 
Does bureaupathology result in reduced hotline func tionality? 
 
In summary, the functionality of the subject hotlin es varied wildly.  
Overall, functionality raged from “Poor” to “Great. ”  It was noted that 
hotlines that had lower levels of bureaupathology a ctually functioned worse 
than their counterparts (PS1, PS2).  Both of these hotlines were also in the 
private sector, and are both in the financial indus try, which could also 
explain the difference.  None of the hotlines exami ned were determined to 
function at a “high” level, as defined by succeedin g in the areas of 
marketing, mechanics, intake/processing, and incent ives. 
For PS1, the functionality was determined to be poo r, performing under 
expectations in 3 of 4 key areas.  As for marketing , the number was difficult 
to locate externally. As for mechanics, the hotline  had only one 
administrator, which is not a recommended practice in the literature.  It is 
suggested that hotlines have several parties managi ng the hotline for a broad 
perspective and the appearance of impartiality.  Wi th respect to 
 
 
 
268
intake/processing, this hotline performed well, as it is managed by a third-
party provider.  As for incentives, based on the ev idence, there were little 
incentives offered.  The hotline was not well adver tised.  The hotline 
administrator said they planned to increase promoti on of the hotline in the 
future.  However, they didn’t seem to have a sense of urgency to increase 
calls, despite the fact the hotline calls were very  low relative to the size 
of the organization, and the industry.  Therefore, it can be assumed 
management didn’t really understand the value of th e hotline. 
PS2’s hotline functionality was also determined to be poor, performing 
under expectations in 3 of 4 key areas.  As for mar keting, the number was 
difficult to locate externally.  With respect to me chanics, this hotline 
performed well.  This organization’s hotline was ma naged by a third-party and 
was also managed internally.  As for intake/process ing, PS2’s process was 
determined to be heavily bureaucratic.  From interv iews with hotline 
administrators, it was learned that the information  flow from intake to 
resolution was quite complex, and involved multiple  internal and external 
parties.  In addition, it was determined this organ ization does not report 
back to the third-party hotline administrator to sh are the outcome/resolution 
of complaints.   
As for incentives, this hotline didn’t perform well .  The third-party 
hotline administrator said this organization, like others in this sector; 
prefer to keep call volume low.  Management attenti on to call volume is 
believed to be contrary to a successful hotline. 
For GS1, their hotline functionality was determined  to be moderate, 
functioning well in 2 of 4 areas.  As for marketing , this hotline performed 
well.  This hotline was easily accessible to extern al parties, and was 
located via a simple “Google” search for “GS1 fraud  hotline” or “GS1 ethics 
hotline.”  In terms of mechanics, this hotline perf ormed well, as it was 
managed by their Office of Inspector General (OIG).   As for the 
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intake/processing, a review of their hotline websit e and associated materials 
determined their process was very complex and diffi cult to navigate.  This is 
believed to hinder hotline reporting.  Finally, as for incentives, 
organizational documents suggested employees are de terred from using the 
hotline.  In an organizational survey, 44% said the y didn’t believe the 
process was truly anonymous and feared retaliation.    
GS2’s hotline was determined to function poorly.  F or GS2, the hotline 
marketing was well marketed.  It was easily located  by an external party.  As 
for mechanics, intake and processing, this hotline was managed by a single, 
internal party.  This practice is not recommended d ue to the appearance of 
reporting and process bias.  With respect to incent ives, the practice of 
having a sole employee serve as hotline manager/int ake personnel is contrary 
to best practices.  The use of one person in this f unction can serve as a 
disincentive to potential callers. 
GS3’s hotline was determined to function at a moder ate level, 
functioning well in 2 of 4 areas.  This hotline was  well marketed.  The 
hotline number was easily located externally.  As f or mechanics, this hotline 
was managed by a third-party provider.  Therefore, this hotline is 
mechanically sound.   
With respect to intake/processing, this hotline per formed well.  This 
hotline is managed by a third-party provider, and o n an internal level, this 
organization had a robust process in place for hand ling calls, which was well 
documented.  GS3 also publicized the outcome of the ir complaints.  This 
practice is advised; as it gives assurance to calle rs their complaints are 
appropriately handled.  This fact was expected to p ositively influence their 
incentives rating.  However, upon further review, i t was determined this 
organization may have actively deterred callers fro m reporting. 
Therefore, as for incentives, this hotline performe d below 
expectations.  Research determined this organizatio n discouraged callers from 
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reporting.  On their website, they encouraged calle rs to report their 
concerns in person, saying “face to face reporting is always the best form of 
communication…”  This instruction is contrary to th e very spirit of an 
anonymous hotline.   
In addition, it was also noted this hotline experie nced a severe drop 
in calls following an internal memo, which said the y had reached their 
“complaint cap” with the third-party provider.  Add itional internal documents 
also documented strain experienced on the departmen t handling complaints.  
This news was a disappointing finding, given this h otline was proven to be 
generating valid and actionable complaints. 
As for NP1, this hotline performed at a moderate le vel, underperforming 
in 2 of 4 areas.  With respect to marketing, their hotline number was easily 
located.  As for mechanics, it was determined this hotline lacked the 
engagement of internal parties. The intake/processi ng for this hotline were 
determined to be good.  They use a third party prov ider.  As for incentives, 
this hotline performed below standards.  Their webs ite encouraged callers to 
“first notify their supervisor, human resources rep resentative, or any 
manager…” then only if “attempts to resolve the iss ue at the local level are 
unsuccessful, the [hotline] is the next step.”  Thi s instruction is contrary 
to the spirit of an anonymous reporting mechanism. 
Does bureaupathology result in reduced best practic es compliance? 
 
 Best practice compliance also varied wildly.  Best  practice compliance 
was at Weak to Moderate levels in four of six of th e subject organizations, 
and at Good to High levels in the other two organiz ations.  The six 
assessment areas were (i) oversight (by high level personnel), (ii) due care 
(in delegating substantial discretionary authority) , (iii) effective 
communication (to all levels of employees), (iv) re asonable steps to achieve 
compliance (which include systems for monitoring, a uditing, and reporting 
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suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal, (v) consistent enforcement (of 
compliance standards including disciplinary mechani sms), and (vi) reasonable 
steps (to respond to and prevent further similar of fenses upon detection of a 
violation) (“response”). 
 As for PS1, the best practice compliance was evalu ated as weak, 
underperforming in 4 of 6 key areas.  As for oversi ght, this hotline had only 
one internal delegate to handle complaints.  With r espect to due care, this 
hotline had a clear process.  As for communication,  this hotline was 
determined to not be well communicated.  Their pers onnel confirmed the lack 
of communication. As for compliance, yes, this hotl ine had taken appropriate 
compliance measures, in that they were managed by a  third party provider.  
With respect to enforcement and response, the data was unavailable.  The 
absence of data to this effect indicates this organ ization is not 
communicating outcomes, which is contrary to best p ractices.   
As for PS2, the best practice compliance was evalua ted as moderate, 
underperforming in 3 of 6 key areas.  As for oversi ght, this hotline had 
substantial oversight, with an internal manager and  associated team 
designated for this purpose.  With respect to due c are, this hotline had a 
clear process, also, with appropriate designees.  A s for communication, this 
hotline was determined to not be well communicated.   Information concerning 
this hotline was very difficult to locate in the pu blic domain. As for 
compliance, yes, this hotline had taken appropriate  compliance measures in 
that they were managed by a third party provider.  With respect to 
enforcement and response, the data was unavailable.   The absence of data to 
this effect indicates this organization is not comm unicating outcomes, which 
is contrary to best practices. 
At GS1, the best practice compliance was evaluated as moderate, 
underperforming in 3 of 6 key areas.  As for oversi ght, this hotline had high 
level oversight in place.  With respect to due care , this hotline had a clear 
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process.  As for communication, this hotline was de termined to be well 
communicated. As for compliance, this hotline fell short of expectations. 
While this hotline was managed by a third party, th eir OIG, internal surveys 
indicated a large number of employees didn’t believ e their complaints were 
anonymous.  With respect to enforcement and respons e, the data was 
unavailable.  The absence of data to this effect in dicates this organization 
is not communicating outcomes, which is contrary to  best practices. 
At GS2, the best practice compliance was evaluated as good, performing 
well in 4 of 6 key areas.  As for oversight, this h otline had high-level 
oversight in place.  With respect to due care, this  hotline’s escalation 
process involved only one employee.  Therefore, the y were not determined to 
have a clear, well-managed escalation process.  As for communication, this 
hotline was determined to be well communicated. As for compliance, this 
hotline performed well. Data was disseminated and c ommunicated to employees 
and the general public.  With respect to enforcemen t and response, this 
hotline made reports available to the public, which  confirmed they conduct 
proper enforcement and also respond appropriately. 
At GS3, the best practice compliance was evaluated as high, performing 
well in 6 key areas.  As for oversight, this hotlin e had high-level oversight 
in place.  With respect to due care, this hotline h ad a clear escalation 
process. As for communication, this hotline met exp ectations.  However, there 
was one difference worth noting.  While GS3 made in formation available 
externally, this was the only government organizati on analyzed in this study 
that didn’t have a hotline poster available to the public on their website.  
As for compliance, this hotline performed well. Dat a was disseminated and 
communicated to employees and the general public.  They used a third party 
provider and also had an internal escalation proces s.  With respect to 
enforcement and response, this hotline made reports  available to the public, 
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which confirmed they conduct proper enforcement and  also respond 
appropriately. 
At NP1, the best practice compliance was evaluated as moderate, 
performing well in 3 of 6 key areas.  As for oversi ght, this hotline had 
high-level oversight in place.  With respect to due  care, this hotline had a 
clear escalation process. As for communication, thi s hotline fell short of 
expectations.  While GS3 made certain information a vailable externally, this 
hotline discouraged potential callers with language  on their website. They 
were also the only government organization analyzed  in this study that didn’t 
have a hotline poster available to the public on th eir website.  As for 
compliance, this hotline performed well. Data was d isseminated and 
communicated to employees and the general public.  They used a third party 
provider and also had an internal escalation proces s.  With respect to 
enforcement and response, this hotline fell short o f expectations.  NP1 
didn’t make any information available to the public  about their hotline’s 
enforcement or response to complaints received.  Th is practice is consistent 
with bureaupathology theory. 
Does bureaupathology result in fraud, waste and abu se? 
 
In each of the subject organizations, substantial e vidence of internal 
fraud committed during the relevant time period, co rresponding to the 
individual hotline data analyzed. 
Overall, this study determined the organizations lo st $281,308,000 due 
to employee fraud.  The greatest amount of fraud wa s seen in the private 
sector, where $280.5 million was lost due to fraud- related loss, fines and 
settlements.  In the government and nonprofit secto r, the actual fraud loss 
was smaller, but there were more instances of corru ption. 
For PS1 and PS2, they publicized in their client di sclosures 
bureaucracy could lead to fraud. 
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In their 2007 Annual Report, PS1 said “the transact ions we process are 
increasingly complex…we rely on the ability of our employees…in the event of 
a breakdown or improper action by third parties or employees, we could suffer 
financial loss…” At PS2, in their 2010 Form 10K, th ey said employees could be 
responsible for fraud, when they disclosed, “cyber attacks and other events 
that could have an adverse security impact…may orig inate from within PS2.”  
In addition, they said, “There have also been a num ber of highly publicized 
cases involving fraud or other misconduct by employ ees in the financial 
services industry in recent years and PS2 runs the risk that employee 
misconduct could occur.” 
This study also determined employees have knowledge  of fraud. For GS2, 
in their reviews, certain employees alluded to the existence of internal 
fraud by calling coworkers “criminals.”  At GS3, it  was noted in the public 
record that one employee crime was discovered via t he hotline. 
Table 32 on the next page displays the results of t he fraud analysis 
for each case study.  Table 33 provides the results  for each of the sub-
questions. 
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Table 32 Fraud Table 
Org PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 Totals 
Time-frame March 1, 
2006-
November 31, 
2007 
2004-2010 2003-2012 2008-2012 2006-2012 July 1, 
2012-June 
30, 2013 
 
Time 
Period 
1 yr 6 yrs 9 yrs 4 yrs 6 yrs 1 yr 
Fraud 
Amount 
$9 million $112 million Unknown $428k $100k  $200k $121,728,000 
Penalties 
Paid 
(Fraudster
) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A $80k N/A $80k 
Fines to 
Firm 
N/A $1.5 million N/A N/A N/A N/A $1.5 million 
Settlement
s Paid 
(Firm) 
N/A $158mm N/A N/A N/A N/A $158 million 
Employees 
Involved 
5 9 69 10 7 1 101 total; 
32 (w/ loss 
amounts) 
Fraud Type Embezzlement
, data 
theft, 
corruption 
Embezzlement
, data theft 
Employee 
misconduc
t 
Embezzlement
, data 
theft, 
corruption 
Embezzlement
, corruption 
Embezzlemen
t 
Embezzlement
, data 
theft, 
corruption, 
employee 
misconduct 
Linked to 
Financial 
Crisis 
Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes, 3 
Total Loss $9 million $271.5 
million 
Unknown $428k $180k $200k $281,308,000 
Average 
Loss Per 
Year 
$9 million $45.25 
million 
Unknown $107k $30k $200k  
Average 
Loss Per 
Employee 
$1.8 million $30.2 
million 
Unknown $42.8k $26k $200k 
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Table 33 Sub-question Results Table 
 
 
Research Sub-
questions 
Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
  Sector Private 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Federal 
Government 
State 
Government 
City 
Government 
Nonprofit 
Specific 
Finding 
1. Does 
Dysfunctional 
Organizational 
Bureaucracy 
exist? 
Yes Yes; 
acknowledged 
by org. 
Yes; 
acknowledge
d by org. 
Yes; news 
articles, 
President 
reported 
Yes; news 
articles 
Yes; news 
articles, 
special 
forums 
created 
Yes; news articles; 
federal citations 
2. Do 
employees 
perceive 
bureaupatholog
y? 
Yes Yes, 23% Yes, 38.5% Yes, 72% Yes, 64% Yes, 67% Yes, 88% 
  Strongest 
Indicator 
Present: 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
Hierarchy of 
Authority 
Hierarchy 
of 
Authority 
and 
Insistence 
on the 
Rights of 
Office 
Career 
Service 
Insistence 
on the 
Rights of 
Office 
Insistence 
on the 
Rights of 
Office 
Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
  Bureau-
pathology? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Strongest 
Indicator 
Present 
Prolonged 
Role 
Enactment 
Prolonged 
Role 
Enactment 
Prolonged 
Role 
Enactment 
Impersonal 
Treatment 
Impersonal 
Treatment 
and 
Resistance 
to Change 
Impersonal Treatment 
3. Does Not always. Yes, call No, Call No call Yes,  call Yes; No, Call level was 
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Research Sub-
questions 
Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
bureaupatholog
y result in 
low hotline 
calls? 
In 50% of 
cases.  In 
half of the 
organizations 
had call 
levels below 
benchmarking. 
level was 
Low, below 
benchmarking 
level was 
High; above 
benchmarkin
g 
level was 
High; above 
benchmarkin
g 
level was 
Low; below 
benchmarkin
g 
Exceeded 
benchmarkin
g for 4 
years, 
until 2010, 
then calls 
dropped 
High; calls exceeded 
benchmarking 
4. Does 
bureaupatholog
y result in 
reduced 
hotline 
functionality?  
  Poor, 3 of 4 
k (number 
hard to find 
internally 
and 
externally) 
l (not 
enough 
parties 
engaged) 
m (3rd party 
managed) 
n (managers 
didn’t 
understand 
value of 
hotline) 
  
Poor, 3 of 
4 
k (hard to 
find number 
externally) 
l (3rd 
party 
managed; 
dedicated 
internal 
team) 
m (heavily 
bureaucrati
c process; 
managers do 
not report 
resolution 
back to The 
Network) 
n (The 
Network 
said 
financial 
firms like 
to keep 
call volume 
low) 
Moderate, 2 
of 4 
k (easily 
found via a 
Google 
search for 
GS1 Fraud 
Hotline or 
GS1 Ethics 
Hotline” a 
Poster is 
available) 
l (managed 
by OIG) 
m (process 
seems 
overly 
bureaucrati
c and 
difficult 
to 
navigate) 
n (avg. 44% 
emp. said 
they fear 
of 
retaliation
, anonymity 
is not 
Poor, 3 of 
4 
k (easily 
located 
externally) 
l (hotline 
only has a 
single 
person 
handling 
calls) 
m (a single 
actor adds 
a perceived 
reporting 
and process 
bias) 
n 
(employees 
especially 
disgruntled 
due to 
historical 
context) 
  
Great, 3 of 
4 
k (easily 
located 
externally) 
l (3rd 
party 
provider) 
m (3rd 
party 
provider 
and 
internal 
handling 
process; 
however, 
believed to 
be 
suffering 
due to 
below) 
n 
(reporting 
discouraged
; potential 
callers 
urged to 
report in 
Moderate, 2 of 4 
Marketing (employees 
are encouraged to 
contact manager 
first) Mechanics (not 
enough parties 
engaged) Intake (3rd 
Party 
managed) Processing 
(3rd party managed) 
Incentives 
(administrator didn’t 
understand value of 
hotline; callers were 
persuaded against 
calling) 
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Research Sub-
questions 
Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
  guaranteed) 
  
person) 
  
5. Does 
bureaupatholog
y result in 
reduced best 
practices 
compliance? 
Not always.  
The hotlines 
performed at 
Weak to High 
levels, 
despite the 
presence of 
bureaupatholo
gy. 
Weak, 4 of 6 
p (1 
delegate 
only) 
q (clear 
process) 
r (not well 
communicated
) 
s (yes, 3rd 
party 
managed) 
t (data 
unavailable) 
 u (data 
unavailable) 
  
Moderate, 3 
of 6 
P 
(oversight 
present) 
q (Ethics 
office) 
r (not well 
communicate
d 
externally) 
s (yes, 3rd 
party 
managed) 
t (data 
unavailable
) 
 u (data 
unavailable
) 
  
Moderate, 3 
of 6 
p (high 
level 
oversight) 
q (clear 
escalation 
process) 
r (data 
communicate
d 
externally) 
s (OIG 
managed, 
however, 
surveys say 
employees 
fear 
reprisal) 
t (data 
unavailable
) 
u (data 
unavailable
) 
  
Good, 4 of 
6 
p (high 
level 
oversight) 
q 
(escalation 
process is 
unclear) 
r (data is 
communicate
d 
externally) 
s (a single 
staffer is 
noted) 
t (reports 
indicate 
enforcement
) 
u (reports 
indicate 
escalation) 
High, 6 of 
6 
p (high 
level 
oversight) 
q 
(escalation 
process is 
clear) 
r (data is 
reported 
externally) 
s (3rd 
party 
provider 
with 
internal 
escalation 
process) 
t (reports 
indicate 
enforcement
) 
u (reports 
indicate 
escalation) 
Moderate, 3 of 
6Oversight (internal 
oversight) Due Care 
(clear 
process) Effective 
Communication (well 
communicated, but 
employees discouraged 
from 
calling) Reasonable 
Steps to Achieve 
Compliance (yes, 3rd 
party managed) 
Consistent 
Enforcement (data 
unavailable) Reasonab
le Steps to Respond 
and Prevent Similar 
Offenses (data 
unavailable) 
  
6. Does 
bureaupatholog
Yes, internal 
fraud was 
$9 million 
is losses by 
$271.5 
million in 
Employee 
misconduct 
$428k by 10 $180k by 7 $200k by 1 employee 
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Research Sub-
questions 
Organization PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
y result in 
fraud, waste 
and abuse? 
discovered in 
each 
organization 
5 employees losses by 9 
employees 
by 69 
employees 
reported; 
loss 
amounts not 
provided 
employees employees 
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Discussion 
There were some important takeaways from this work,  to include: hotline 
functionality and crime, the concept of organizatio ns as victims, and the 
employees as clients. 
This study demonstrated benchmarking alone might no t tell an 
organization how well their hotline is actually fun ctioning to prevent and 
detect crime.  Organizations may need to conduct mo re comprehensive 
examinations of their hotline, to include known cri me and external or 
historical factors to determine the true health of their hotline.  But today, 
only the organizations can determine their own true  hotline functionality, as 
they are the only party with access to their organi zational crime data. 
It is possible that organizations might have a fals e sense of security 
about their own hotlines. Organizations may assume,  after benchmarking, their 
hotlines are functioning well, so they are protecte d against internal crime.  
However, as demonstrated in this study, a hotline f unctionality assessment 
may not have a consistent relationship with interna l crime levels.   
Overall, hotlines will always be unique in that the  organization’s 
primary clients are also their employees.  This fac tor provides a unique 
challenge for hotlines, in that the bureaupathology  of the organization 
cannot be easily separated from the client. 
Conclusion 
This study determined organizational bureaucracy do es not have a 
consistent relationship to hotline performance.  Th e literature said 
organizational bureaucracy could have resulted in d ecreased hotline 
performance.  That was not consistently proven in t his study. Rather, the 
stronger the level of bureaucracy in an agency, the  better the hotline 
performed from a metrics, functionality and best pr actices perspective. 
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This means that the media reports which posited tha t the SEC hotline is 
suffering due to excessive bureaucracy may be false . 
However, those reports said the complainants might believe, due to 
excessive bureaucracy their complaints are not bein g handled appropriately.  
Here, it was learned that perception could be an ou tcome of the lack of 
communication to complainants about the process, wh ich was a noted 
shortcoming of many hotlines, even in those hotline s that followed best 
practices. 
 
This study further established the value of reviewi ng the historical 
context when analyzing a fraud hotline.  In several  instances in this study, 
a subject hotline “benchmarked” appropriately.  A f ull evaluation of the 
historical context and the state of organizational fraud was often times the 
sole indicator that the hotline potentially may not  be performing according 
to expectations.  
Here, the strongest bureaucracy indicator was “Insi stence on the Rights 
of Office, and the strongest bureaupathology indica tor present was 
“Impersonal Treatment.”  Both conditions gave rise to better hotline 
performance, but may also give rise to internal fra ud. 
This study considered social media in evaluating fr aud hotlines.  In 
their “Recommended Practices for Office of Inspecto r General Hotlines,” the 
Department of Homeland Security advances the use of  social media in fraud 
hotlines.  (2010) 
This work set forth a hotline assessment methodolog y that can be 
replicated in any organization.  This study used a holistic approach to 
analyze fraud hotlines that included several unique  factors, such as 
historical context and social media analysis of emp loyee sentiment.  This 
methodology is advanced with the end goal of all or ganizations evaluating 
their present fraud hotlines, for effectiveness, an d their organizations, for 
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internal fraud. Further hotline assessments will se rve to further build the 
general body of knowledge regarding fraud hotlines.   In Patrick Scott’s work, 
“Examining Red Rape in Public and Private Organizat ions,” he suggests as “one 
of the most effective strategies to advance the sta te of knowledge is to 
continue to expand the use of different methodologi es (both qualitative and 
quantitative) and different populations to study re d tape.”  (2002, p. 481).  
Table 34 on the next page provides a detailed summa ry of the findings 
in this study. 
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Table 34 Detailed Summary of Findings 
 
Org PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Org Type Private 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Federal 
Government 
State 
Government 
City 
Government 
Nonprofit 
Size 48,256 260,000 17,359 17,891 19,500 31,000 
Hotline Name Integrity 
Hotline 
Ethics 
Hotline 
OIG Hotline Fraud, Waste 
and 
Mismanagement 
Hotline 
Fraud, Waste 
and Abuse 
Hotline 
Concern Connection 
Line 
Management 3 rd  Party and 
Internal 
3rd  Party and 
Internal 
Office of 
Inspector 
General (OIG) 
GS2 
Legislative 
Audit Bureau 
3rd  Party and 
City Auditor 
3rd  Party and Internal 
Respondents 
Indicating IV 
23% (Sample 
Size 195; 45 
indicated IV; 
54 comments 
indicated IV) 
38.5% (Sample 
Size, 403; 
155 indicated 
IV; 186 
comments 
indicated IV) 
72% 
(Population 
85; 61 
indicated 
presence of 
IV; 99 
comments 
indicated IV) 
64% 
(Population 
29; 18 
indicated 
presence of 
IV; 32 
comments 
indicated IV) 
67% 
(Population 
18; 12 
respondents 
indicating 
presence of 
IV; 22 
comments 
indicated IV) 
88% (Sample Size 170; 
150 indicated IV; 343 
comments indicated IV) 
Bureaucracy IV 5 of 5 
General (12); 
a (4) 
b (3) 
c (3) 
d (3) 
e (6) 
5 of 5 
General (48); 
a (22) 
b (7) 
c (5) 
d (9) 
e (21) 
5 of 5  
General (20) 
a (2) 
b (6) 
c (1) 
d (14)  
e (8) 
3 of 5  
General (4) 
a (3) 
b (0) 
c (0) 
d (3)  
e (5) 
 
5 of 5  
General (1) 
a (3) 
b (1) 
c (1) 
d (1) 
e (4) 
 
5 of 5 
General(6) 
a (23) 
b (20)  
c (2)  
d (14) 
e (34) 
 
Bureaupatholog
y IV 
f (6)  
g (9) 
h (1) 
I (5) 
j (2) 
f (16) 
g (19) 
h (17) 
I (13) 
J (9) 
 
f (8) 
g (17) 
h (11) 
i (11)  
j (5) 
 
f (7)  
g (3) 
h (3) 
I (3) 
J (1) 
 
f (3) 
g (2) 
h (3) 
I (1) 
J (2) 
 
f (113) 
g (15) 
h (35) 
I (79) 
J (2) 
 
Hotline 
Metrics (DV) 
Low; below 
benchmarking  
 
High; above 
benchmarking   
 
High; above 
benchmarking  
Low; below 
benchmarking  
Low, Exceeded 
benchmarking 
for 4 years, 
until 2010  
High; 
Calls exceed 
benchmarking 
Hotline Poor,3 of 4 Poor, 3 of 4 Moderate, 2 Poor, 4 of 5 Great, 3 of 4 Moderate, 2 of 4  
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Org PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
Functionality 
(DV) 
k (number 
hard to find 
internally 
and 
externally) 
l (not enough 
parties 
engaged)  
m (3 rd  party 
managed) 
n (managers 
didn’t 
understand 
value of 
hotline) 
 
k (hard to 
find number 
externally) 
l (3 rd  party 
managed; 
dedicated 
internal 
team) 
m (heavily 
bureaucratic 
process; 
managers do 
not report 
resolution 
back to The 
Network)  
n (The 
Network said 
financial 
firms like to 
keep call 
volume low) 
 
of 4 
k (easily 
found via a 
Google search 
for GS1 Fraud 
Hotline or 
GS1 Ethics 
Hotline” a 
Poster is 
available) 
l (managed by 
OIG) 
m (process 
seems overly 
bureaucratic 
and difficult 
to navigate) 
n (avg. 44% 
emp. said 
they fear of 
retaliation, 
anonymity is 
not 
guaranteed)  
 
k (easily 
located 
externally) 
l (hotline 
only has a 
single person 
handling 
calls)  
m (a single 
actor adds a 
perceived 
reporting and 
process bias)  
n (employees 
especially 
disgruntled 
due to 
historical 
context) 
 
k (easily 
located 
externally) 
l (3 rd  party 
provider) 
m (3 rd  party 
provider and 
internal 
handling 
process; 
however, 
believed to 
be suffering 
due to below) 
n (reporting 
discouraged; 
potential 
callers urged 
to report in 
person) 
 
k (number located 
easily) 
l (not enough parties 
engaged)  
m (3
rd 
Party managed)  
n (administrator 
didn’t understand 
value of hotline) 
 
Best Practices 
(DV) 
Weak, 4 of 6  
p (1 delegate 
only) 
q (clear 
process) 
r (not well 
communicated) 
s (yes, 3 rd  
party 
managed) 
t (data 
unavailable) 
 u (data 
unavailable) 
 
Moderate, 3 
of 6 
P (oversight 
present) 
q (Ethics 
office) 
r (not well 
communicated 
externally)  
s (yes, 3 rd  
party 
managed) 
t (data 
unavailable) 
 u (data 
unavailable) 
Moderate, 3 
of 6 
p (high level 
oversight) 
q (clear 
escalation 
process) 
r (data 
communicated 
externally) 
s (OIG 
managed, 
however, 
surveys say 
employees 
fear 
Good, 2 of 6 
p (high level 
oversight) 
q (escalation 
process is 
unclear) 
r (data is 
communicated 
externally) 
s (a single 
staffer is 
noted) 
t (reports 
indicate 
enforcement) 
u (reports 
High, 6 of 6 
p (high level 
oversight) 
q (escalation 
process is 
clear) 
r (data is 
reported 
externally, 
calls are 
discouraged; 
no poster) 
s (3 rd  party 
provider with 
internal 
escalation 
Moderate, 3 of 
6Oversight (internal 
oversight) Due Care 
(clear 
process) Effective 
Communication (well 
communicated, but 
employees discouraged 
from 
calling) Reasonable 
Steps to Achieve 
Compliance (yes, 3
rd 
party managed) 
Consistent Enforcement 
(data 
unavailable) Reasonabl
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Org PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
 reprisal) 
t (data 
unavailable) 
u (data 
unavailable) 
 
indicate 
escalation) 
process) 
t (reports 
indicate 
enforcement) 
u (reports 
indicate 
escalation) 
e Steps to Respond and 
Prevent Similar 
Offenses (data 
unavailable) 
 
Historical 
Context (DV) 
Conducive to 
Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased 
Calls 
(Financial 
Crisis 2008) 
 
Conducive to 
Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased 
Calls 
(Financial 
Crisis 2008) 
Conducive to 
Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased 
Calls 
(2008; 2012 
emp. surveys; 
average 44% 
believe 
retaliation 
for 
reporting) 
Conducive to 
Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased 
Calls 
(2011 end of 
collective 
bargaining; 
unprecedented 
level of 
protests and 
other 
demonstration
s during this 
time) 
Conducive to 
Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased 
Calls 
(Calls 
declined 
after 2009 
Hotline 
report said 
there was a 
cap on the 
hotline calls 
received by 
the provider) 
Conducive to Fraud; 
Conducive to 
Increased Calls 
(Hurricane Sandy) 
 
Evidence of 
Internal Fraud 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Evidence of 
Negative 
Employee 
Sentiment 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Result IV 
 
Bureaucracy 
 
Strongest 
Presence 
Hierarchy of 
Authority 
 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
 
 
 
Hierarchy of 
Authority 
 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
 
Career 
Service 
 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
 
 
Hierarchy of 
Authority 
 
Career 
Service 
 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
 
 
Hierarchy of 
Authority 
 
Insistence on 
the Rights of 
Office 
 
 
 
Hierarchy of Authority 
 
Insistence on the 
Rights of Office 
 
 
 
Bureaupatholog
y 
Impersonal 
Treatment 
Prolonged 
Role 
Prolonged 
Role 
Impersonal 
Treatment  
Impersonal 
Treatment 
Impersonal Treatment 
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Org PS1 PS2 GS1 GS2 GS3 NP1 
Assessment 
Element 
 
 
Prolonged 
Role 
Enactment  
 
Enactment 
 
Resistance to 
Change 
 
Enactment 
 
Resistance to 
Change 
 
 
Prolonged 
Role 
Enactment 
 
Resistance to 
Change 
 
Resistance to 
Interrogation 
and 
Investigation 
 
 
Resistance to 
Change 
 
Resistance to 
Interrogation and 
Investigation 
Result DV Metrics, 
Functionality 
and Best 
Practices 
Affected 
Metrics- poor 
Functionality
- poor 
Best 
Practices- 
weak 
Evidence of 
Historical 
Context, 
Internal 
Fraud, 
Disgruntled 
Employees 
DV 
Functionality 
Affected 
Metrics- 
moderate 
Functionality
- poor 
Best 
Practices- 
moderate 
Evidence of 
Historical 
Context, 
Internal 
Fraud, 
Disgruntled 
Employees 
DV Performing 
Moderately 
Metrics- 
moderate 
Functionality
- moderate 
Best 
Practices- 
moderate 
Evidence of 
Historical 
Context, 
Internal 
Fraud, 
Disgruntled 
Employees 
DV Metrics, 
Functionality 
Affected 
Metrics- low 
Functionality
- poor 
Best 
Practices- 
good 
Evidence of 
Historical 
Context, 
Internal 
Fraud, 
Disgruntled 
Employees 
DV Metrics 
Affected 
Metrics- low 
Functionality
- great 
Best 
Practices- 
great 
Evidence of 
Historical 
Context, 
Internal 
Fraud, 
Disgruntled 
Employees 
DV Metrics, 
Functionality and Best 
Practices Affected 
Metrics- great 
Functionality- 
Moderate 
Best Practices- 
Moderate 
Evidence of Historical 
Context, Internal 
Fraud, Disgruntled 
Employees 
Notes Despite an 
“average” 
rating, 
comments 
indicate 
fraud, 
massive 
bureaucracy 
Despite an 
“average” 
rating, 
comments 
indicate 
fraud, 
massive 
bureaucracy 
Employee 
reviews 
contained 
information 
that could be 
actionable to 
managers.  
Specific jobs 
positions and 
departments 
The 
historical 
context 
suggests 
employees of 
the State of 
GS2 at this 
time would be 
especially 
disgruntled – 
Evidence that 
an internal 
crime was 
reported via 
the hotline; 
According to 
one report, 
from 2010-
2012, 82% of 
their 
Despite an “average” 
rating, comments 
indicate fraud, 
massive bureaucracy 
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were 
referenced. 
a condition 
that is known 
to give rise 
to fraud and 
can further 
inhibit fraud 
reporting. 
complaints 
received were 
substantiated 
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Policy Implications 
There are several policy implications to this work.   If organizational 
bureaucracy can result in a hotline that performs w ell, or not, there are a 
number of important implications.  Those implicatio ns will be addressed with 
respect to functionality, transparency, rationality , and costs. 
Functionality 
 
One key policy implication of this study is that we ll functioning 
hotlines may exist in organizations with bureaupath ology, disgruntled 
employees, fraud, and other problems.  As a result,  management may have to 
determine how to alleviate bureaupathologies withou t adversely affecting 
their fraud hotlines.   
Some organizations in this study had better functio nality and best 
practice adherence, despite the presence of bureaup athology.  This finding 
demonstrates the importance for management to consi der known fraud and any 
external factors giving rise to fraud, when evaluat ing the performance of 
their hotline. According to this study, it is possi ble for organizations to 
have well-functioning hotlines despite organization al bureaucracy.   
Here, this study determined internal fraud existed regardless of the 
performance of the hotline.  However, this study di dn’t have the internal 
data to determine whether all known fraud was being  reported to the hotline.  
Internally, management can use this information to inform the performance of 
their hotline. 
Management may also be able to alleviate certain bu reaupathologies if 
it believed they are affecting employee fraud. Acco rding to the literature, 
managers can directly affect the level of bureaupat hology in a given 
organization. 
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This study determined there were unique combination s of bureaucracy and 
bureaupathology indicators in organizations. Theref ore, it is believed that 
managers can control the specific excessive bureauc racy conditions in their 
organizations, once identified.  
Bureaucracy Theory strongly supports this notion. B ureaucracy theorists 
find managers are uniquely empowered to monitor org anization conditions and 
alleviate any known excess (Tompkins, 2005). Tompki ns views this as a process 
a dynamic one, where managers are constantly adapti ng to internal and 
external organizational change (2005, p. 65). For o rganizations, Perez and 
Barkhurst (2012) recommend an “inflexible accountab ility mechanism” 
management can use to monitor and control excessive  bureaucracy (p. 168). 
General recommendations for managers to assess and control 
organizational bureaupathology include adjustments to agency personnel, 
reorganization, obtaining feedback on its performan ce from outside sources, 
and creating overlapping administrative responsibil ities. (Meier & Krause, 
2003, p. 7; Inside Bureaucracy) (Giblin, 1981) 
Transparency 
 
This study found organizations that were transparen t about their 
hotlines performed better.  This transparency is al so a part of hotline best 
practices.  Transparency into hotline complaints an d their outcomes is said 
to provide reassurance to past and potential caller s their complaints are 
heard.  As part of that transparency, it is also im portant the existence of 
the hotline is well communicated. 
For hotlines that performed better, the organizatio n shared their 
hotline statistics, complaints and outcomes with th e rest of the 
organization. This study learned that management ha s the ability to control 
the transparency of hotline data.  In the case of P S2, the hotline data was 
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previously always made transparent to the organizat ion and beyond.  When the 
internal hotline management changed in or around 20 10, the data was suddenly 
no longer available.  It would seem as though this was a management decision.  
This study noted that private sector hotline number s were not as 
readily accessible as their public sector and nonpr ofit sector counterparts.  
One reason for this is that the public sector and n onprofit organizations are 
assuming callers will originate externally whereas private sector callers do 
not.  However, callers often originate externally.   
According to available statistics, most employee ca llers call hotlines 
from outside the office and outside of business hou rs.  In addition, callers 
can be third parties (i.e. vendors, or other suppli ers) who will also likely 
seek the number externally. 
Organizations can make their hotline numbers readil y accessible to 
external users.  One of doing this is to embed gene ric keywords in the page, 
regardless of the hotline name.  Hotlines in this s tudy had many naming 
conventions.  While individual organizations have l atitude to select the name 
for their hotlines, it made it more challenging for  the number to be located.  
Some hotlines, when the term “fraud hotline” was se arched, didn’t return a 
result because the hotline, despite being a “fraud hotline” by definition, 
was known by a different name.  Hotlines should con sider embedding keywords 
in their hotline webpage or otherwise which will al low for searches for 
“fraud hotline” and similar to return their hotline  page. 
Rationality 
 
Bureaupathology theories assume employees are ratio nal actors who may 
choose not to report fraud.  The policy implication  of this finding is that 
employees can be persuaded and/or conditioned to re port internal fraud. 
Caiden’s premise of bureaupathology assumes employe es are rational actors. 
Per Caiden, employees who are exposed to excessive bureaucracy will respond 
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by “not inform[ing] on wrongdoing.” (p. 25)  Here, Caiden is assuming 
employees are making a conscious decision to withho ld information from the 
company concerning known internal fraud.  
In this study, most subject organizations didn’t re port the outcome of 
their hotline investigations (PS1, PS2, GS1, NP1). This practice is also 
consistent with bureaupathology theories, which say  that employees tend to 
conceal information. Per best practices, making hot line outcomes transparent 
can increase the likelihood of reporting. Providing  data and information 
regarding outcomes also gives confidence to the pub lic that the organization 
is well managed from an anti-fraud perspective. 
Cost  
 
This study determined management response to cost c oncerns might be 
affect hotline reporting.  An Interview with a thir d party hotline 
administrator confirmed that clients prefer to keep  costs down, and they are 
charged based on the number of reports. The GS3 hot line administrators, 
managed by this provider, documented a “complaint c ap” in their 
organizational documents and immediately following,  the number of reports 
received to their hotline dropped.  It is unknown w hether management 
implicitly or explicitly discouraged future reporti ng, and how this reduction 
was achieved.  However, the data shows that the con cerns expressed by 
management immediately preceded a steep reporting d ecline. 
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Table 35 Key  
Indices 
Bureaucracy:  (a) Hierarchy of Authority, (b) System of Rules, ( c) Technical Expertise, (d) Career Service, 
and (e) Insistence on the Rights of Office.  
 
Bureaupathology:  (f) Impersonal Treatment, (g) Prolonged Role Enact ment, (h) Resistance to Change, (i) 
Resistance to Interrogation and Investigation, and (j) Strict Reliance on Organizational Rules and 
Procedures.  
 
Functionality:  (k) marketing, (l) mechanics, (m) intake/processin g, and (n) incentives.  
 
Best practices:  (p) oversight (by high level personnel), (q) due c are (in delegating substantial 
discretionary authority), (r) effective communicati on (to all levels of employees), (s) reasonable ste ps to 
achieve compliance (which include systems for monit oring, auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing  
without fear of reprisal (t) consistent enforcement  (of compliance standards including disciplinary 
mechanisms), and (u) reasonable steps (to respond t o and prevent further similar offenses upon detecti on of 
a violation. 
  
Scales 
 
Hotline Metrics  
(1 point) High- Meets or exceeds benchmarking in ea ch year of analysis 
(3 points) Low- Does not meet benchmarking estimate s in many years of analysis 
(5 points) Poor- Does not meet benchmarking estimat es in any year of analysis 
 
Functionality Scale  
(points) 4 of 4 Failure; 3 of 4 Poor; 2 of 4 Modera te; 1 of 4 Great; 0 of 4 High 
  
Best Practices Scale  
(points) 6 of 6 Failure; 5 of 6 Poor; 4 of 6 Weak; 3 of 6 Moderate; 2 of 6 Good; 1 of 6 Great; 0 of 6 High 
 
Performance Scale  
Low: 14-15 points 
Below Average: 10-13 points 
Average: 7-9 points 
Above Average: 5-8 points 
High: 0-4 points 
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Bureaupathology Scale (by % of comments)  
11.  0-10% Present 
12.  11-20%  
13.  21-30%  
14.  31-40% 
15.  41-50% Elevated 
16.  51-60% 
17.  61-70% 
18.  71-80% 
19.  81-90% 
20.  91-100% Extreme 
Historical Context  
-Conducive to fraud if it is established that condi tions indicate there was significant employee fraud  at 
the time of analysis and it is believed to have bee n underreported via the hotline 
-Conductive to increased calls if it is established  that conditions indicate the hotline should have b een 
getting a higher volume of calls, or if it is deter mined employees are underreporting 
-Not conducive to fraud if it is established that c onditions indicate there was not significant employ ee 
fraud at the time of the analysis and it is not bel ieved to be underreported via the hotline 
-Not conducive to increased calls if it is establis hed that conditions indicate the hotline was receiv ing 
the proper amount of calls, or if it is determined employees have reported crimes via the hotline
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Study Limitations 
The limitations of the study included purposive sam pling methods, non-
probability sampling methods, representation, absen ce of hotline data, 
aggregated benchmarking data, absence of reporting documentation, the use of 
social media data and internal fraud reporting limi tations.   
Purposive Sampling Methods 
 
This collective case study was limited to include t he case study 
analysis of six hotlines whose data was accessible.   While research efforts 
were made to include organizations of varying secto rs, types and sizes, via 
purposive sampling method, the scope was largely li mited by the ability of 
the study to obtain the data from the public domain . 
Non-Probability Sampling Methods 
 
Another limitation is this study used a non-probabi lity sampling 
method.  The study used a purposive sampling method .  Specifically, of those 
limited hotlines for which data was available, the researcher used judgment 
to include a variety of organizations. Although it is a non-probability 
sampling method, the use of purposive sampling is a ppropriate in a study 
where the data is limited and the sample being anal yzed is small and when the 
subject is challenging to locate. (Bernard, 2012)  In fact, qualitative 
researcher Barnard finds that sampling “almost alwa ys” has to be used when 
“studying hard-to-find populations.” (2012, p. 166)  
Representation 
 
Another limitation, inherent in case study research , is the challenge 
of representation.  According to Stake, while “a sa mple of just a few is 
unlikely to be a strong representation of others. C ase study research is not 
sampling research.  We do not study a case to under stand other cases.  Our 
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first obligation is to understand this one case.” ( 1995, p. 4) Stake finds 
the most important criteria in selecting subjects f or case studies is to 
“maximize what we can learn.” (Stake, 1995, p. 4)  Here, despite the limited 
availability of data, case subjects were selected w ith an eye towards gaining 
a varied perspective (small, large financial firm; city, state and federal 
government, non profit organization). 
Data Limitations 
 
Hotline Data 
 
There are several limitations of this study that sh ould be noted.  
First, one limitation was a lack of available hotli ne data.  Due to an 
absence of reporting requirements, individual level  hotline data is not 
widely available.  In the private sector, it is qui te limited ,  as it is 
largely not reported in the public domain and is of ten restricted internally.  
When interviewed, private sector hotline administra tors advised they had 
discretion in deciding whether their hotline inform ation would be reported in 
the public domain.  Public sector data is somewhat less scarce, but it is not 
consistently reported in the public domain, and the  availability and 
granularity of the data varies wildly based on the agency.   
Aggregated Benchmarking Data 
 
Another limitation was the absence of disaggregated  data for 
benchmarking purposes in the financial sector.  The  leading benchmarking 
reports do not disaggregate the data from the finan cial sector, but rather 
group it with the real estate and insurance industr ies.  When asked, the 
company (The Network) would not provide disaggregat ed data for research (or 
any) purpose.  As a result, the data used to benchm ark the financial industry 
hotlines included the statistics from all three sec tors.   
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A limitation also exists in the time frame of the h otline data.  
Ideally, the time period for all six hotlines’ data  would correspond to 
foster comparison analysis.  However, one hotline’s  data, PS1’s, was from a 
limited time period (2006-2007).  Due to availabili ty constraints, this 
limitation could not be overcome.  Nevertheless, th e data period is research-
relevant in that it represents the first two years of that hotline’s 
operation.  It was also the time period leading up to the financial crisis. 
Absence of Supporting Documentation 
 
Another data limitation is the absence of supportin g documentation. 
While the raw data concerning the number of calls i n a given time period was 
located, supporting documentation, which could illu minate the time when the 
call/tip was received, the nature of complaint, fin al resolution, etc., is 
confidential and thus unavailable for research purp oses.  While this is a 
limitation in a qualitative study, it is a limitati on inherent in a study of 
an unregulated and largely confidential process. 
Another limitation, due to the lack of available da ta, is the inability 
of this study to determine certain hotline reportin g limitations and process 
flaws.  For instance, available data will not clari fy which hotline calls 
failed to illuminate a major fraud.  Likewise, it i s impossible to ascertain 
the complainants whose data was perhaps mishandled or erroneously categorized 
as non-urgent. For instance, while a complaint rega rding an employee who 
appeared to be “living beyond their means” or “disg runtled” or “does not take 
vacation” could seem innocuous to one hotline repre sentative, to another, it 
could be seen as a fraud indicator (and research su ggests all of these 
attributes can indicate fraud).  This study will al so not be able to identify 
potential complainants who decided not to come forw ard with information.  
Absence of Reported Outcomes 
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This study determined outcomes of fraud hotline rep orts are not 
consistently reported back to the third party provi der.  As a result, it is 
challenging to gauge the effectiveness of the hotli ne in terms of its ability 
to receive high quality complaints (those resulting  in a conviction, etc.).  
When analyzing the key industry benchmarking data, this study learned they 
did not have a single recorded conviction resulting  from any of the hotlines 
they manage.  This statistic is problematic, as it may not be accurate, due 
to a lack of reporting on the part of the client or ganizations. 
Fraud Data 
 
This study noted the challenge of obtaining interna l company fraud 
statistics in the public domain.  Here, the lack of  fraud data made it 
difficult to determine the true state of employee f raud and crime. As a 
result, this study was unable to say definitively w hether the hotline was 
preventing and detecting all known internal crime. 
Incomplete white-collar crime data is a limitation that is well 
documented in the law enforcement/research communit y (Steffensmeier, 1989; 
Barnett, 2000; Bookman, 2007; U.S. Department of Ju stice, 2009) and 
consequently, is also a limitation in this study. 
The fraud data used in this study consisted of inte rnal frauds reported 
in the public domain.  However, that data is not as sumed to be a complete and 
accurate source of internal fraud in a given organi zation. Internal frauds 
are not always reported in the public domain, and a re often not reflected in 
hotline data.  It is believed that organizations ar e aware of additional 
internal frauds, and this data (housed privately in  their legal, compliance, 
human resources, or other departments) is not avail able to researchers.  
Social Media Data 
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Another limitation is this study’s use of existing social media data.  
Ideally, researchers would have access to employees  and have the ability to 
conduct interviews, rather than use existing data.  However, in this study, 
such interviews were not possible.   
There are limitations inherent in online reviews, i ncluding the 
possibility of falsified data (from a competitor, e tc.).  As a result, a 
certain margin of error can be expected. However, i n this study, the reviews 
were found be significantly detailed, which makes t hem less likely to have 
been fabricated.  Workers also discussed company sp ecifics, which would be 
unknown to those outside the company.  
Nevertheless, there is a possibility for bias or fa lse reviews.  In 
this study, sample sets for PS1 and PS2 consisted o f reviews that were below 
average for that organization.  Here, this limitati on reduces the likelihood 
the review has been created by the company or their  agent (as their review is 
unlikely to be negative). Additionally, it was beli eved this sample set of 
respondents would be more likely to have communicat ed the company might 
exhibit signs of excessive bureaucracy.  The level of “bureaucracy” and 
excessive bureaucracy, or bureaupathic behaviors we re examined together, as 
laypersons often use the word “bureaucracy” with a negative connotation.  
Therefore, when examining employee comments, this w as considered a negative 
term. 
Using existing review data as an information source , in certain 
qualitative studies, such as this study, is both a necessity and an 
advantage.  Anonymous reviews contain candid inform ation.  The website 
Glassdoor is also a known forum for employees to sh are grievances.  
Researchers may not have been able to glean this in formation in a traditional 
interview format.  
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While a certain margin of error can be expected.  H owever, overall, the 
research community cannot invalidate anonymous onli ne reviews because in this 
case, to do so, would serve to invalidate the entir e spirit of an anonymous 
hotline, which operates entirely based on anonymous  comments. 
 
 
Future Research 
The following recommendations for future research c an serve to further 
solidify and expand upon the existing knowledge bas e concerning fraud 
hotlines and build upon what was learned in this st udy. 
Additional Case Studies 
 
This case study has gleaned some important findings  about fraud 
hotlines. However, replication, via additional case  studies, will further 
expand upon these findings.  Further case studies w ill serve to further 
establish what this study learned about individual hotlines, the state of 
organizational bureaucracy, the role of the individ ual manager, and the 
effects of organizational bureaucracy on fraud hotl ine performance and on 
organizational fraud.   
The replication of this study in additional organiz ations may also 
yield additional important findings about the prese nce of particular 
bureaucracy and bureaupathology indicators in other  organization types (i.e., 
federal government organizations), which could not be concluded in this study 
due to its use of single organization types (i.e., nonprofit). 
Content Analysis 
 
When analyzing the individual hotlines, it was note d they varied 
greatly in the way they were named and marketed.  O ne potential area of 
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expansion for this study would be to further explor e those differences.  This 
analysis could include a content analysis of variou s individual hotline 
websites, their hotline naming conventions, means o f communication and 
advertisement and further explore the relationship between that content and 
the performance of their hotline. 
Another interesting finding in this study was the u niqueness, and 
similarities in particular bureaucracy and bureaupa thology indicators in 
social media data.  Also significant was the mentio n by employees of crime in 
their organizations.  Further analysis of this cont ent could yield important 
outcomes. 
Transparency 
 
This study noted that many organizations, even thos e who adhered well 
to best practices, often didn’t offer transparency into their hotline data, 
their complaints, or their outcomes.  Many organiza tions didn’t report follow 
up investigations and outcomes of hotline reports. Transparency into hotline 
data is recommended as a part of best practices, be cause it can give the 
potential complainant confidence their complaint wi ll be handled. 
It is believed complainants to the SEC whistleblowe r hotline may 
believe their complaints are not being handled appr opriately due to a lack of 
disclosure in this regard.  Thus it would be of int erest to query to the 
population of complainants to that hotline to see i f that is in fact true. 
White Collar Crime Metric 
 
This study acknowledged the challenge in determinin g white-collar crime 
levels in organizations. While scholars have previo usly acknowledged this 
limitation, little has been done to close this rese arch gap.  
Here, the white-collar crime metric was challenging  to determine, and 
the results are incomplete.  The researcher had to rely on media reports and 
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other third party documentation to determine organi zational crime.  Much of 
the internal crime in organizations is not reported  outside the organization.  
Thus it is assumed the level of crime, if known, wo uld be higher than what 
was determined in this study. 
Therefore today, the organizations themselves are t he only party that 
will ever know for certain whether their hotlines a re truly catching all of 
their organizational crime.  Future research effort s in the area of fraud 
hotlines could include collaboration with individua l organizations, which 
could be done anonymously, to analyze this data and  determine the true 
assessment of their hotline in preventing a and det ecting crime in their 
organization.    
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